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THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE: ONE HOPE
FOR CONGRESS TO REGAIN PARITY OF
POWER WITH THE PRESIDENT
TaomAS D. MoRGANI
In recent years Congress has seen its role in policy-making eroded
at an ever-increasing rate. A war it had not declared and could not
end initiated the calls for Congress to reassert its authority. President
Nixon's impounding of appropriated funds, although not the first pres-
idential assertion of this power,' has further intensified congressional
concern.
Forty years of decline in congressional influence will not be stayed
overnight. Nor will a single change in congressional procedures ac-
complish instant parity. Even if Congress' will can be expressed, en-
forcement of that will is likely to remain a problem.2 It seems, how-
ever, that a significant part of Congress' problem is its relative inability
to acquire and assimilate information about existing federal programs,
new executive proposals, and alternatives that might be preferable to
both.
Formal congressional investigations can never be more than a
partial answer. The time of a Senator or Representative is a scace
resource, and committee hearings usually consume far more of it than
the information developed warrants. More important than formal hear-
ings, Congress needs the capacity to conduct periodic reviews and
analyses of low-level agency operations that determine how programs
really work and whether services are being delivered.
No radical change in procedure is required to obtain this infor-
mation. Congress now has an institution, if it will use it, through
t Associate Professor of Law, the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
College of Law. Special thanks go to Mr. Paul Shnitzer, Associate General Counsel of
the GAO, Mr. B.Z. Goodwin, Deputy General Counsel of the Air Force, and his
predecessor, Mr. William Munves, for making materials available during my research.
Errors of interpretation of those materials are of course my own.
1. President Kennedy, for example, asserted this authority in a celebrated battle
with Congress over production of the RS-70 manned bomber. See Davis, Congres-
sional Power to Require Defense Expenditures, 33 FoRn. L. Rav. 39 (1964); Fisher,
Funds Impounded by the President: The Constitutional Issue, 38 GFo. WASH. L. Rv.
124 (1969). See generally Comment, Executive Impounding of Funds: The Judicial
Response, 40 U. Cm. L. RPV. 328 (1973).
2. Possible roles for the General Accounting Office in enforcement of congre4-
sional intent are discussed in text 4ccompanying notes 8$-90 infra,
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which to keep informed. That agency is the General Accounting Office
(GAO), headed by the Comptroller General of the United States.8
THE ORIGINS OF THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, 4 which created the
GAO,5 was considered in an atmosphere not unlike the present. World
War I had just ended. In fiscal year 1914 the entire federal budget
had been just over one billion dollars. By fiscal year 1920, however,
largely as a result of inflation and military spending, expenditures were
projected to be over 10.8 billion dollars. Congress was smarting be-
cause of public criticism of its inability to bring spending under control.
It determined that part of the fault lay in the system, of executive
budget submissions by individual agencies:
[Tlhe Secretary of the Treasury. . . has no power to ... coor-
dinate the services of the several bureaus or to prevent duplications
in the service. Bureaus under different executive departments do-
ing similar work are thus stimulated in a spirit of rivalry, and so
far as the estimates that come to Congress go, no one coordinates
or attempts to coordinate the various activities of the several de-
partments.6
Three complementary changes were proposed in this system. First,
a Bureau of the Budget (now called the Office of Management and
3. The General Accounting Office has about three thousand professional em-
ployees of whom about one hundred are attorneys. 1972 COMp. GEN. ANN. REP. 149.
It has field offices in sixteen States and four foreign cities. Nevertheless it remains
one of the most anonymous of Government institutions. The present Comptroller
General is Elmer B. Staats, appointed in 1966 for a fifteen-year term. He has spent
most of his career in federal service and was Deputy Director of -the Bureau of the
Budget under Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson. The G.A.O.
REv., Summer, 1971, at 186-87.
The preeminent book on the General Accounting Office is still H. MANSFIELD,
THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL (1939) [hereinafter cited as MANSFIEL]. It was preceded
by two shorter studies by a predecessor to the Brookings Institution, D. SMITH, THE
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE: ITS HISTORY, AcIrivnus & ORGANIZATION (1927)
[hereinafter cited as SMITH]; W.F. WILLOUGHBY, THE LEGAL STATUS & FUNCTIONS OF
THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE OF TIE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT (1927) [hereinafter
cited as WILLOUGHBY]. Two more recent books on the GAO are R. BROWN, THE
G.A.O.: UNTAPPED SOURCE OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER (1970); MACHINERY & ALIED
PRODUCTS INSTITUTE, THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR AND THE GENERAL AccOUNTING
OFFICE (1966) [hereinafter cited as MAPI STUDY].
4. 31 U.S.C. §§ 1-60, 71, 471, 581, 581a (1970).
5. Id. § 41.
6. 58 CONG. REC. 7083 (1919) (remarks of Congressman Good). See also id.
at 7087 (remarks of Congressman Byrnes); id. at 7092 (remarks of Congressman
Madden); id. at 7096-99 (remarks of Congressman French); id. at 7201-03 (remarks
of Congressman Williams); id. at 7222-23 (remarks of Congressman Hastings); 59
CONG. REc. 6353 (1920) (remarks of Senator Jones). A good history of the budget
and accounting process before 1921 can be found in MANSFIELD 23-65; SMrrH 1-58.
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Budget) was proposed to put absolute responsibility for the budget es-
timates on the President. Secondly, changes were offered in the House
rules providing for creation of a single Committee on Appropriations
to replace the eight individual committees theretofore considering
budget requests.* Thirdly and more important "than any [other]
single step we could possibly take," an "accounting department," ul-
timately called the General Accounting Office, was created to be re-
sponsible only to Congress. It was to audit all expenditures and report
any payments which were wasteful or not in accordance with law.
The House was promised "a wonderful change."
The officers and employees of this department will at all times be
going into the separate departments in the examination of their
accounts. They will discover the very facts that Congress ought
to be in possession of and can fearlessly and without fear of re-
moval present these facts to Congress and its committees.
8
The effect of the General Accounting Office, as far as it has gone,
has indeed been positive. Its reports to Congress on the administra-
tion of programs, while sometimes criticized by the offices under in-
vestigation, are widely regarded as objective and non-partisan and are
7. Technically, this was not part of the Budget and Accounting Act because a
change in House rules does not require the approval of the Senate or the President.
The proposal was, however, treated as part of the package of reforms proposed.
58 CoNG. REc. 7084 (1919) (remarks of Congressman Good); id. at 7126-27 (re-
marks of Congressman Taylor); id. at 7209-10 (remarks of Congressman Temple).
8. 58 CoNG. Rnc. 7085 (1919) (remarks of Congressman Good). See also id.
at 7095 (remarks of Congressman Howard); id. at 7215 (remarks of Congressman
Purnell); id. at 7219 (remarks of Congressman Mandell).
The Special Committee on the Budget had been impressed by and sought to emu-
late the office of the British comptroller and auditor general. Congressman Good
waxed eloquent in often-quoted words. "If the comptroller and auditor general of the
British House of Commons is the 'real guardian, on behalf of the House of Com-
mons, of the purse of the nation,' the comptroller general provided for under this bill
will become the real guardian of the Treasury of the United States." Id. at 7085
(emphasis added). See also id. at 7088-89, 7901 (remarks of Congressman Bymes);
81 CONG. RFc. 652-56 (1937) (remarks of Congressman Wadsworth recalling cir-
cumstances of creation of the General Accounting Office).
The following story was repeated several times during the debates and illustrates
the basis of the concern for independence of the executive. "President [Cleveland]
desired to use a certain appropriation for a given purpose, and was told by his Comp-
troller of the Treasury ...that he could not do it. But the President insisted and
finally said, 'I must have the fund, and if I cannot change the opinion of my comp-
troller, I can change my Comptroller.' . . . Now, we propose to change that." 61
CONG. R.c. 982 (1921) (remarks of Congressman Good).
In order to achieve this independence, the Comptroller General was given a
fifteen-year term and made removable before that time only by impeachment or a
"concurrent resolution" of Congress for named causes. The bill was passed first in
1920, 59 CONG. Rnc. 7956 (1920), but it was vetoed by President Wilson who consid-
ered it unconstitutional to deny the President the right to remove someone he ap-
pointed, 59 CoNa. REc. 8609 (1920); see, e.g., WiLLouGHBY 7-16.
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often the basis for constructive changef As a measure of its impar-
tiality, in recent years specific new challenges have been given to the
GAO, notably administration of the extraordinarily sensitive Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971.10 As one writer put it, at a time
9. In Fiscal Year 1972, a total of 948 formal audit reports were issued, about
the same number as in other recent years. 1972 Comp. GEN. ANN. REP. 166. A
summary of the findings and recommendations can be found each year in the Ap-
pendix to the Comptroller General's Annual Report. Some representative titles should
suggest the variety of types of studies conducted. U.S. Comp. GEN., AcQuismoN oF
MAJOR WEAPON SYSTEMS, Comp. Gen. Rep. No. B-163058 (July 17, 1972); U.S.
CoMP. GEN., DEFENSE bINusTRy PoFrr STUDy, Comtp. Gen. Rep. No. B-159896
(March 17, 1971); U.S. CoMi. GEN., EFFEcTnVENEss AND ADMINiSTRATIoN OF THE
CoMMUNITY ACTION PRoGRAM UNDER TrLE II OF THE ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY Acr
OF 1964, Comp. Gen. Rep. No. B-130515 (March 18, 196); U.S. COMP. GEN.,
MANAGEMENT OF FEDERALLY FINANCED RESEARCH By THE UNvERSmy OF MIcHOaAN-A
CAsE STUDY, Comp. Gen. Rep. No. B-117219 (Sept 25, 1970); U.S. CoM. GuN.,
PROJECrED COSTS OF T=E INDOCHINA WAR, Comp. Gen. Rep. No. B-169832 (Aug. 28,
1970); U.S. CoMIp. GEN., SuRvEy OF THE APPLICATION OF THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICY
OF SELF-INSURAN CE, Comp. Gen. Rep. No. B-168016 (June 14, 1972); U.S. COMP.
GEN., TIGHTER CONTROL NEEDED ON OCCUPANCY OF FEDERALLY SUBSIIZED HousING,
Comp. Gen. Rep. No. B-114860 (Jan. 20, 1971). The GAO's latest technique is the
use of "should cost" analysis to determine the proper price of an item. See U.S.
COmp. GEN., INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT REVIEWS OF DEFENSE CONTRACTORS' OPERA-
TIONS, Comp. Gen. Rep. No. B- ( 1973).
Of course not everyone agrees that the GAO is objective and helpful. For ex-
ample, audit reports have been described as "inevitably characterized by a lack of
knowledge and sympathy with respect to administrative .. . problems." MoDiar-
mid, Reorganization of the General Accounting Office, 31 AM. POL. Sm. Rnv. 508,
511 (1937). Another has said, "[We note increasing tendencies toward an insuffer-
able self-righteousness." 108 CONG. REc. 16,278 (1962) (remarks of Rep. Clem
Miller). Professor Cibinic says the Comptroller General is accused of being "a 'second
guesser with 20/20 hindsight,' the little man wearing a green eye shade gleefully
hunting for errors and improprieties long after transactions have been completed."
Cibinic & Laskin, The Comptroller General and Government Contracts, 38 Guo.
WASH. L. REv. 349 (1970) (hereinafter cited as Cibinic & Lasken). By way of
illustration, a private attorney complains, "Audit reports never mention contracts, pro-
cedures or procurement practices which are satisfactory ... [AO's] practice is to
single out some item . . .which could have been handled differently with alleged
savings to the Government. .. Many believe the GAO audit reports are needlessly
undermining public confidence in government procurement and damaging the reputa-
tion of government contractors." Beach, Role of the General Accounting Office in
the Regulation of Industry, 21 Bus. LAWYER 235, 237-38 (1965). See also MAPI
STUDY 76-79. At the other extreme, Ralph Nader has charged that the GAO hired
as an outside consultant to study failings in certain programs, the very accounting firm
which had designed cost control for the programs in the first place. Chicago Sun-
Times, Sept. 28, 1972, at 14, col. 1. Cf. Meyers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926)
discussed infra at text accompanying n.87. Congress failed to override the veto but the
bill was passed in the next session of Congress and signed by President Harding
after the removal language was changed to "by joint resolution of Congress ...
[for named causes or] by impeachment." 31 U.S.C. § 43 (1970). For an extensive
discussion of the issues see MANSFILD 65-70, 74-92; WILLOUGHBY 1-16; MAPI
STUDY 22-25.
10. 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 431-54 (Supp. 1973). The Comptroller General's most sensi-
tive task is acting as "supervisory officer" under subchapter I, "Disclosure of Federal
Campaign Funds," id. §§ 431-42. See Up from Green Eyeshades, NEwswuEK, Sept.
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when the remark was a high compliment, "On Capitol Hill, the Comp-
troller General is accorded a deference comparable to that given the
Director of the FBI."'"
In the half-century of its existence, the responsibilities of the
General Accounting Office have expanded far beyond "going into the
separate departments in the examination of their accounts." Most im-
portantly, from early in the GAO's history the Comptroller General
has asserted the power to determine the "legality" of executive pro-
grams and to cut off funds for any not meeting his approval. Some
of the practices derived from this assertion of power are based on du-
bious authority, represent questionable policy, and tend to distract the
GAO from the work through which it can be most useful to Congress.
This article proposes changes to help the GAO become a more ef-
fective agent in Congress' effort to play a major role in policy-making.
ADIm1 NISTRATIVE CONTROL BY AUDIT
The Traditional Financial Audit
Government financial audit procedure has changed somewhat
since 1921 but it is still conceptually the same. Each agency pays its
bills through persons called "disbursing officers." Such officers may
be, but usually are not, in policy-making positions in their agencies.
These officers, in turn, submit to periodic accountings of their receipts
and expenditures in internal or administrative audits. If all is found
in order the agency's accounts are transmitted to the General Account-
ing Office for review. 2
11, 1972, at 22. See also GAO Investigating Secret Gift of $200,000 to Nixon Cam-
paign, N.Y. Times, March 1, 1973, at 1, col. 2.
11. J. HAI RS, CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION 160 (1964). For
two specific illustrations of this deference, see Hearings on the Capability of G.A.O.
to Analyze and Audit Defense Expenditures Before the Subcomm. on Executive
Reorganization of the Senate Comm. on Gov't. Operations, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at
1-26 (1969); Hearings Pursuant to S. Con. Res. 2 Before the Joint Comm. on the
Organization of the Congress, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 9, at 1363-1413 (1965;.
12. The most thorough discussion of this subject is provided by SENATE COMM.
ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT IN TE FEDERAL GOV'T, S. Doc. NO.
11, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); SENATE CoMM. ON Gov'T OPERATIONS, FINANCIAL
MANAGEMENT IN THE FEDERAL Gov'T, S. Doc. No. 92-50, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
See also MANSFIELD 121-44, 178-97; WILLouGHBY 22-38, 147-58; 58 CoNG. REC.
7199-200 (1919). A good comparison of British and American practice is provided
in Goldberg, Legislative Control over Expenditures, THE G.A.O. REv., Spring 1971,
at 40.
In fact, today the volume of transactions has led to the use of statistical sampling
procedures in audit of vouchers under $100. 2 S. Doe. No. 92-50, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1971).
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At this point, three deceptively simple provisions come into play.
The first two were originally passed in 1817 and 1868, respectively,
and were continued in the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. First,
section 305 of the Act provides:
All claims and demands whatever by the Government of the
United States or against it, and all accounts whatever in which the
government of the United States is concerned, either as debtor or
creditor, shall be settled and adjusted in the General Accounting
Office.1
3
Secondly, section 304 states: "Balances certified by the General Ac-
counting Office, upon the settlement of public accounts, shall be final
and conclusive upon the Executive Branch of the Government. ... 1
Finally Congress also provided in section 304: "All powers and duties
which on June 30, 1921, were conferred or imposed by law upon the
Comptroller of the Treasury. . . shall. . . be vested in and imposed
Further, some agencies have been given specific exemption from GAO audit.
E.g., 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1970) (Veterans Administration); see R. BRowN, supra
note 3; 1965 CoMP. GEN. ANN. REP. 331-34. See also Patman, Passman and the
G.A.O., Wall St. J., Sept. 22, 1972, at 10, col. 1, criticizing the attempt to subject the
Federal Reserve Board to GAO audit alleging that it is an attempt to get legislative
control of an independent entity.
13. 31 U.S.C. § 71 (1970). This section was originally adopted as Act of
March 3, 1817, ch. 45, § 2, 3 Stat. 366: "[AII claims and demands whatever, by the
United States or against them, and all accounts whatever, in which the United States
are concerned, either as debtors or as creditors shall be settled and adjusted in the
Treasury Department." See 58 CONG. PEac. 7287-88 (1919) (explanation by Congress-
man Good).
14. 31 U.S.C. § 74 (1970). This provision was originally adopted as Act of
March 30, 1868, ch. 36, 15 Stat. 54: "The balances . . . stated by the Auditor and
certified to the heads of Departments by the Comptrollers of the Treasury, upon the
settlement of public accounts, shall not be subject to be changed or modified by the
heads of Departments, but shall be conclusive upon the executive branch of the Gov-
ernment, and be subject to revision only by Congress or the proper courts." At the
same time, Congress made clear that the Act of March 3, 1817, ch. 45, § 2, 3 Stat.
366, quoted note 13 supra, "shall not be construed to authorize the heads of depart-
ments to change or modify the balances that may be certified to them by . . . the
comptroller of the treasury, but that such balances ... shall be ... final and conclu-
sive upon the executive branch of the government." Act of March 30, 1868, ch. 36,
15 Stat. 54. These sections were passed in order to let Treasury officers force the
War Department to pay bonuses due Civil War veterans. Cibinic & Lasken 355-58.
From this particularized beginning came the language of broad applicability we have
today.
In the Senate version of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1919 (the Act vetoed
by President Wilson), provision was made for a Board of Appeals to hear objections
to settlement of particular claims. 59 CoNG. REc. 6353 (1920). The provision was
deleted in conference. Id. at 7721. The appellate function was apparently to cor-
respond to the purely appellate role the Comptroller of the Treasury had performed,
between 1894 and 1921, which was designed to get consistency among the rulings of
the six auditors who headed branches under him. Act of July 31, 1894, ch. 174,
§ 8, 28 Stat. 208. See also 26 CoNG. REc. 7474 (1894) (remarks of Senator Sherman).
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upon the General Accounting Office and be exercised without direction
from any other office."' 5
For purposes of these provisions, according to the Comptroller
General, "[tihe word 'settle' means to ascertain and pay while 'adjust'
means to determine the amount due. .. ."I" If a disbursing officer's
accounts are found in order, the balances are "certified." If, however,
certain payments have been made improperly, an "exception" will be
stated and such payments will be "disallowed" by the General Account-
ing Office. If the Comptroller General cannot be persuaded to change
his mind, recovery of the payment is sought first from the payee.17
If it cannot be recovered in that way, the Department of Justice is re-
quired by law to bring suit against the disbursing officer personally
to make the Treasury whole.'
If this procedure were limited to disallowing payments made cul-
pably or negligently it would not be worthy of special note, but it has
not been so limited by the Comptroller General. "Illegal" payments
have been disallowed as well. In this context, "illegal" means any
payment made under an interpretation of statute or law different from
that of the Comptroller General.
A good illustration, but only one of many, is provided by Comp-
troller General McCarl's first vigorous assertion of this power. 19 The
Federal Employee's Compensation Commission had determined to pay
compensation to workers for diseases brought on by several years'
work under unhealthful conditions. Only a year after taking office, in
July 1922, Comptroller General McCarl informed the Commission that
compensation could be paid only for personal injury, not such occu-
pational diseases. He refused to pay certain vouchers without docu-
15. 31 U.S.C. § 44 (1964).
16. 4 CoMP. GEN. 404, 405 (1924). But see 58 CONG. RFc. 7129-30 (1919)
(colloquy between Congressman Linthieum and Congressman Taylor). Those of the
Comptroller General's opinions which are deemed most important are published in
annual volumes cited herein as Comp. GEN. The vast majority of decisions, however,
are unpublished and only available (free of charge) from the Reference Department of
the GAO. In spite of this, the GAO has held all agencies bound to follow all deci-
sions, whether published or not. 28 Coms,. GEN. 69 (1948).
17. A voluntary refund will be sought first from the payee, but failing that the
Comptroller General may set off the "debt" against a payment currently due the con-
tractor on the same or another contract. United States v. Munsey Trust Co., 332
U.S. 234 (1947); United States v. Cohen, 389 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1967). But cf.
United States v. Isthmian S.S. Co., 359 U.S. 314 (1959) (admiralty case). If set-off
is impossible, the matter may be referred for action by the Justice Department.
See D. PACE, NEGOTmATON AND MANAGEmENT oF DEuNsa CoNRmrs 38 (1970).
18. 31 U.S.C. § 505 (1970).
19. 2 ComP. GEN. 6 (1922).
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mentation that the payments had been for disease traceable to specific
injuries. The Commission argued that its own findings were con-
trolling on the issue of cause, but the Comptroller General disagreed.
Any time the spending of money is involved, he said, the decision
of the Comptroller General is final.20
The Commission then took the position that the executive agencies
are to follow the opinions of the Attorney General, not Congress'
agent, the Comptroller General. The Attorney General in this case
had held that the Comptroller General was wrong and that his opinion
need not be followed.2 1 This led to Comptroller General McCarl's fa-
mous "declaration of independence," written directly to President Hard-
ing:
I am always pleased to consider most carefully the views of any
interested branch of the Government in connection with any matter
before me or in support of a proper request for reconsideration of
action taken, but I may not accept the opinion of any official, in-
clusive of the Attorney General, as controlling of my duty under
the law.22
The Commission stood firm, so the Comptroller General disal-
lowed over ten thousand dollars on the accounts of the disbursing offi-
cer (who of course was not a member of the Commission), took action
to recover the disallowances from his surety, and withheld payments
to him of any further sums.2 3
When the Commission proposed a court test of the issue, McCarl
responded with what was undoubtedly his most extraordinary assertion
of authority:
The question as to the right and duty of the accounting officers
...to refuse to allow credit . . . for payments made in direct
contravention of decisions of the Comptroller General of the
United States is not a question which properly may be submitted
to and determined by any court.24
That statement became and apparently still remains GAO doctrine.
A GAO attorney rationalized the position this way:
The Constitution expressly reserves to the legislative department
of the government, as against both the executive and judicial de-
partments, control over all moneys in the Treasury of the United
20. 2 ComP. GEN. 225 (1922).
21. 33 Op. ATr'Y GEN. 476 (1923).
22. 2 CoM. GEN. 784, 787 (1923).
23. 3 Coie. GEN. 497 (1924).
24. 3 Cobe. GEN. 545, 548 (1924).
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States .... [Tif judicial precedents were imperatively binding
on the accounting officers, money would be drawn from the Treas-
ury not only by appropriations made by law but by precedents
established by courts .... 25
Comptroller General McCarl attempted again and again to control
the executive by audit. He spawned countless controversies over such
questions as whether prosthetic appliances such as artificial eyes and
limbs constituted "reasonable medical . . . supplies" for which the
25. McGuire, The Accounting Officers of the United States and Judicial Prece-
dents, 19 ILL. L. RBv. 523, 531-32 (1925). The most articulate assertion of this posi-
tion had been by Comptroller of the Treasury Lawrence in Meigs' Res Adjudicata
Case, VI U.S. First Comptroller's Dec. 220, 244 (1885), refusing to follow Meigs v.
United States, 19 Ct. Cl. 497 (1884). Comptroller Lawrence had been willing to
abide by decisions of the United States Supreme Court, "the most learned and able
judicial body of this or any other country," but argued that the decisions of lower
courts might be "erroneous" and conflicting. See also WiLLouGmmY 159-70. A di-
rectly contrary view of the Comptroller General's duty is taken in Langeluttig, Legal
Status of the Comptroller General of the United States, 23 ILL. L. REv. 556, 583-87
(1929).
Probably the best impartial analysis is in Mansfield, ludicial Review of the
Comptroller General, 20 CoRNELL L.Q. 459 (1935). Mansfield explains that the
Comptroller General was never permitted to appear in the Court of Claims to defend
his position, and he considered the Attorney General often to be working at cross-
purposes with him. As a result he considered many Court of Claims precedents to
be bad law and refused to follow them. Id. at 470.
Not surprisingly, the Court of Claims disagreed as to the GAO's authority, and
the controversy led to outbursts like the following from the Court:
This question has repeatedly, in previous cases, been decided in favor of the
plaintiff ... . There is no reason why the plaintiff should have been put to
the expense of bringing suit to recover what is unquestionably due him except
the arbitrary action of the General Accounting Office in refusing to follow
the law as it has been announced by the court in previous decisions. McCabe
v. United States, 84 Ct. Cl. 291, 292 (1936). 'The excuse for not mak-
ing payment is stated by the Acting Comptroller General in a letter that is
singularly free from any suspicion of logic." Belcher v. United States, 94
Ct. Cl. 137, 140 (1941).
The GAO rarely asserts this position today. But see Shnitzer, The United States
General Accounting Office, 2 WEsT's FEDERAL PRACnCE MANuAL § 1701, at 151
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Shnitzer]. Mr. Shnitzer is Associate General Counsel of
the GAO and his statements of policy and practice are reliable and authoritative.
He describes lower court opinions as only "persuasive" to the GAO, not "binding"
Shnitzer § 1732.
By way of illustration, the Court of Claims held in Tracy v. United States, 142
F. Supp. 943 (Ct. Cl. 1956), that a disabled serviceman's retirement pay is to be
computed on the basis of his permanent rank rather than his temporary rank. The
Comptroller General criticized the decision and refused to follow it, 36 CoMp. GEN.
628 (1957), but after the Court of Claims held the same way in two later cases the
Comptroller General gave in, 37 CoM1,. GEN. 585 (1958). A court decision in the
specific case before the GAO, however, is conceded to bind the Comptroller General
under the doctrine of "estoppel by judgment." 36 CoMP. GEN. 628 (1957); Sbnitzer
§ 1733.
A fascinating recent assertion of this independence is Comp. Gen. Dec. No. B-
175004 (Oct. 12, 1972) (unpublished), which asserts that findings of fact and con-
clusions of law of a district court in a bid protest are not binding upon the GAO, nor
even entitled to comity. The case is put in oApxt in t#xt 4ccompanying notes infra,
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Government might pay.2 6  In one case he forbade purchase of dis-
count bridge-toll coupon books as an illegal "advance payment" in
spite of a fifty percent saving.27  Further, in one of many confronta-
tions with President Roosevelt he ruled that the Department of Agricul-
ture could not relocate farmers as part of a New Deal emergency relief
program.
28
The Comptroller General argued that he was not forcing account-
able officers to act completely at their peril, since Congress had pro-
vided:
Disbursing officers, or the head of any executive department,
or other establishment not under any of the executive departments
may apply for and the Comptroller General shall render his de-
cision upon any question involving a payment to be made by them
or under them, which decision, when rendered, shall govern the
General Accounting Office in passing upon the account containing
said disbursement.
29
The effect of this advance opinion provision, however, is even
more to require that executive agencies obtain and follow the Comp-
troller General's interpretation of what the law requires. The provision
gave the Comptroller General the theoretical basis effectively to require
advance approval of every payment by a federal agency. The inci-
dents of GAO involvement in executive decisions were often trivial in
themselves but led to a situation in which
26. 5 CoN,. Gm. 688 (1926), afj'g 5 CoMP. Gm. 301 (1925), and rejecting
35 Op. ATr'y. GEN. 36 (1926).
27. Unpublished decision described in MeDiarmid, supra note 9, at 511 n.12.
28. See 40 Op. ATr'y. GEN. 193 (1942), citing Comp. Gen. Dec. No. B-23881
(Mar. 5, 1942) (unpublished).
29. 31 U.S.C. § 74 (1970). Certifying officers may request advance opinions
pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 82d (1970). The Comptroller General has not limited him-
self to answering questions from certifying officers, disbursing officers or heads of de-
partments. See, e.g., 49 Com,. GEN. 59, 60-61 (1969), the Philadelphia Plan case dis-
cussed in text accompanying notes 34-52 infra.
An interesting illustration of this advisory function was provided when Rep.
Melvin Laird, then Secretary of Defense-designate, asked the Comptroller General
whether he could accept the increased pay for cabinet officials scheduled to take effect
during the term of the 91st Congress if he were sworn in as a member of that Con-
gress pending his confirmation as a cabinet officer. The Comptroller General and later
the Attorney General held that he could, in spite of U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 6, provided
he were confirmed prior to the time Congress' power to veto the raise had expired.
See 42 Op. ATry. GEN. No. 36 (1969), referring to the G.A.O. decision. The
Comptroller General's opinion is unpublished because communications between the
G.A.O. and members of Congress are treated by the GAO as "privileged."
Private citizens also can get advisory opinions from the GAO even though no pro-
vision for such opinions is made in § 74. Such "private inquiries' are most often the
bid protests discussed infra in Part III. As Cibinic and Lasken dryly observe: "Left
unexplained by the Comptroller General is the derivation of his authority to make
exceptions to the statutory law. Cibinic & Lasken 377.
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[s]tatutes were tortured, and the usual legal presumptions re-
versed, in order to support new pretensions. If this was the mean-
ing of independence, it was abundantly realized. In practice it
chiefly meant controversies over the finality of administrative de-
terminations and the continual substitution of the Comptroller
General's conclusions on matters of fact and of law for those of
the department heads. To a large degree he was successful in
these assertions and in consequence he narrowed markedly the
previous scope of departmental discretion.30
Change to Comprehensive Audits
Comptrollers General since McCarl have continued the attempt
to control by audit, albeit less often.31 One reason the pace has slack-
30. MANSFIELD 71-72; cf. WILLouGHBY 17-38. See also McDiarmid, supra note
9, at 510: "Since it is removed from actual administration, the General Accounting
Office constantly requires detailed information supporting a proposed expenditure of
minor proportions. The cost of preparation may exceed many times the amount of
the expenditure itself. .. ."
31. For example, in 1955, Congress had prohibited "disposal or transfer by con-
tract or otherwise of work that has been . . . performed by civilian personnel of the
Department of Defense unless justified to the Appropriations Committees Act of
July 13, 1955, ch. 358, § 638, 69 Stat. 321 (1955). President Eisenhower threatened
to ignore this "unconstitutional" constraint on executive action. The Comptroller
General thereupon announced that he would uphold the legislation and disallow pay-
ments made in violation of it. See INDocINwA: THn CoNsTrrrONAL CRIsis, 116
CONG. Rac. 15,414 n.64 (1970). See also the GAO's discussion of what it sees as its
jurisdiction in 46 CoMP. GEN. 441, 453 (1966).
There is another way in which the audit process has gotten the Comptroller
General into potentially sensitive areas. As part of the power to settle accounts, the
GAO has acted as the arbiter of disputes between federal agencies. For example, in
1970 the Corps of Engineers sought reimbursement from the Department of the
Interior for damage to a park caused during construction of a power plant at Grand
Coulee Dam. In effect a judicial proceeding was impossible because the courts have
said a suit by one agency against another is really one by the United States against
itself. See Defense Suplies Corp. v. United States Lines Co., 148 F.2d 311, 312
(2d Cir. 1945). The Comptroller General followed his "longstanding rule that one
executive department may not reimburse another for use of real property damaged by
another agency." 1970 Comp. GEN. ANN. REP. 114, citing Comp. Gen. Dec. No. B-
169228 (Apr. 14, 1970) (unpublished). See also Note, The Comptroller General
of the United States: The Broad Power to Settle and Adjust All Claims and Ac-
counts, 70 HARv. L. REv. 350, 353-54 (1956).
To date, no major concern seems to have been expressed over the Comptroller
General's handling such questions, but one can imaigne problems arising. Anytime
agency A does something for agency B without reimbursement, agency B is better able
to perform its statutory duties and agency A is less able to perform its own. A shift
in priorities can thus be accomplished by whoever is the arbiter. For example, the
Department of Defense, through its Domestic Action Program, provides manpower and
use of facilities to sponsor various social welfare activities in conjunction with other
agencies. The General Accounting Office presumably would take the position that it
could determine (a) whether the other agencies may, must, or may not reimburse the
Department of Defense, or (b) whether the Department of Defense has exceeded its
statutory authority. The Attorney Genral might well take another position. Such
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ened is that the practical meaning of "audit" as used by the Comp-
troller General has changed over the years. The most significant de-
velopment was the Accounting and Auditing Procedures Act of 1950.
Where early Comptrollers General relied on "centralized voucher au-
dits," today the emphasis is on "comprehensive audits."
The centralized voucher audit consists of the examination of
expenditure and collection vouchers and related documents sub-
mitted periodically in support of financial transactions of Gov-
ernment officers having personal accountability for public funds.
The main objectives of this type of audit are to determine whether
expenditures are made legally and solely for the objects for which
appropriations Were made ...
In contrast, the comprehensive audit is performed at the site
of operations, its scope encompasses the agency as a whole and its
activities, and the extent of detailed examination work is gov-
erned by the adequacy and effectiveness of the controls exercised
by the management over its operations, as determined by a study
and testing of those controls.32
questions could become as sensitive as those about the Philadelphia Plan, discussed in
text accompanying notes 34-52 infra.
32. SENATE COMM. ON Gov'T OPERATIONS, REVIEW oF AuDrr RnroRTs Op THE
CoMs'TEOLLTE GENnnAL, S. REP. No. 1572, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1956). See also
S. Doc. No. 11, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); Staats, G.A.O. Auditing in the Seventies,
THE G.A.O. REv., Spring 1972, at 1.
The shift from detailed voucher audit to comprehensive audit caused the G.A.O.
work force to shrink from 15,000 in 1945 to 4,300 in 1965. Hearings Pursuant to
S. Con. Res. 2 Before the Joint Committee on the Organization of the Congress,
89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 9, at 1388 (1965) (testimony of Acting Comptroller General
Weitzel).
Another important feature of the 1950 Act had to do with agency accounting
systems. The First Hoover Commission had recommended the creation of a "per-
formance budget" which focused on objectives to be met rather than items to be
purchased. It also proposed creation of an Accountant General to prescribe agency
accounting methods, subject to approval by the Comptroller General. The Com-
mission believed the accounting is a management tool and thus should be the respon-
sibility of the executive. Congress recognized that accounting and auditing involved
more than the processing of agency vouchers, but it did not want to give authority
completely to the executive branch. See H.R. REP. No. 2556, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1950), and S. REP. No. 2031, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950). It made the agencies
responsible for initial development of their accounting systems, but left the Comp-
troller General in charge of (1) prescribing "principles, standards, and related re-
quirements" for agency accounting systems, (2) approval of such systems, and (3) re-
viewing the systems from time to time. A number of agencies have even now not
had their accounting systems approved. See H.R. REP. No. 179, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965). With respect to the original understanding of the GAO's role in the develop-
ment of accounting systems, see MANsFMELD 198-224; WmLOUGHmY 109-35.
Another provision, 31 U.S.C. § 60, had been adopted even earlier in 1946. It
authorized and directed the Comptroller General to make an "expenditure analysis" of
each executive agency "to determine whether public funds have been economically and
efficiently administered and expended." However Congress has never appropriated
funds to permit the GAO to carry out this task.
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The significance of the distinction for our purposes is two-fold.
First, under a voucher audit the Comptroller General has many more
individual opportunities to make a decision on legality. Each one is a
potential disallowance. The present Comptroller General thus ex-
presses his judgments of policy in comprehensive reports more often
than in legal opinions on specific payments. Secondly, the disallow-
ances under a voucher audit, although annoying, are often collateral
to program objectives and thus only occasionally trigger a violent ex-
ecutive response.83  Disallowances under a comprehensive audit, how-
ever, almost by definition would go to the heart of a program. The
response could be expected often to equal the most celebrated threat-
ened disallowance in recent years-that involving the so-called Phila-
delphia Plan.
The Philadelphia Plan
Executive Orders dating from 1941 have required non-discrimina-
tion clauses in government contracts that provided sanctions for racial
discrimination during contract performance.34 In 1966, however, the
Labor Department tried to add teeth to the clauses by requiring that
bidders submit affirmative action programs for approval by the Office
of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC) prior to contract award.
The requirement was tested in St. Louis, San Francisco, and Cleveland
for almost two years, and in February 1968 the Johnson Administra-
tion proposed regulations to implement the practice nationwide. 35
Representative William C. Cramer of Florida called the Comp-
troller General's attention to the plan. He objected to the Labor De-
partment's requiring an "acceptable program" without defining in ad-
vance for bidders what minimum promise was required for accepta-
bility.
In its first reply to Representative Cramer, the General Accounting
Office attempted to avoid a direct confrontation with the executive
agency. Assistant Comptroller General Frank Weitzel noted that no
33. This point is perceptively made in Cibinic & Lasken 378-79.
34. Exec. Order No. 8,802, 6 Fed. Reg. 3109, 3 C.F.R. 957 (1938-43 Compila-
tion) (1941), was the first. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12.319, 3 C.F.R.
167 (Supp. 1965) (1965), is the basis of the current clause. Current regulations on
equal opportunity in federal contracting are collected in 41 C.F.R. Ch. 60 (1972).
A good discussion of the background leading up to the Philadelphia Plan is contained
in Comment, The Philadelphia Plan: A Study in the Dynamics of Executive Power,
39 U. Cm. L. REv. 723 (1972).
35. 33 Fed. Reg. 3000 (1968).
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cases had yet arisen in which a low bidder had actually lost a contract
because of an unacceptable affirmative action program.30 He acknowl-
edged, however, that failure to include minimum standards of ac-
ceptability constituted a "technical violation" of the competitive bid-
ding regulations, which require that a contract must be awarded on the
basis of price alone and must not require negotiation after the bids
are opened. 37 A letter was sent to the Secretary of Labor "advising" him
of this problem.
That, of course, was not what the Labor Department wanted to
hear. Apparently, part of the Department's fear was that "minimum
standards" would become the maximum proposed. Part of the psy-
chology of affirmative action was getting the contractor to use "the
utmost in creativity, ingenuity and imagination, 38 and the depart-
ment apparently hoped to use the ambiguity of the situation itself to
bluff contractors into more generous, carefully-considered proposals.
Representative Cramer, however, would not quit. He pointed
out that the "Philadelphia Pre-Award Plan," adopted in 1967 prior
to the 1968 GAO opinion, was equally vague about the minimum
standard for compliance and had not been changed in response to the
first opinion. In reply to this complaint, the Comptroller General was
more direct in his ruling:
[I]n our view where federally assisted contracts are required
to be awarded on the basis of publicly advertised competitive bid-
ding, award may not properly be withheld pursuant to the Plan
from the lowest responsible and otherwise responsive bidder on
the basis of an unacceptable affirmative action program, until pro-
vision is made for informing prospective bidders of definite min-
imum requirements to be met by the bidder's program and any
other standards or criteria by which the acceptability of such pro-
gram would be judged.
S. . T]he present lack of specific detail and rigid guideline
requirements for an acceptable affirmative action program ...
permits denial of a contract to the low bidder to be based on
36. 47 CowP. GEN. 666, 669 (1968).
37. The regulations governing federal civilian procurement, Federal Procure-
ment Regulations (FPR), are found in 41 C.F.R. 6, 1 (1972). Procurement by the
Department of Defense is governed by the Armed Services Procurement Regulations
(ASPR), published pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 2202. Part 2 of both FPR and ASPR
deals with the requirements for formal advertising.
38. This justification may be found in 48 CoMP. GEN. 326, 328 (1968), and is




purely arbitrary or capricious decisions, and award to be made on
the basis of similar decisions. 39
On this point the new Nixon Administration then yielded. Re-
vised standards were issued that required the OFCC Area Coordinator
to set a "range of minority manpower utilization of each of the desig-
nated trades" which would go out with the invitation for bids. Each
contractor was then to be required to submit his own specified range
in his proposal. If his range was not equal to or more ambitious than
that set by the OFCC, he would be non-responsive and would not get
the contract. There was to be no negotiation.4 °
One might have thought that the Comptroller General would be
satisfied. His only previous objection apparently had been met in the
manner he had suggested. However his involvement in the issue had
only begun. In response to further questions from unnamed members
of Congress, he solicited a memorandum from the Solicitor of Labor
on the legality of the revised plan.
The Solicitor's brief relied heavily on the Government's power to
prescribe the terms and conditions on which it will contract, 41 but the
Comptroller General was unconvinced. The requirement of goals sat-
isfied the procurement statutes' requirement of specificity, but it raised
problems under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Requiring a contractor
to meet minority employment goals, the Comptroller General reasoned,
would require him to make race a factor in hiring. Indeed it would
constitute a "quota" system expressly prohibited by the Act. Quoting
extensively from the legislative history, he concluded that hiring to
achieve a racial balance was prohibited.42
39. 48 ComP. GEN. 326, 328 (1968).
40. Order to the Heads of All Agencies from Assistant Secretary of Labor Arthur
A. Fletcher Announcing the Revised Philadelphia Plan 6, 9 (June 27, 1969), re-
printed, 115 CONG. Ruc. 39,951-53 (1969).
41. The Solicitor's forty-four-page typewritten brief is unpublished and undated
but has been reprinted in Hearings on the Philadelphia Plan and S. 931 before the
Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. at 255-74 (1969).
42. 49 COMP. GEN. 59, 65-67, 71 (1969). There can be no doubt that Comp-
troller General Staats intended to reiterate the jurisdictional philosophy of Comptroller
General McCarl: "Our interest and authority in the matter exists by virtue of the
duty imposed upon our Office by the Congress to audit all expenditures of appropriated
funds, which necessarily involves the determination of the legality of such expenditures
.... " Id. at 60-61. See also 117 CoNG. RFc. 36,642 (1971), where Senator Ervin
quotes Comptroller General Staats as writing: "While the number of instances where
these differences over the authority of the GAO is relatively small, we believe ... they
present a substantial threat to the maintenance of effective legislative control over
the expenditure of public funds."
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The Labor Department had, of course, consulted with the Depart-
ment of Justice throughout the now eighteen-month-long controversy.
At this point, a formal opinion of the Attorney General was solicited.
Not surprisingly, the Attorney General flatly disagreed with the Comp-
troller General's finding of compulsory quotas. He pointed to specific
provisions of the plan and said:
The Plan provides that the contractor's commitment to specific
goals "is not intended and shall not be used to discriminate against
any qualified applicant or employee (sec. 6(b)(2))." Further-
more, the obligation to meet the goals is not absolute. "In the
event of failure to meet the goals, the contractor shall be given
an opportunity to demonstrate that he made every good faith ef-
fort to meet his commitment. In any proceeding in which such
good faith performance is in issue, the contractor's entire com-
pliance posture shall be reviewed and evaluated in the process of
considering the imposition of sanctions." (see. 8(g)).
48
The Department of Labor thus proceeded with the plan, but many
members of Congress, led by Senator Sam Ervin, expressed indigna-
tion. The Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Senate Judi-
ciary Committee held hearings on "whether the Labor Department has
usurped Congressional authority. . . ."" Citing the statutory lan-
guage that the Comptroller General's decisions are "final and con-
clusive upon the executive branch of the Government," Senator Ervin
urged the Senate not to "shirk the Constitutional responsibility of Con-
gress to maintain control over appropriations." 4  Indeed, he intro-
43. 42 Op. ATr' GEr. No. 37 at 4 (1969). The Attorney General reasoned
further:
The United States as a contracting party may not require an employer to en-
gage in practices which Congress has prohibited. It does not follow, how-
ever, that the United States may not require of those who contract with it
certain employment practices which Congress has not seen fit to require of
employers generally....
M • o mhe employer may have a right to refuse to abandon his customary
hiring practices, but he has no right to contract with the Government on his
own terms.
Id. at 5, 9 (citations omitted). For an opposing view on this particular issue see
Remmert, Executive Order 11,246: Executive Encroachment, 55 A.B.AJ. 1037 (1969).
The Attorney General's closing sentence particularly incensed the Comptroller
General: "I hardly need add that the conclusions expressed herein may be relied on by
your Department and other contracting agencies and their accountable officers in the
administration of Executive Order 11246." 42 Op. ATr'y GaN. at 11-12.
44. Hearings on the Philadelphia Plan, supra note 41, at 1.
45. 115 CoNG. REc. 39,126 (1969). The Solicitor of Labor sought to explain
why he followed the Attorney General instead of the Comptroller General by saying
that while the latter could rule on legality of particular vouchers, the former had au-
thority to direct the executive departments on broad "questions of general importance
directly affecting the performance by Executive agencies of functions independently
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duced a rider to the Supplemental Appropriation Bill of 1970, con-
sidered during Christmas week of 1969, which would have expressly
prohibited expenditure of any federal funds on any "contract or agree-
ment which the Comptroller General of the United States holds to be
in contravention of any Federal statute."46 He, of course, asserted that
this only confirmed the power the GAO already had.47
Congress desperately wanted to get home for Christmas, and Pres-
ident Nixon equally wanted to be free of binding GAO review. The
President threatened to veto any legislation, including the supplemental
appropriation to run all federal agencies, which contained such a pro-
vision.48  What had begun as an issue over the Civil Rights Act thus
ultimately became-or was treated as-a confrontation of legislative
and executive power. In that round, Congress gave in to the Presi-
dent, although Senator Ervin's position received considerable support.49
The matter never reached the stage of GAO disallowance. Be-
fore the plan could be implemented, an association of contractors sued
to enjoin inclusion of the Philadelphia Plan provisions in an invitation
for bids for construction of a Marsh Creek dam. The district court up-
held the plan requirements and granted summary judgment for the
government. 0 The court of appeals affirmed, 51 and the Supreme
Court denied certiorari.52
confided to them and not those simply involving payments." 115 CONG. REC. 39,123
(1969). The abstract debate over the relative powers of the Comptroller General and
Attorney General is lengthy and need not be repeated here. See WiLLOUGHBY 44-61;
Bimbaum, Government Contracts: The Role of the Comptroller General, 42 A.B.A.J.
433 (1956); McGuire, The Opinions of the Attorney General and the General Ac-
counting Office, 15 GEo. L.J. 115 (1927); Note, Alice in Wunderlich. The Attorney
General's Dream of Limiting the GAO's Claim Settlement Authority, 18 CATE. U.L
REV. 544 (1969).
46. Introduced as § 904 of H.R. 15209, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); see 115
CONG. Rnc. 39,944 (1969).
47. The proposed section began, "In view of and in confirmation of the authority
invested in the Comptroller General of the United States by the Budget and Accounting
Act of 1921 . . . ." H.R. 15209, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 904 (1969).
48. 1969 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PPESImnS oF THE UN=TE! STATES: PCEMU
NIXON 1038, 1039, received by the Congress at 115 CONo. REc. 40,738 (1969).
49. The vote, held late on December 22, was 39-29 to defeat the provision.
115 CoNG. REc. 40,749 (1969).
50. Contractors Ass'n of E. Pennsylvania v. Secretary of Labor, 311 F. Supp.
1002 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
51. Contractors Ass'n of E. Pennsylvania v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159
(3d Cir. 1971). The court held that the authority to prescribe the Plan arises from
the broad grant of procurement authority in titles 40 and 41 of the United States Code.
The court went on, 'This [Civil Rights Act] general prohibition against discrimination
cannot be construed as limiting Executive authority in defining appropriate affirma-
tive action on the part of a contractor." Id. at 173.
52. 404 U.S. 854 (1971). The Comptroller General apparently has acquiesced
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Who Shall Restrain the Executive?
The Comptroller General's attempt to stop the Philadelphia Plan
and even the controversies of the McCarl era were not solely attempts
at institutional empire building. They reflected a functional defi-
ciency in the American system of government. Legislation authorizing
executive action can and often does set specific limits on that author-
ity.-53 The power to authorize must necessarily include some power
to define the boundaries. Congress, however, cannot have the fore-
sight to define the limits on authority in every concrete case. More-
over, as problems change, limits once precise become hard to apply.
in the court's conclusions and has made no further objections on this particular issue.
See, e.g., 50 Coln,. GEN. 844 (1971).
On a later civil rights issue, the legality of the Small Business Administration's
program for assisting minority enterprise, the GAO has gone from a position of un-
certainty to one upholding the program.
Pacific Coast Util. Serv. v. Laird, Civil No. 71-1035 LHB (N.D. Cal., June 15,
1971), has held this so-called SBA § 8(a) program illegal. That case is now pending
before the Ninth Circuit. Another case, Ray Baillie Trash Hauling v. Kleppe, 334
F. Supp. 194 (D. Fla. 1971), had also held the plan illegal, but that case has now
been reversed, 477 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1973). The plan had been upheld earlier in
Kleen-Rite Janitorial Services v. Laird, Civil No. 71-1968W (D. Mass. Sept. 21,
1971), and Space Services of Georgia v. Laird, 18 CCH Cont. Cas. F. % 86,920 (D.
Conn. 1972), neither of which was appealed. Up until the Court of Appeals decision
in Baillie, the law was sufficiently unclear that the Comptroller General refused to
rule, Comp. Gen. Dec. No. B-175609 (June 27, 1972) (unpublished). When the
Court of Appeals decision was announced, however, the Comptroller General accepted
the position that the plan is legal. Comp. Gen. Dec. B-174146 (Feb. 12, 1973) (un-
published); cf. Fortec Constructors v. Kleppe, 18 CCH Cont. Cas. F. f 86,845
(D.D.C. 1972), aft'd, 18 CCH Cont. Cas. F. % 86,911 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See generally
Boskoff, The Small Business Administration and its Minority Subcontracting Program,
7 PuB. CONT. NEWSLETTm No. 2, at 11 (1972).
53. Most restrictions have been innocuous. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 2207 (1970)
(forbidding gratuities to contracting officials); 41 U.S.C. § 48 (1970) (requiring pur-
chase of certain products from National Industries for the Blind). But a few have
reflected bitter battles between Congress and the executive over control of national
policy. See, e.g., Act of Sept. 16, 1940, ch. 720, § 3(e), 54 Stat. 886 (forbid-
ding deployment of draftees beyond Western Hemisphere and U.S. possessions and
territories); Act of July 13, 1955, ch. 358, § 638, 69 Stat. 321 (forbidding "contracting
out" of work done by federal civilian employees); Act of Dec. 19, 1963, Pub. L. No.
88-215, 79 Stat. 440 (forbidding use of NASA funds for joint Soviet-American lunar
landing program). See also 115 CONG. REC. 40,015 (1969), summarizing other exam-
ples.
A somewhat different problem was presented in 1962 when Congress sought to
compel the President to spend funds on the RS-70 manned bomber. See Davis,
Congressional Power to Require Defense Expenditures, 33 Fona. L. REv. 39 (1964);
Fisher, Funds Impounded by the President: The Constitutional Issue, 38 GEo. WASIL
L. Rav. 124 (1969); cf. Goostree, The Power of the President to Impound Appro-
priated Funds: With Special Reference to Grants-in-Aid to Segregated Activities, 11
AM. U.L. REV. 32 (1962). The issue was raised again in the closing days of the
92d Congress when President Nixon sought authority to limit spending to 250 billion
dollars in fiscal year 1973. See generally Comment, 40 U. Cm. L. REv., supra note 1.
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Congress sometimes may even leave statutes intentionally vague on con-
troversial issues on which no single position can command a majority.
54
But just as Congress must have the power to limit authority, it
seems fair to suggest that the Executive should have the discretion to
choose the strategy for carrying out a given legislative mandate. If
the President is to be held responsible for program results, and he
should be, he should have as few limits as possible on his choice of
methods.55 What the Constitution has failed to provide is a specific
mechanism for determining when the President has gone too far in his
choice of alternatives. Without such a constraint the executive branch
can be virtually unrestrained in the definition as well as the execution
of policy. The critics of recent Presidents' conduct of foreign and do-
mestic affairs have been making what amounts to this same point.
In France, for example, the Cour des Comptes, an administrative
court, performs the limiting role. 6 The Republic of China constitu-
tion provided for five branches of government, one of which was as-
signed this task.57  In the United States the GAO has moved into
the vacuum. The question seems to be not whether the role needs
performing but whether the GAO is the best agency to do it.
An example may help illustrate the problem. Since 1969 the De-
fense Appropriations Act has provided that "none of the funds appro-
priated by this Act shall be used to finance the introduction of Ameri-
can ground combat troops into Laos and Thailand."58s Suppose it
were alleged that Army personnel guarding Air Force bases in Thailand
are "ground combat troops." Who is to decide? It might be difficult
54. Koslow, Standardless Administrative Adjudication, 22 ADMIN. L. R v. 407
(1970); cf. Miller, Statutory Language and the Purposive Use of Ambiguity, 42 VA.
L REv. 23 (1956).
55. This was the essential message of Professor Mansfield in 1939. MANsFmLD
11-12, 178-81. See also MAPI STuDY 34-38. Professor Cibinic perceptively observes
in this same vein that the weak executive does not want to be accountable and uses the
GAO as a crutch. When he has a tough issue he can seek a GAO advance decision
and try to blame any subsequent problems on the GAO. Cibinic & Lasken 393.
56. See C. HAMSON, ExEcuTrVE DisCREnrON & JUDCIAL CONTROL (1954); J.
MAGNET, LA CouR Das CoMI' s (1965). The best comparative study of the GAO
and its western European counterparts is E. NORMANTON, TE ACCOtJNTABILrry AND
AuDrr OF GovENmENrs (1966).
57. The branch, established by Chapter IX of the 1946 constitution, was called
the Control Yuan and was empowered to censure and impeach administrative officials,
as well as audit. 2 A. PEASLEE, CONSTITUToNs OF NATIONS 291 (1966); W. TuNG,
THm POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS OF MODERN CHINA (1964).
58. Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 643, 83 Stat. 487 (1969); Pub. L. No. 91-669, § 843,
84 Stat. 2038 (1971); Pub. L. No. 92-204, § 742, 85 Stat 735 (1971); Pub. L. No.
92-570, § 741, 86 Stat. 118 (1972).
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to find a private plaintiff who could properly raise the issue in court.
Recent decisions liberalizing rules of standing might conceivably permit
a soldier ordered to the area to file suit,59 for example, but the Comp-
troller General might argue that he could, quite apart from the courts,
simply cut off money for the operation. Indeed, to put the proposi-
tion more baldly, it would be consistent with the Comptroller Gen-
eral's previous positions to say that if he at any time had thought the
Vietnam War illegal, he could single-handedly have brought it to an
end.
Defenders of this role for the GAO argue that because it is a
"legislative agency," the GAO is in a better position than the executive
agencies to know and carry out congressional intent.60 Two fallacies
in this argument should be plain. First, calling an agency "legislative"
does not imbue it with insight. In fact, the GAO is one of the least
informed agencies about congressional intent at the time legislation is
passed. The agencies or individual legislators, not the GAO, draft
most legislation, defend it in hearings, and comment on changes as it
progresses through the Congress. In most cases the GAO's insights
about legislative intent are reconstructed after the fact and thus are
usually less accurate than the insights of agencies and often are little
better than those of any other outside observer.
59. The issues concerning standing to sue have been set out at length elsewhere.
E.g., L. JAFF., JtDiCIL CoNTROL OF AMmusTrAw'E AcTioN, ch. 12, 13 (1965);
3 K. DAvis, ADmuSTRATwIVE LAw TREATI SE, 208-94 (1958). Briefly, the older cases
held that only someone whose "legal right" was infringed by administrative action had
standing to complain. This was questioned in cases holding that a "person ag-
grieved" by administrative action, e.g. FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S.
470 (1940), or one acting as a "private attorney general," e.g. Associated Indus. v.
Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943), had standing to sue.
In Associations of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150 (1970), a group of data service companies challenged a rule of the Comptroller
of the Currency allowing national banks to provide data services. The lower courts
had denied standing, holding that there was no legal injury if their damages stemmed
from mere competition. There was no legal right, the court said, to be free from
competition. The Supreme Court reversed and specifically rejected the "legal interest"
test. The court said that the "question [was] whether the interest sought to be pro.
tected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or
regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question." Id. at 153. See also
Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 400 U.S. 45 (1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159
(1970).
Our hypothetical soldier ordered to Laos or Cambodia would have to contend that
the restriction was "arguably" designed to protect him. The question is not free from
doubt, but he might seem to be among the classes Congress had in mind when the sec-
tion was passed. Cf. Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 42 U.S.L.W. 2067 (E.D.N.Y. July 25,
1973) (Congresswoman and pilots seek to enjoin bombing of Cambodia).
60. E.g., Shnitzer § 1734.
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Secondly, "congressional intent" is elusive and probably nonexist-
ent on most controversial programs. That is, individual legislators
certainly had understandings of what was intended by particular
phrases in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, for example, but there prob-
ably was no consensus. When one talks about the "intent" shown by
legislative silence on an issue, the problem is even worse. This is
probably true even if the bill's managers expressed one view or an-
other, since when the vote came theirs counted no more than any
others. And if the GAO should act today on some legislator's criti-
cism, based on present statements of previous intent, the opportuni-
ties for error are obvious.
GAO resolution of these issues of intent has at least two other
unavoidable consequences. First, GAO consideration of these cases is
often shielded from public view and thus can be a way of burying con-
troversy rather than revealing problems. The press and public show
signs of greater sophistication about the importance of GAO reports,
but the agency is still largely anonymous. If a question were raised
about the legality of the Vietnam War or the use of federal funds for
busing, for example, it would be publicly reported and the issues aired
far better in court instead of before the GAO. Any compromise or
settlement of the issues would likewise be open to public scrutiny in
a way that the quiet dropping of a GAO investigation would not.
Secondly, it seems a mistake to entrust judgment to an agency
"loyal to" one of the disputants. Important as increasing congressional
authority may be, reducing executive responsibility for decisions in-
evitably tends to weaken executive accountabilty for results. It is as
important to a healthy balance of power that executive discretion be
preserved as it is that congressional limits be respected. It is not un-
reasonable to expect that a group of legislators-particularly commit-
tee chairmen or others with influence and seniority-eager to have a
program managed a particular way would call upon the Comptroller
General to hold that any other management is "illegal."61  The GAO
has a remarkable record of independence, but as discussed earlier, the
Philadelphia Plan issue appears to have been raised in just this way.
While there are always some limits on authority, it seems that pro-
ceedings to enforce them should not be instigated as a method of sub-
61. J. HARmS, CONGRBSSIONAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION 161 (1964): "The
'agent of Congress' becomes in effect the agent of powerful individual members, or
particular parts of Congress."
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stituting congressional for executive management. 62
Of course, one can argue that an agency could always "appeal"
the Comptroller General's decision by asking the full Congress to
change the law. If things were that simple, however, individual legis-
lators could equally well accomplish their purposes through new legis-
lation. The fact is that in most cases neither side wants that burden.
One need only contemplate the likelihood of achieving either repeal
or reconfirmation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 today to understand
the problem.
The Original Understanding of GAO Authority
The question of the Comptroller General's authority really comes
down to what the statute means when it says his decisions in settle-
ments of public accounts are "final and conclusive on the Executive
Branch."6  Comptroller General McCarl argued that it means an ex-
ecutive agency is obliged to abide by the Comptroller General's rulings
even in the face of contrary judicial opinion.64
There is a logical test for that proposition. If it is true, a court
should consider the Comptroller General's findings-whether of fact or
law-"final and conclusive" in later litigation to enforce his ruling.
That does not seem to have been Congress' intent. The power to "set-
tie and adjust," as well as the "final and conclusive" language, were
both carry-overs from the powers of the Comptroller of the Treasury.
As the Congress was certainly aware, his authority had not been con-
strued to be "binding" on anyone, in the sense later Comptrollers Gen-
eral have used that term, because his decisions were subject to judicial
review de novo in any proceeding to recover an overpayment or en-
force a disallowance. 65
62. Attempted congressional management of the executive can arise in several
other forms. The best account is given in the Brookings Institution study, J. HAlus,
supra note 61. Two particularly analogous forms of direct intervention are the re-
quirements that agencies "come into agreement" with the requisite congressional com-
mittee before taking action, id. at 213-32, and the requirement that a proposed program
lie on the table, usually for sixty days, to give the Congress time within which to dis-
approve the proposal, id. at 206-13. The constitutionality of such practices are open
to question. Id. at 238-48. See also Whelan, Purse Strings, Payments and Procure-
ment, 1964 PuB. L. 322, 347-48; Whelan & Phillips, Government Contracts: Emphasis
on Government, 29 LAw & CoNTEmP. PROB. 315, 325-31 (1964).
63. 31 U.S.C. § 74 (1970).
64. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
65. MANSFmLD 106-07. See generally, id. 93-117. This has to be qualified in
that there were classes of claims against the Government which were cognizable by the
Comptroller and Auditors of the Treasury but not by the Court of Claims. E.g.,
1300 [Vol. 51
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
Kihlberg v. United States6 was the seminal case in this area.
In that case a contract for shipping goods through Indian territory
had provided that the Army Quartermaster's determination of the dis-
tance shipped would be used to calculate compensation. The Gov-
ernment later tried to set the Quartermaster's determination aside on
the grounds that his estimate of distance had been wrong. The Su-
preme Court however held that the Government is bound by the con-
tracting agent's decision. The payee cannot be forced to give money
back even upon the later determination that the Government agent was
wrong.
Kihlberg was then the basis for a series of decisions that gave
finality to determinations of executive officers. One of these cases re-
lated directly to the power of the Comptroller of the Treasury. In
United States v. Mason & Hanger Co.67 the issue was whether the con-
tractor had to refund to the Government the cost of a bond premium
for which he had been reimbursed under a cost-type contract. The
contracting officer had considered it a reimbursable cost, but the Comp-
troller of the Treasury had disagreed. The Supreme Court followed
Kihlberg and concluded that "the Comptroller of the Treasury has no
power" over payments made in settlement of a contract.
Finally, in Smith v. Jackson 8 the Auditor of the Panama Canal
Zone had withheld sums from the salary of the district judge to repre-
sent rent for Government-furnished quarters for a period when he was
absert from the Canal Zone. The judge sued for the amount in ques-
tion, and the Supreme Court affirmed his right to it in no uncertain
term, saying, "[Tihe auditor had no power to refuse to carry out the
law ind . . .any doubt which he might have had should have been
subcrdinated, first, to the ruling of the Attorney General and, second,
beyond all possible question to the judgments of the courts below." 69
Cases attempting to charge disallowances to the disbursing officer
gave equally little weight to the decision of the Comptroller. Comp-
trolltr of the Treasury Warwick told Congress:
[T]here is no great inclination on the part of the courts to recog-
nize what might be called the technical laws for the use of ap-
Unitd States v. Babcock, 250 U.S. 328 (1919). These never reached the stage of
"ilepi" payments. More on claims, particularly the impact of S & E Contractors v.
Unitd States, 406 U.S. 1 (1972), appears in text accompanying notes 91-168 infra.
.6. 97 U.S. 398 (1878).
)7. 260 U.S. 323 (1922).
i8. 246 U.S. 388 (1918).
i9. Id. at 390-91.
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propriations. If the Government has received a benefit from the
use of money, ordinarily the court will not give judgment
against the principal for the surety. 70
For example, in United States v. Warfield71 a Baltimore postal
clerk had been assigned to Washington by the Postmaster General,
contrary to statute. The Baltimore postmaster, who was a disbursing
officer, had no actual knowledge of where the man worked, and all
payments were in accordance with departmental regulation. The
Comptroller nevertheless sought to hold the postmaster personally liable
for repayment of the clerk's salary, a result the court of appeals termed
"unconscionable." Quoting the district court, it said:
I have not found a reported case in which an innocent disbursing
agent has been held liable under such circumstances. It hardly
seems that the financial operations of the Government could go
on if at the peril of refunding the money every subordinate was
required to exercise his own judgment as to whether an apparently
legal claim which his superior directed him to pay was to be paid
or not.7
2
It was against this backdrop that the Budget and Accounting Act
of 1921 created the GAO. The cases since 1921 suggest that these
principles have not changed. In Miguel v. McCar78 an enlisted man
in the Philippine Scouts sought regular Army retirement pay. When
the voucher for that pay came to the Army disbursing officer for Ma-
nila, it was sent to the Comptroller General for an advance decision
on the legality of payment. Comptroller General McCarl ruled pay-
ment illegal and kept the voucher, so an action was brought to compel
him by mandamus or injunction to reverse his decision and return the
voucher for payment. The Court found not that his decision was
"final" but instead that he was so clearly wrong that return c the
voucher was in order.
Further, in United States v. Heler' 4 an Army captain acting as a
disbursing officer had bought caskets for reburial in America o7 sol-
diers who had died in France. Citing emergency conditions, ho had
not used formal advertising, and the Comptroller General sought bcov-
70. Hearings on the Establishment of a National Budget System Before the Flouse
Select Comm. on the Budget, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. 237 (1919).
71. 170 F. 43 (4th Cir. 1909).
72. Id. at 45-46.
73. 291 U.S. 442 (1934). Interestingly enough, the Court was wary of isspig a
mandatory injunction to a legislative official, so it simply "called [his] attentidn" to
the decision in the belief he would act accordingly. Id. at 456.
74. 1 F. Supp. 1 (D. Md. 1932).
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ery on his bond for the amount of the expenditure. The court relied
heavily on Warfield in denying recovery, and its analysis of the re-
spective power of the Comptroller General and the courts is significant:
[Tihe Comptroller General is charged with the duty of seeing that
there is some formal inVestigation, at least, in regard to the pro-
priety of those items-hence this suit-and, of course, it is the
duty of the court in a case of this kind to . . . see whether the
government has made out its case.75
This statement seems to put the issue well. Some commentators,
trying to be deferential to the Comptroller General, have said his deci-
sions are "conclusive on the Executive Branch" but not on the judi-
cial branch.76  That is sheer doubletalk. To say that the Comptrol-
ler General's views are "conclusive" at all when in fact they are of no
effect in court can only have a chilling effect on executive discretion. 77
This is not to say that the disbursing officer will suffer no penalty if
his payment is found in fact to have been egregiously illegal. It is to
say that the court will utterly ignore the Comptroller's opinion in mak-
ing its findings. 7s
75. Id. at 2.
76. Shnitzer § 1739. See also 115 CoNG. REc. 39,969 (1969) (remarks of Sena.
tor Byrd).
77. It can be argued that the Comptroller General's power of disallowance is
simply a device to get issues into court for a judicial test. 115 CoNG. REc. 39,963
(1969) (remarks of Senator Allott); id. at 39,970 (remarks of Senator Holland).
As discussed, however, the Comptroller General has not considered himself so limited.
78. See Leeds & Northrop Co. v. United States, 101 F. Supp. 999 (E.D. Pa.
1951); James Graham Mfg. Co. v. United States, 91 F. Supp. 715 (N.D. Cal. 1950);
Climatic Rainwear Co. v. United States, 115 Ct. Cl. 520 (1950).
It is fair to ask what arguments the Comptroller General has in his favor that
has allowed him to maintain his position this long. One is the fact that the Comp-
troller of the Treasury had been given specific statutory authority to construe statutes
in order to provide consistency among the six auditors. Act of July 31, 1894, ch. 174,
§ 8, 28 Stat. 208. Since the Budget and Accounting Act then provided that the Comp-
troller General succeeded to the powers of the Comptroller of the Treasury, 31
U.S.C. § 71 (1970); see 33 Op. ATr'y GEN. 383 (1922), the answer to this argu-
ment is that an initial construction of statutes is necessary in the process of auditing
vouchers and the Comptroller of the Treasury had been given this role to make the
various auditors' rulings uniform. 26 CoNo. REc. 4299-300 (1894).
Next, there was a repeated discussion of the "judicial role" of the Comptroller
General in the debates on the Budget and Accounting Act. E.g., 58 CoNG. RE.
7131 (1919) (remarks of Congressman Good); id. at 7136 (remarks of Congressman
Hawley). From this it might be concluded that he was to have judicial power. In
fact, however, the references were all in the context of the salary and tenure the
Comptroller General should have. There was substantial concern that he not be-
come beholden to the agencies and that he fearlessly point out their waste, but beyond
that the reference to "judicial role" was mere hyperbole. For example, "[J]udicial
powers ... must be exercised by the comptroller general .... [However] [alnyone
who feels aggrieved by the decision may go to the Court of Claims and sue there to
protect his rights. . . ." Id. at 7278 (remarks of Congressman Andrews).
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A Matter of Separation of Powers
The question then arises whether Congress could give the GAO
such review authority even if it wished to. The suggestion has been
made by executive officials from the President on down that a genuine
separation of powers issue is presented. 79 The Comptroller of the
Treasury could have the power of disallowance, it is argued, because
he was in the executive branch. Giving the same power to the GAO,
on the other hand, would be unconstitutional because it would be in-
terfering with executive discretion.
As indicated above, there may be practical arguments in favor of
this separation of powers approach. It is probably important that no
department of government-not even Congress-be both lawmaker and
judge. There is little question that Congress can and should assert a
rule in policy-making by prescribing particular actions of executive
agencies by specific restrictions on appropriations. The separation of
powers question is raised only where Congress or its agent also de-
cides when a violation has occurred. Each year Congress must pass a
new appropriation. Each year it can thus impose limits on future be-
havior. Beyond that it probably should not go. A realistic reading
of the case law, however, gives little basis to suggest that the courts
would find a constitutional issue.
In Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes" Congress had passed
a law expressly requiring the Postmaster General to pay the plaintiff
a sum owed him. The Postmaster General argued that for the legis-
79. E.g., 1969 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESmDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES:
RiCHARD NIXON 1038-39 (1969), also found at 115 CONG. REc. 40,738 (1969); Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Production and Stabilization of the Senate Comm. on Bank-
ing, Housing and Urban Affairs, on S. 669 & S. 1901, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 116-18
(1972) (statement of Dwight A. Ink, Office of Management and Budget); 117
CONG. Rac. 7278 (1971) (letter from George P. Shultz, Director, Office of Manage-
ment and Budget); 115 CONG. REC. 39,957 (1969) (letter from Atty. Gen. John
Mitchell); Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Committee on Gov't Operations
on H.R. 474, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1784-89 (1969) at 1784-89 (testimony of Irving R.
Jaffe, Department of Justice).
A related skirmish over separation of powers concerns the Cost Accounting Stand.
ards Board, 50 U.S.C. § 2168 (1970). This is a five member board, chaired by the
Comptroller General, which seeks to establish uniform accounting rules for federal
contracts. It is said to be in the legislative branch of the government, and the Nixon
administration wants it moved to the executive branch. See S. 1901, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1971); Hearings on S. 699 and 1901 before the Subcomm. on Production and
Stabilization of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1972).
80. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838). On the question of review of the Comp-
troller General, see MAN sF LD 106-07.
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lative branch to order him, as a discretionary executive official, to act
was a breach of the separation of powers. The Supreme Court held,
however, that where legislation was specific and otherwise valid, it
could create a ministerial duty even for a member of the President's
cabinet. In dicta the Court suggested that there were discretionary
powers inherent in the Executive that Congress could not regulate, but
it did not elaborate further.
The idea of inherent executive authority reached its zenith in My-
ers v. United States.81  President Wilson had tried to remove a post-
master from office in the face of a statute that said that postmasters
could be fired only with Senate approval. The Supreme Court held
that the requirement of Senate approval was unconstitutional because
removal of inferior officials was an inherent power of the President
not subject to congressional review.
The Court's dictum in a case just two years later was even more
favorable to this position:
It may be stated then, as a general rule inherent in the
American constitutional system, that, unless . . . incidental to the
powers conferred, the legislature cannot exercise either executive-
or judicial power ....
Legislative power, as distinguished from executive power, is
the authority to make laws, but not to enforce them or appoint
the agents charged with the duty of such enforcement. The lat-
ter are executive functions.
82
The argument from these cases would be that the General Ac-
counting Office, a legislative agency, may not use the audit power to
direct the day-to-day activities of the managers in the executive branch.
Congress may pass legislation, the argument would run, but they can-
not directly enforce it."3
Later cases, however, have eroded beyond recognition the con-
stitutional concept of inherent power. Less than a decade after deciding
Myers, the Court all but overruled it in Humphrey's Executor v. United
States.8 4 The cases were different-Humphrey was an FTC Commis-
81. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
82. Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 201-02 (1928). The case
held that vesting the control of Philippine government corporations in legislative offi-
cials violated the separation of powers provisions of the Philippine Organic Act which
the Court in the quoted passage compared to the American constitution.
83. The testimony of Mr. Jaffe, 1969 Hearings, supra note 79, develops this
argument most fully.
84. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
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sioner while Myers was a postmaster-but the Court limited Myers to
cases of "purely executive officers" and specifically disapproved its
broad dicta about inherent executive authority and inherent limits on
congressional power.85
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer8" further eroded the
constitutionally protected sphere of executive discretion. The Supreme
Court rejected President Truman's claim of inherent authority to take
over steel mills, even in a national emergency. It pointed out that
Congress had passed no legislation specifically authorizing seizure and
indeed had considered and rejected such a course. Justice Jackson, in
his concurring opinion, was more specific:
When the President takes measures incompatible with the ex-
pressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb,
for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus
any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter. Courts
can sustain exclusive presidential control in such a case only by
disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject.81
Finally, it goes without saying that Congress can establish admin-
istrative agencies with investigative, legislative, and judicial authority
substantially intertwined. To be sure, such agencies are generally sub-
ject to procedural limitations not imposed upon the GAO, and no
pretense is made that they are necessarily loyal to Congress. The
point is, however, that Congress can create them largely independent
of and to some extent regulating the executive.
The question, then, does not seem really to be whether Congress
could give the GAO the power of disallowance. It could. As a bar-
gaining point in the current battle to regain parity with the executive,
it even may constitute a credible threat. In an ideal world, however,
the argument for separation of function is an argument Congress itself
should accept as it seeks to make the GAO a more effective aid in the
policy-making process rather than simply a monkey wrench in the
executive works.
85. Id. at 626-32. Indeed Justice Frankfurter later dismissed the broad Myers
dicta as the influence of Chief Justice (and former President) Taft. Larson v.
Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 726 (1949) (dissenting opin.
ion).
86. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
87. Id. at 637-38; see Kauper, The Steel Seizure Case: The President and the
Supreme Court, 51 MIcH. L. REv. 141 (1952); cf. The Floyd Acceptances, 74 U.S.
(7 Wall.) 666 (1868); Junger, Down Memory Lane: The Case of the Pentagon Papers,
23 CASE W. Ras. L. REv. 3 (1971) (arguing that New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), presents the same separation-of-powers issue as Youngs-
town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer).
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The Proper Role for the GAO
Three bills pending in the 93d Congress would provide a reason-
able compromise. They would empower the GAO to file suit for de-
claratory judgment or injunction against executive action it believes
to be illegal.8 This power would go beyond the GAO's primary
function of reporting to Congress and would provide at least one mech-
anism by which genuine disagreements over the legality of executive
action could be tested.
But the GAO needs more than the power to file suit. A disburs-
ing officer is most often acting in accord with a policy that his agency
believes legal. The policy may even have been at least informally ap-
proved by the Attorney General. The Justice Department can thus
find itself in an inherent conflict of interest in such cases. Its duty to
prosecute the disbursing officer can conflict with its desire to defend
administration policy. No lawyer or group of lawyers should be faced
with this conflict of interest. The Justice Department can and appar-
ently does settle most of the cases, which effectively denies the GAO
opportunity to get judicial ratification of its position.89 Thus Congress
should give the Comptroller General the authority to have his own
Office of General Counsel initiate and manage all litigation against
executive action he believes to be in violation of the law.
As suggested above, the GAO should be specifically empowered
88. These are S. 460, tit. VII, S. 1042, and S. 2049, tit. I, 93d Cong. President
Nixon had originally proposed this as a compromise to prevent Congress' passing
Senator Ervin's Philadelphia Plan amendment, discussed in text accompanying note
46 supra: "The position I am taking is, therefore, that the amendment... should be
modified to permit prompt court review of any differences between legal opinions of
the Comptroller General and those of the Executive and to permit the Comptroller
General to have his own counsel (rather than the Attorney General) to represent him
in such cases." 1969 PuBLic PAPERS OF THE Pu EsDENT OF "r-m UNrrEm SrATES:
RicHARD NIXON 1038-39. The legislative debate highlighting these issues and problems
is at 115 CONG. REc. 39,970-73 (1969).
WrLLouGHBY 61 expressly criticizes this approach since in his view matters of
"efficiency" are no business of the courts. It is doubtful, however, that someone
writing now-45 years later-would agree, and indeed the Comptroller General par-
ticipated in developing S. 460, S. 1042, and S. 2049.
89. See MANsFmLD, supra note 25. Could the GAO even now do more? Some say
no, that all the GAO's power comes down to is the power to recommend actions to
the Attorney General who may pursue them or compromise them as he wishes. This,
however, ignores 31 U.S.C. § 93 (1970), which provides: "The General Accounting
Office shall superintend the recovery of all debts finally certified by it to be due to the
United States." Could the GAO "superintend" the Justice Department's handling of a
law suit based on a certification of debt? See 28 U.S.C. §§ 516, 519 (1970). Could it
prohibit a settlement or a confession of error? If this authority were ever asserted by
the GAO, a separation of powers question would be sharply presented.
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to proceed by way of injunction or declaratory judgment, not simply
by disallowance. The validity of a payment is a different question
from the culpability of the disbursing officer. Such officers rarely
are discretionary officials and the object should be to prevent illegal
action, not get "compensation" for it. In order to remove the Comp-
troller General's alleged "control" function once and for all, absolute
personal liability of disbursing and certifying officers should be abol-
ished in theory, as it effectively has been in practice. Such officers
should be liable only for payments knowingly or negligently made
contrary to a specific court decision or unambiguous statute.90
CLAIMS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT
The Philadelphia Plan illustrates the most dramatic kind of GAO
confrontation with the executive branch-the attempt to "disallow" an
entire program. But conflicts also occur in more mundane settings,
such as over the payment of sums allegedly owed by the Government.
The GAO's mandate once again is said to be the statutory direction
that "[a]ll claims and demands whatever by . . . the United States or
against it. . .shall be settled and adjusted in the General Accounting
Office." 1 As previously shown, that language is used to justify disal-
lowances upon audit of completed transactions. It is also used to justify
prior GAO-initiated intervention into the process of deciding whether
a particular Government creditor should be paid.
The Claims Process Generally
Taking the words literally, one possible interpretation of the lan-
guage "settle. .. all claims" might be to make the GAO the clearing-
90. A useful analogy is provided by the Anti-Deficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. § 665
(1970), which forbids expenditures in excess of appropriations. Criminal penalties are
provided for "knowingly and willfully" violating the Act, 31 U.S.C. § 665(i)(1)
(1970), and administrative discipline is authorized for lesser violations. Id. A report
to the President and Congress is required in either case, 31 U.S.C. § 665(i)(2)
(1970), but in no case is the offending official personally liable for the money.
Further, Congress even now has given the Comptroller General authority to re-
lieve disbursing officers from "physical loss or deficiency of Government funds, vou-
chers, records, checks, securities, or papers in his charge" if such loss or deficiency
"occurred without fault or negligence on the part of such officer or agent." 31 U.S.C.
§ 82a-1 (1970). However "illegal" payments may not be so excused. Id. Dis-
bursing officers may also seek relief in the Court of Claims 28 U.S.C. § 1496 (1970).
Certifying officers may be relieved from liability by the Comptroller General even
if the certified payment was technically illegal. 31 U.S.C. § 82c (1970). The two
sections were passed at different times and no explanation of the different treatment
is apparent. See also 31 U.S.C. § 95a (1970).
91. 31 U.S.C. § 71 (1970). The history of this section is set out at note 13
supra.
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house for payment or non-payment of all sums allegedly owed by or
to the United States. In theory, for example, to decide whether a man
was entitled to a pension, the Comptroller General would determine
that a man had been in the Army, had been wounded, had been
honorably discharged, and so on. Indeed the Comptroller General
stands ready to handle some claims himself exactly that way.92 A
claimant need only write a letter stating the nature of his claim and
the amount allegedly due. The GAO will then write to the agency
for its version of the facts. When the facts are in dispute, the agency
version carries a "presumption of correctness," 98 but the claimant may
submit his own documentary evidence, including affidavits, to try to
overcome the presumption. If the GAO has substantial doubt about
a claim, it will disallow it.94
Of course, most claims are not so considered by the GAO. Even
when this section was passed in 1817 the Comptroller did not actually
handle each transaction.9" Then as now the vast majority of claims
against the Government were physically handled through the agency
disbursing officers we have already discussed, a practice that saves
time for agencies and claimants alike.
92. The procedure is set forth in 4 C.F.R. §§ 31.1-.8 (1972). A more complete
description may be found in D. PACE, NEoTIArioN AND MANAGEMENT OF DEFENSE
CoNTRAcrs 38-39 (1970); Foster, The General Accounting Office and Government
Claims, 16 D.C.BJ. 193, 275, 321 (1949); Shnitzer §§ 1736-1751.
We do not in this section discuss collection of debts to the United States. To a
great extent that was covered in Part I. Agencies are expected to collect most debts
themselves. Uncollected debts go to the GAO for coordination and possible set off
against sums owed the same person by another agency. The process is more fully
discussed in Shnitzer §§ 1752-1767.
Further, this article does not consider the GAO's special statutory responsibility
under 49 U.S.C. § 66 (1970) to audit all transportation claims. See Shnitzer §§
1768-1780.
93. E.g., 42 CoN,. GEN. 124, 134 (1962); Foster, supra note 92, at 279. The
regulations are not so candid and say only: "The burden is on claimants to establish
the liability of the United States .... The settlement of claims is based upon the
written record only." 4 C.F.R. § 31.7 (1972).
If this procedure seems archaic, one must remember that the authority to settle
claims has remained virtually unchanged since 1817. That was a time when sovereign
immunity was in full flower and there was no such thing as a court of claims. If
someone had a claim against the United States he took it to the Comptroller or to
Congress, and generally was thankful for anything he got.
94. 42 CoMP. GEN. 124, 142 (1962); 33 COM. GEN. 394 (1954). In doing
so, the GAO relies on Longwill v. United States, 17 Ct. Cl. 288 (1881), and Charles v.
United States, 19 Ct. Cl. 316, 319 (1884): "When ... doubts are entertained as to
the validity of the demands of claimants, the parties may be sent to this court to
prove their cases under the rules and forms of law.. ..
95. For an extensive discussion of the history of claims settlement, see WLL-
ouHmmY 62-69; Cibinic & Lasken 352-58.
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Is a claimant's position any different after a GAO "settlement"
than after a mere agency payment? If the claim is paid he is the-
oretically better off because the GAO will be estopped from later "dis-
allowing" the payment. 96  On the other hand, if the agency turns
the claimant down he can then appeal to the GAO, while the converse
is not true.
Even GAO denial of a claim is not the last word, however. GAO
settlement of a claim is said to be "conclusive on the Executive Branch
of the Government but not on the claimant.19 7 but once again the talk
of a "conclusive" decision confuses more than clarifies the matter. A
far better way to put the rationale for the finality of both agency and
GAO payments at this initial level is the concept of accord and satis-
faction. In reality, when the GAO becomes involved it offers to settle
the claim for a particular sum. If the claimant likes the offer, he
takes it and the matter is closed.98 If it is unacceptable, he pursues
his further judicial or administration remedies. The power to "settle
• ..all claims" appears absolute, but that language was written fifty
years before creation of the Court of Claims as a viable judicial rem-
edy.99 Now many claimants can sue directly in that court, and the
GAO's conclusions in the matter are utterly irrelevant,100 just as set-
tlement negotiations would be in any other case.
Surprisingly little conflict has arisen between the GAO and execu-
tive agencies with respect to this parallel and overlapping jurisdiction
to settle claims. 1° ' Sums at stake have usually been small, relatively
96. Cf. Lambert Lumber Co. v. Jones Eng'r & Constr. Co., 47 F.2d 74 (8th Cir.
1931),
97. Sbnitzer § 1739.
98. Cf. Marr v. United States, 106 F. Supp. 204, 207 (Ct. Cl. 1952). Seen in
this light, the GAO's presumption that the agency is right seems far less arbitrary. It
also is reasonable for it to deny any claim "as to which there exists any substantial
question of fact or law." Shnitzer § 1739.
99. The Court of Claims was created in 1855. Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122,
10 Stat. 612 (1855). The growth in significance of the Court of Claims seems to have
taken the GAO somewhat by surprise. In 1924, Comptroller General McCarl wrote:
[J]udgments of the courts ... are to be reported to the Congress for ap-
propriations. The appropriations originally available for the particular subject
matter are not ordinarily chargeable with such judgments. . . . The differ-
ence in the result in the two forums-the courts and the General Accounting
Office-here clearly appears. A favorable determination by the General Ac-
counting Office upon a claim makes it immediately payable from such moneys
as may remain unexpended in the obligated appropriation. ....
4 Comp. GEN. 404, 406 (1924).
100. E.g., Iran Nat'l Airlines Corp. v. United States, 360 F.2d 640, 641-42
(Ct. Cl. 1966).
101. One area of minor conflict is illustrated by Marr v. United States, 106 F.
Supp. 204 (Ct. Cl. 1952). There a claim for work done for the Alaskan Road Coin-
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few claimants have gone to the GAO for relief, and as to those that
have, the agencies have tended to believe their position was getting
fair consideration from the GAO. In theory, this same basic process
might be available for "settlement" of disputed sums due under Gov-
ernment contracts. Whether or not it is so available has been a mat-
ter of major controversy reaching the United States Supreme Court.
GAO Intervention in the Disputes Process
A Government contract contains clauses that transform what
would ordinarily be a breach of contract by the Government into a
claim for "equitable adjustment" of the contract price. 10 2  The con-
mission was barred by the Court of Claims' six-year statute of limitations. A claim to
the GAO may be filed any time within ten years so the GAO settled the claim in
question. The Commission resisted paying this sum since it thought the Court of
Claims statute protected it. The Court of Claims held, however, that the GAO has
clear authority to so settle. The Court of Claims then had jurisdiction to enforce
the GAO settlement even though not the original debt.
102. For example, the "Changes" clause in a standard contract for supply of
material reads:
The Contracting officer may at any time, by a written order, and with-
out notice to the sureties, make changes, within the general scope of this con-
tract, in any one or more of the following: (i) Drawings, designs, or spec-
ifications, where the supplies to be furnished are to be specially manufac-
tured for the Government in accordance therewith; (ii) method of shipment
or packing; and (iii) place of delivery. If any such change causes an in-
crease or decrease in the cost of, or the time required for, the performance of
any part of the work under this contract, whether changed or not changed by
any such order, an equitable adjustment shall be made in the contract price
or delivery schedule, or both, and the contract shall be modified in writing
accordingly. Any claim by the Contractor for adjustment under this clause
must be asserted within 30 days from the date of receipt by the Contractor of
the notification of change: Provided, however, That the Contracting Officer,
if he decides that the facts justify such action, may receive and act upon any
such claim asserted at any time prior to final payment under this contract.
Failure to agree to any adjustment shall be a dispute concerning a
question of fact within the meaning of the clause of this contract entitled
"Disputes." However, nothing in this clause shall excuse the Contractor
from proceeding with the contract as changed.
41 C.F.R. § 1-7.101-2 (1972). The "Disputes" clause then reads:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this contract, any dispute con-
cerning a question of fact arising under this contract which is not disposed of
by agreement shall be decided by the Contracting Officer, who shall reduce
his decision to writing and mail or otherwise furnish a copy thereof to the
Contractor. The decision of the Contracting officer shall be final and con-
clusive unless, within 30 days from the date of receipt of such copy, the
Contractor mails or otherwise furnishes to the Contracting Officer a written
appeal addressed to the Secretary. The decision of the Secretary or his duly
authorized representative for the determination of such appeals shall be final
and conclusive unless determined by a court of competent jurisdiction to
have been fraudulent, or capricious, or arbitrary, or so grossly erroneous as
necessarily to imply bad faith, or not supported by substantial evidence. In
connection with any appeal proceeding under this clause, the Contractor
shall be afforded an opportunity to be heard and to offer evidence in support
of its appeal. Pending final decision of a dispute hereunder, the Contractor
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tractor must continue work despite the "breach" and must seek his
equitable adjustment first from the contracting officer. If they can
agree, that is the end of the matter, but if they cannot agree, the con-
tractor has thirty days to appeal to the head of the agency.
Almost invariably this in practice means bringing the case before
a board of contract appeals. Such boards are not creatures of stat-
utes. They are established by administrative regulations of their agen-
cies to hear cases arising under agency contracts. 08 The boards range
from legal personnel assigned to hear cases on a part time basis to
large, full-time boards sitting in regular panels.10 4  All, however, hold
full, adversary hearings on the facts and law and render a decision
on the merits.
It may initially seem somewhat surprising that the GAO would
have tolerated so long such an executive procedure that supplants much
of its theoretical authority over claims. Comptroller General McCarl
had early declared himself authorized to consider even unliquidated
disputed claims. 10 5 The Supreme Court, however, had long held that
the power of executive agencies to make contracts includes the power
to settle them.10 The GAO can, and to some extent has, argued that
the Budget and Accounting Act amended that rule, but even McCarl
recognized that the General Accounting Office has never been equipped
to hold adversary hearings. 10 7  As a result it has been severely ham-
pered in making factual determinations. Deciding whether work was
done, at what cost, whether changes were ordered, appropriate over-
head rates, and so on, are virtually impossible for the GAO without
shall proceed diligently with the performance of the contract and in accord-
ance with the Contracting Officer's decision.
(b) This "Disputes" clause does not preclude consideration of law
questions in connection with decisions provided for in paragraph (a) above:
Provided, That nothing in this contract shall be construed as making final
the decision of any administrative official, representative, or board on a ques-
tion of law.
41 C.F.R. § 1-7.101-12 (1972).
103. See Shedd, Disputes and Appeals: The Armed Services Board of Contract Ap-
peals, 29 LAw & CONTE P. PROB. 39, 66 (1964).
104. There are now eleven different boards. A listing of them can be found in
4 REPORT OF a COMM'N ON Gov'T PRocUREMENT 14 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Paoc. CoMM'N]. A good discussion of Board rules of procedure is provided in Burch,
Discovery Procedures and Techniques Before Government Boards of Contract Appeals,
4 PUB. CoN-r. LJ. 119 (1971).
105. 4 Comp. GEN. 404 (1924).
106. United States v. Corliss Steam-Engine Co., 91 U.s. 321 (1875). See also
Cannon Constr. Co. v. United States, 319 F.2d 173, 178 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
107. 4 Cow,. GEN. 404, 405-06 (1924), quoting Comptroller of the Treasury
Downey in 21 CoM. DEc. 134, 138 (1914).
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some sort of documentary record it can take as true. The GAO like-
wise has never had technical personnel on its own staff, so it must rely
on a written record to assess the quality or sufficiency of work done.
As a result, deference to agency fact-finding has been a practical nec-
essity. The GAO calls this "exhaustion of administrative remedies," '
but the label is misleading. The practice derives solely from expediency
and not from primary jurisdiction or any perceived need to defer
agency expertise. 10 9
If a contractor is dissatisfied with a board of contract appeals de-
cision, his ordinary remedy is an appeal to the Court of Claims." 0
That court's review is not de novo. In the early 1950's, in United
States v. Moorman"' and later United States v. Wunderlich," 2 the
Supreme Court had held that there was no judicial review at all of an
administrative decision rendered under the disputes clause absent "con-
scious wrongdoing, an intention to cheat or be dishonest." Congress
reversed those decisions by the so-called W underlich Act," 3 which
provided for an appeal to the Court of Claims on questions of law
and the issue of whether the administrative decision was based on sub-
stantial evidence.
The GAO was not disinterested in the content of the Wunderlich
legislation. In early drafts of the Act, some prepared by it, the GAO
108. 37 CoMI'. Gm. 568 (1958); Comp. Gen. Dec. No. B-169376 (May 13,
1970) (unpublished); Comp. Gen. Dec. No. B-166501 (Apr. 7, 1968) (unpublished);
Comp. Gen. Dec. No. B-160778 (Apr. 25, 1968) (unpublished).
109. Even now, in fact, the Comptroller General insists that some classes of
claims, for example, claims for breach of contract, may only be settled in his office.
E.g., 44 CoMP. GEN. 353, 358 (1969). But see Shedd, Administrative Authority to
Settle Claims for Breach of Government Contracts, 27 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 481 (1959).
This view has been contested by the agencies and the Court of Claims does not agree,
e.g., Cannon Constr. Co. v. United States, 319 F.2d 173 (Ct. Cl. 1963), but it illus-
trates that the GAO still considers determination of sums the Government owes to
be its function and any power in the agencies in this regard to be more a matter of
convenience than a matter of right. Some have proposed an "all breach" disputes
clause to eliminate any distinction between breaches covered by the clause and those
which are not. E.g., Lane, Administrative Resolution of Government Breaches-The
Case for an All-Breach Clause, 28 FED. BJ. 199 (1968); 4 PRoc. COmM'N 22-23.
The Supreme Court has insisted upon "exhaustion of administrative remedies" be-
fore a contractor can file suit in court. E.g., United States v. Joseph A. Holpuch Co.,
328 U.S. 234 (1946). In part, then, the exhaustion of remedies language is one more
example of the GAO conceiving of itself as functionally like a court.
110. The court's jurisdiction is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1970), suits founded
upon an "express or implied contract with the United States." Concurrent jurisdiction
exists in the United States District Courts for claims not exceeding 10,000 dollars.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(2) (1970).
111. 338 U.S. 457 (1950).
112. 342 U.S. 98 (1951).
113. 41 U.S.C. § 321-22 (1964).
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was given a right of review of administrative decisions coequal with
the courts." 4 That is, either side could "appeal" a board of contract
appeals decision to the GAO. Substantial opposition was raised to
that, however, primarily by contractors who feared the GAO would
be a "watchdog of the Treasury" and regularly reverse decisions favor-
able to them.115 Faced with probable defeat of any bill specifically
giving the GAO a right of review, the Comptroller General supported
deletion of that power in exchange for the following language in the
House committee report: "The elimination of the specific mention of
the General Accounting Office from the provisions of the bill as
amended should not be construed as taking away any of the jurisdic-
tion of that office."'1 6 The Comptroller General asserted the GAO
had lost nothing and was "in precisely the same situation it was in
before [the Wunderlich case]." 17
The Function of a Contract Appeals Board
To find one's way through the rhetoric in this area, it is important
to see that there are two inconsistent but often simultaneously held
views of the nature of an agency board of contract appeals. On the
one hand, the disputes clause provides that the board is the "duly au-
thorized representative" of the head of the agency. This may imply
that it provides a high level review from the perspective of the Secre-
tary." 8 On the other hand, the trial-type, objective character of the
proceeding and the relative finality that is accorded its findings of fact
make the Board seem more like an independent administrative court
114. S. 2487, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952), as amended by the Senate. See S. REP.
No. 1670, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1952). This history is set out in great detail in
Justice Brennan's dissent in S & E Contractors v. United States, 406 U.S. 1, 23-90
(1972).
115. The flavor of this period is captured in Schultz, Proposed Changes in Govern-
ment Contract Disputes Settlement: The Legislative Battle Over the Wunderlich Case,
67 HAnv. L. REv. 217 (1953); Spector, Is it "Bianchi's Ghost"-Or "Much Ado
About Nothing," 29 LAW & CONTEMp. PRon. 87, 108-111 (1964). In particular,
concern was expressed over what uncertainty over possible GAO "reversal" would do
to a contractor's ability to get further credit. Schultz, supra at 243-244.
116. H.R. REP. No. 1380, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1954).
117. Hearings before Subcommittee No. 1 of the House Judiciary Committee on
H.R. 1839 et al., 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1953-54) at 136. The question then
arises what the GAO's authority was before Wunderlich. Courts following the Khi-
berg analysis had generally not upheld review. See James Graham Mfg. Co. v. United
States, 91 F. Supp. 715 (N.D. Cal. 1950); Note, S & E Contractors and the GAO Role
in Government Contract Disputes: A Funny Thing Happened on the Vay to Finality,
55 VA. L. REV. 762, 770-72 (1969).
118. See, e.g., McWilliams Dredging Co. v. United States, 118 Ct. Cl. 1 (1950).
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than an extension of the executive agency. 119 In the ordinary case the
nature of a Board never becomes an issue, but in some it is decisive.
The importance of the distinction is illustrated by Continental
Aviation & Engineering Corp.,20 which concerned the allowability of
certain overhead costs and the propriety of the contractor's accounting
methods in years prior to the current contract. The Assistant Secre-
tary of the Army unilaterally asked for an opinion of the Comptroller
General on the question presented. The Comptroller General held that
the contractor's proposed cost allocation violated "universally accepted
accounting principles" and suggested that the agency recover payments
previously made on the "illegal" basis.' 21 "By direction of the Assist-
ant Secretary" of the Army, the contracting officer acted accordingly.
An appeal to the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals fol-
lowed. It was urged that the Board could not hear the appeal. The
Comptroller General had already heard and decided the legal issues,
and the Assistant Secretary of the Army had in effect acquiesced. If
the Board is the alter ego of the agency head, the Government rea-
soned, its decision can have no effect once the Secretary has acted.
Once the Comptroller General has ruled, it could also have been said,
the agency may not act to the contrary.
The Board rejected this view and upheld the contractor's posi-
tion.' 22 It acted as if it were a court, reached the merits, and decided
that under the Kihlberg principle we have already seen,' 21 settlements
made under prior years' contracts cannot be upset. 4
119. This position is espoused convincingly in Shedd, supra note 103, at 68-69.
Even so, it is argued by some that a lesser standard of due process than that pre-
scribed by the Administrative Procedure Act is required for board proceedings. See
Schultz, supra note 115; Cuneo, The Administrative Procedure Act Does Not Apply to
Boards of Contract Appeals, 1 PuB. CONT. L.J. 18 (1967); Spector, Public Contract
Claims Procedures-A Perspective, 32 FE. BJ. 1 (1972). But see Davis, The Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act Applies to Boards of Contract Appeals, I PUB. CONT.
L.J 4, 5-7 (1967).
120. 65-1 B.C.A. 22,284 (Armed Services Bd. Contract App. 1965).
121. Comp. Gen. Dec. No. B-152462 (Jan. 15, 1964) (unpublished). A similar
request from the Assistant Secretary of the Army for advice on a pending Armed
Services Board of Contract Appeals case was rendered several years earlier in Comp.
Gen. Dec. No. B-126848 (Feb. 21, 1956) (unpublished). See also Comp. Gen. Dec.
No. B-118929 (Apr. 10, 1956) (unpublished) (similar request from the General Serv-
ices Administration).
122. 65-1 B.C.A. at 22,286.
123. See text accompanying notes 66-69 supra.
124. It might have openly asserted that it was "independent" and not bound by its
alter ego's-the Assistant Secretary of the Army's-apparent concession. Instead it
avoided facing the issue directly and asserted that the Secretary of the Army had
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In so construing its authority, the Board seemed to be acting con-
sistently with the then-most-recent decision of the Supreme Court,
United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co.125 In Bianchi the Armed Services
Board of Contract Appeals had made a factual record, but the Court of
Claims based its reversal in part on new evidence not presented to the
Board. If the Board were simply a required step to let the head of the
agency make an "offer" before the contractor went to court, such an
approach would be sound. The level at which the contractor intro-
duced his evidence would be his business. If, however, the Board is
the "trial cdurt" in a judicial process, no new evidence should come in
on appeal.
The Supreme Court took the latter view. It recognized that the
administrative proceeding is an essential part of the expeditious, fair
resolution of claims. Thus both sides should be compelled to make their
best case at the first level. Bianchi was immediately seen as an im-
portant decision and was widely read to give a quasi-judicial status to
Board proceedings.
12
Even after Bianchi, however, the GAO considered that it, too,
had a role in the disputes process. For example, in one case it ruled
that the AEC Board of Contract Appeals had no jurisdiction to entertain
an appeal filed more than thirty days after the decision of the contract-
ing officer. No opinion on the merits of the claim was expressed-that
never actually considered the issue carefully. Thus, the Board reasoned, it was able
to act.
Other boards of contract appeals have held they are not ousted of jurisdiction by
the fact that the GAO has previously rendered an opinion on the same factual and
legal questions in the same case. Blake Constr. Co., 71-2 B.C.A. 41,986 (Gen. Services
Admin. Bd. Contract App. 1971); So-Sew Styles, Inc., 71-1 B.C.A. 41,115 (Armed
Services Bd. Contract App. 1971); Emerson Radio & Phonograph Corp., No. NBS-1
(Commerce Dept. Ed. Contract App. Aug. 14, 1957) (unpublished), discussed in
Comp. Gen. Dec. No. B-120714 (Feb. 27, 1958) (unpublished).
But see Winston Bros. Co., 67-1 B.C.A. 29,367, 67-2 B.C.A. 30,751 (Interior
Bd. Contract App. 1967); Reid Contracting Co., 58-2 B.C.A. 8523 (Interior Bd.
Contract App. 1958); Lipsett, Inc., 57-2 B.C.A. 4999 (Armed Services Bd. Contract
App. 1957).
See also Comp. Gen. Dec. No. B-134500 (Feb. 6, 1961) (unpublished), where
the Comptroller General conceded that his earlier decision was not binding on the
Board because it was based on incomplete facts.
125. 373 U.S. 709 (1963).
126. E.g., Davis, supra note 119; Comment, Government Contract Disputes: An
Institutional Approach, 73 YALE L.J. 1409, 1443 (1964).
Bianchi was reaffirmed three years later in United States v. Anthony Grace &
Sons, Inc., 384 U.S. 424 (1966). There the appeals board had ruled it had no juris-
diction and thus had made no record or findings on the substantive issues. The Court
of Claims reversed the jurisdictional point and proceeded to take evidence itself on the
substantive questions. The Supreme Court reversed saying the case should have been
sent back for the Board to make the record.
1316 [Vol. 51
1973] GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE 1317
was not properly before the Comptroller General-but the AEC was
ordered not to pay the sum it had determined was due.
127
Shortly thereafter, in a case involving the Curtiss-Wright Corpora-
tion, the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals had computed
rental on Government-furnished equipment used in commercial
work. 28  The GAO thought the formula used was inadequate to com-
pensate the Government, but a final settlement had been made prior
to the GAO decision. Rather than proceed down the hopeless road
of disallowance, the Comptroller General reacted by sending a directive
to all executive agencies:
Effective immediately, any release or contractual instruments
entered into as a result of a decision by a board of contract ap-
peals, the head of an agency, or a contracting officer under a
contract disputes clause shall include a provision to the effect that
the instrument is not binding if the decision is later found to be in
violation of the standards set forth in the Wunderlich Act.129
The directive was universally ignored, 30 but the GAO's conception of
its role was once again made clear.
The GAO was not alone in its view of its role in disputes cases.
It was able to cite what seemed to be judicial confirmation of that role.
In C.J. Langenfelder & Sons v. United States'81 the Federal Aviation
Agency Contract Appeals Panel had reversed the contracting officer
and granted the plaintiffs claim. The contracting officer refused to
127. 42 COMP. GEN. 357 (1963). The substantive point of this decision is
probably no longer good law. Cf. Money Aircraft Parts, Inc. v. United States, 453
F.2d 1260 (Ct. Cl. 1972). In yet another case, the Comptroller General held Bianchi
applied to him and forbade his considering evidence not before the Board. 43
CoMP. GEN. 1 (1963). In Comp. Gen. Dec. No. B-142040 (Aug. 27, 1962) (unpub-
lished), Comptroller General Campbell had disagreed with the Board but found its
opinion supported by substantial evidence and thus did not try to reverse it. See also
Comp. Gen. Dec. No. B-144847 (Feb. 14, 1961) (unpublished); Comp. Gen. Dec. No.
B-136897, B-139976 (Nov. 18, 1959) (unpublished); Comp. Gen. Dec. No. B-105694
(Nov. 16, 1951) (unpublished).
128. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 58-2 B.C.A. 7770 (Armed Services Bd. Contract App.
1958), 59-2 B.C.A. 10,711 (Armed Services Bd. Contract App. 1959), 59-2 B.C.A.
11,603 (Armed Services Bd. Contract App. 1959).
129. Comp. Gen. Directive No. B-125096, at 1 (Apr. 30, 1963). Comptroller
General Campbell continued:
Since the Congress clearly intended that relief would be provided in any case
where a disputes decision did not conform with the standards of the Wnder-
lich Act, it is clearly inappropriate to permit a release or other contractual
instrument to create finality in such a decision and thus, as a practical mat-
ter, to circumvent the intent of the Congress in the Wunderlich Act.
Id. at 3.
130. Cibinic & Lasken 371.
131. 341 F.2d 600 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
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pay, and the plaintiff sought summary judgment to confirm what the
Board had awarded. The Court of Claims held that
[A]dministrative rulings against the Government are not wholly
free from judicial review. The Comptroller General had long as-
serted authority to examine such determinations and to deny pay-
ment on the basis of illegality. . . . One of the major reasons
for the passage of the [Wunderlich Act] ...was to assure the
General Accounting Office a limited right of scrutiny comparable
to (though perhaps not precisely the same as) that given to the
courts. . . Where the issue is one of law (e.g., interpretation
of the contract), this court has upheld exercises of that power.18 2
Indeed the Court of Claims in Associated Traders, Inc. v. United
States 88 had expressly permitted GAO disapproval of a Board deci-
sion to be used as the basis for a Government "appeal." There the
Government simply refused to pay a Board award. That forced the con-
tractor to appeal himself. Rather than enforce the Board decision as
final, the Court of Claims reviewed the decision using the Wunderlich
Act standards. The right of Government appeal was thus arguably
established, at least by the Court of Claims.
The S & E Contractors Case
Although these earlier examples of GAO review of contract ap-
peals board decisions existed, the critical test of GAO authority was
provided by S & E Contractors, Inc. v. United States,'84 a case which
has implications for each of the issues raised in this article about GAO
authority.
In 1962 S & E Contractors had built an enclosed testing basin for
the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) at a site in Idaho. Its bid
price had been 1.3 million dollars, but its actual costs, including over-
head and profit, were 2.7 million dollars. The company filed a claim
with the contracting officer for the 1.4 million dollar cost increase.
The contracting officer denied most of the company's claim.
Since the AEC had no board of contract appeals at that time,
the matter was referred to a hearing examiner who reversed the con-
tracting officer and sustained most of the contractor's demands. The
132. Id. at 608 (citing cases).
133. 169 F. Supp. 502 (Ct. Cl. 1959). This case was decided by the Court of
Claims the same day it decided Bianchi. The latter was reversed by the Supreme
Court in 1963, as we have seen. It took the Supreme Court nine years longer to wipe
out Associated Traders in S & E Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 406 U.S. 1 (1972).
134. 406 U.S. 1 (1972).
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AEC in effect upheld the hearing examiner on four of the eight claims
by exercising a certiorari-like power not to review; on three others it
affirmed his decision as modified.18 5 The contracting officer was di-
rected to determine the amount due and make payment accordingly.
At this point an AEC certifying officer wrote to the GAO for an
advance opinion on whether he could legally pay the Commission's
award on one of the disputed claims. The GAO ruled that "essen-
tially a question of law" was presented and that because the Wunder-
lich Act makes board decisions of law not final, it could therefore re-
view the case. It took the GAO almost three years to reach a deci-
sion. Then, in late 1966 the GAO ruled that not only the claim it
had been asked about, but also all of the contractor's other claims,
should be denied because the AEC's decision upholding them was
"not supported by substantial evidence."'18 6 At that point, the AEC
concluded that it would "take no action in connection with the claims,




The contractor's only recourse was to file suit in the Court of
Claims. He cited the decision of the AEC as binding and said the Gov-
ernment was in breach of contract for not paying. Adding breach
damages to his original claim, the damages sought rose to almost two
million dollars.
The Justice Department in defending the appeal had its own axe to
grind. It did not want to concede that the GAO had any right to re-
view the decisions of executive agencies. Instead the Justice Depart-
ment made a "thorough and independent review" of the whole record
itself and made an "uninfluenced" decision that the AEC decision was
indeed wrong.'38  The Attorney General urged the court to see the
GAO intervention "as being the occasion but not the cause of the liti-
gation and in no way itself an administrative decision having effect
. . . or coming under. . . review" in the Court of Claims.'
39
The Court of Claims upheld the Justice Department's view. It
held
that the Comptroller's powers of decision and settlement, though
great, may be assumed to lapse and fail at the Court House
135. Id. at 5-6.
136. 46 Comp. GN. 441, 451 (1966). The opinion goes into elaborate detail
on the GAO's theory of its jurisdiction. Id. at 451-63.
137. 433 F.2d 1373, 1374 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
138. Id. at 1375.
139. Id.
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door. Therefore, it is not necessary for us to determine what de-
cisions he might make or what finality they might have in cases
not brought before us.
40
The Court, following its own precedents, sent the case back to the
Commissioner for review under Wunderlich Act standards.
The Supreme Court reversed in 1972 in an opinion by Justice
Douglas. The purpose of the disputes clause is, the Court said, "to
provide a quick and efficient administrative remedy and to avoid 'vex-
atious and expensive and, to the contractor oftentimes, ruinous litiga-
tion.'" This case was almost ten years old, the court noted, and that
almost per se provided an example of "vexatious litigation.''
A citizen has the right to expect fair dealing from his gov-
ernment ... and this entails in the present context treating the
goVernment as a unit rather than as an amalgam of separate en-
tities. . . . [T]he A.E.C. spoke for the United States and its de-
cision, absent fraud or bad faith, should be honored.
142
The result in the particular case was not entirely unexpected.
Indeed even the GAO had admitted that its review authority was in-
direct and limited to causing the AEC to withold payment. 14  The
Government's only real argument was the theory that both parties-
not just the claimant-should be held to have a right of appeal. The
Court, however, dismissed the idea, saying, "Normally . . . the duty
of the Department of Justice is to implement [an agency] decision and
not to repudiate it."'
1 44
More damaging to the GAO than the result, which after all was
basically consistent with Kihlberg, may be the court's gratuitous dicta.
First it spoke of GAO and Justice Department review as "additional
140. Id.
141. 406 U.S. at 8, quoting Kihlberg v. United States, 97 U.S. 398, 401 (1878).
Kihlberg is discussed at text accompanying note 66 supra. It, of course, did not in-
volve a disputes clause.
On the matter of the timely decision, see Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v.
United States, 461 F.2d 1352 (Ct. CI. 1972). There the Maritime Administration
had had a claim before it for four years, and the contractor finally filed suit before
the Board decision alleging the delay constituted a breach of contract over which the
Court of Claims had jurisdiction. The court agreed that in some circumstances delay
could be a breach but found four years was not too long in this case.
142. 406 U.S. at 10.
143. Brief for United States at 44. The Government was represented in the Su-
preme Court by the Justice Department, specifically by Mr. Irving Jaffe of the Civil
Division, who has been at odds with the GAO's view of its jurisdiction. See notes 59
& 79 supra. In order to get the GAO position before the Court, the GAO prepared a
ten-page appendix to the Government's brief.
144. 406 U.S. at 13.
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bureaucratic oversight," '145 hardly boding well for any alleged power
of disallowance. Then, in a footnote the Court discussed the spe-
cific statutory power given the GAO to inspect contractor records look-
ing for kickbacks and said: "If the Comptroller General has the broad,
roving investigatory powers that are asserted, specific statutory grants
of authority such as this provision relating to kickbacks would be
superfluous.'
146
Justice Blackmun, speaking for four Justices, added insult to in-
jury in a statement directly undercutting any pretentions as to the
power to disallow:
[T]he Government, by its position here, would grant itself the
right to challenge its own executive determination whenever the
General Accounting Office, by interposition, thinks this should be
done. This, for me, does not make good sense and, in the ab-
sence of clear congressional authorization, I doubt that it would
make good law.
1 47
Justice Brennan wrote a lengthy dissent, convincingly showing
the role the GAO had played, or tried to play, since 1921. He argued
that at the time the Wunderlich Act was passed, a right of appeal ex-
isted in the Government, albeit not an appeal to the GAO. 4 ' Only
two other Justices were persuaded, however, and the GAO has gotten
out of the disputes business, at least for now.
49
145. Id. at 14.
146. Id. at 10 n.8.
147. Id. at 20.
148. Id. at 23-90. The opinion was joined by Justices White and Marshall.
The Wunderlich Act says simply that the board's decision shall not be "final on a
question of law," 41 U.S.C. § 322 (1970), or where its findings are "fraudulent or
capricious or arbitrary or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith, or not
supported by substantial evidence." 41 U.S.C. § 321 (1970). It has been argued that
a decision not satisfying those standards is wholly void, and that the invalidity thus
may be asserted by anyone, including the GAO. The problem with such reasoning is
that the disputes clause is more precise and says a board decision is "final" until re-
versed "by a court of competent jurisdiction." See note 102 supra. This more
specific language could and should be said to estop the Government from denying
finality. Further, S & E Contractors could easily have been decided on this more
narrow basis and thus could have answered Mr. Justice Brennan's elaborate discussion
of legislative intent.
149. Indeed the GAO might argue that its authority to collaterally attack a Board
decision is not directly affected by S & E Contractors. That is, it might argue it could
set off the "illegal" award on a later contract, see, e.g., United States v. Cohen, 389
F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1967), or direct the Justice Department to sue to recover the
"illegal" payment. The message of S & E Contractors seems loud and clear, however,
that once a contractor gets an award, it is his and no "bureaucratic" review can take
it from him. The Court of Claims has so held. In Dynalectron Corp. v. United
States, 18 CCH CoNT. CAs. F. 81,757 (CL Cl. 1972), the board had ruled partly for
the contractor and partly for the government. Each appealed from part of the deci-
sion. The court held the contractor's objections could be heard but the government's
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What Should the GAO Role Be in the Disputes Process?
If a board of contract appeals proceeding is in effect a request
that the head of the agency informally look over what his contracting
officer decided, then S & E Contractors is right: the board decision
should be looked at as a mere offer which the claimant may choose to
accept or reject. The claimant should be able to "appeal," i.e., get a
binding judgment, but the agency should not be able to impeach its
own offer. A fortiori, as S & E Contractors held, the GAO should
be able to criticize agency settlements but not stop payments.
If, on the other hand, a board appeal is seen as the first step in
an adversary judicial procedure, it makes little sense to say one liti-
gant is bound by it but not the other.150 This latter view seemed
to have been taken in Bianchi, and S & E Contractors notwithstanding,
it seems more to comport with reality.
Boards of contract appeals today are a mixed lot of varying in-
dependence and quality, but the idea of the board acting as alter ego
of the head of the agency is ludicrous-at least as regards the major
boards. Suggestions have been made to move more nearly to a few
full-time independent boards which behave and are treated as inde-
pendent bodies. 151 The suggestions have regularly been opposed by
could not. The GAO has heard the message of S & E Contractors and has quietly
retreated from its practice of review. Comp. Gen. Dec. No. B-174899 at 5 (June 1,
1972) (unpublished): "[T]his Office . .. will no longer review Board of Contract
Appeals decisions absent a showing of fraud or bad faith." Indeed in 52 CoMI'. GEN.
63 (1972), it even withdrew its objection to payment under a Board award it had
"reversed" before S & E Contractors.
150. Justice Blackmun, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and
Powell, uncritically accepted a proposition that illustrates the problem exactly. He
wrote, "The result would be a strange one if, as even the GAO here concedes, a con-
tracting officer's decision favorable to a contractor possesses finality . . . while a de-
cision at the higher level of the agency itself does not." 406 U.S. at 20-21. That re-
sult is not at all strange if one sees the contracting officer's decision as an "offer," the
acceptance of which constitutes an accord and satisfaction, while the Board's decision
is analogous to that of a trial court which may be appealed by either side. Put another
way, it is presumably not "strange" that the Government may seek certiorari from a
decision of the Court of Claims. To find appeal from a Board decision "strange" is
to assume away the question: Is the Board more like a court or more like an informal
superior of the contracting officer? The Commission on Government Procurement, by
a vote of seven to five, has now proposed reversing S & E Contractors by legislation to
give both sides the right of appeal. 4 PRoc. CoMM'N 25-27. This recommendation
has been incorporated as § 9(e) of H.R. 9062, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
151. E.g., Frana, Are There Too Many Boards of Contract Appeals?, 17 CATHi.
U.L. R.v. 44 (1967). The boards are now purely creatures of contract and administra-
tive regulation. In order to confirm their jurisdiction and trial-type character, legisla-
tion would be desirable.
In fairness, it should be said that there is a strong current of thought that boards
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the small agencies, who believe that separate boards better understand
the problems of specific agencies. Consolidation, or at least common
rules of procedure,152 seem essential, however, to have a fair, responsive
system.
What would be the GAO's role in such a system? Congress could
use S & E Contractors as a catalyst for legislation, as it did with Wun-
derlich, and could grant the GAO the power of review. It should not
do so, however. First, the GAO is not equipped to act as an appellate
court. Of course, in this kind of proceeding, especially after Bianchi,
fact-finding is no problem. But GAO review is wholly in camera, by
members of the general counsel's office unknown to the parties. Fur-
ther, the GAO is an agency with a definite policy-making role. Try
as it may to be fair, the GAO is simply not a court.'"8
In its efforts to give dignity and finality to Board decisions, the
Court in S & E Contractors, and indeed in Bianchi, was certainly cor-
rect. The Air Force General Counsel put it well when he said:
[A]t some time, litigation of a dispute must come to an end. The
longer cases drag on, the more both sides lose. Litigation costs,
uncertainty, impairment of credit and countless other factors make
defeat more difficult and victory less real. It is only natural for
a losing lawyer-Government or private-to believe that justice
of contract appeals should either be dissolved altogether and claimants left to a judicial
remedy, or that claimants have the alternatives of a judicial remedy. Congressman
Celler has so proposed. H.R. 14726, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). The position is
persuasively advocated in Spector, Public Contract Claims Procedures-A Perspective,
30 FED. B.J. 1, 11 (1971). Mr. Spector is a Commissioner of the Court of Claims and
a former Chairman of the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals. The alterna-
tive direct judicial remedy was also advocated by the Commission on Government
Procurement. 4 PRoc. COMM'N 23-25. This recommendation is § 7 of H.R. 9062,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); cf. Comment, 73 YALE L.J, supra note 126, at 1450-57,
which proposes creation of an entirely new court to hear such cases.
152. A proposed set of common rules was prepared by Professor Whelan's seminar
at Georgetown University and published as PROPOSED UNIFOEm RULEs oF PRocEDURE
FOR GOvERNMENT AGENCY BoARDs OF CoNTA cr APPEALs (1967). "Model Rules for
Boards of Contract Appeals," based on the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals
rules, were proposed by a Federal Bar Association Committee, in 1968 and "Proposed
Uniform Contract Appeals Rules" were developed by an ABA committee in 1972. See
Burch, supra note 104 at 122-23; FED. CoNT. REP. No. 443, Aug. 21, 1972, at E-1.
153. This lack of procedural due process in GAO review has bothered commenta-
tors. Doolittle, Review of Boards of Contract Appeals Decisions, 39' PA. B.A.Q. 516
(1968); Kostos, Review of Boards of Contract Appeals Decisions, 39 PA. B.A.Q. 521,
523-24 (1968). Others, however, suggest that procedural due process was not a central
issue in passage of the Wunderlich Act. Schultz, Wunderlich Revisited. New Limits
on Judicial Review of Administrative Determination of Government Contract Disputes,
29 LAw & CoNTEM,. PRoB. 115, 118 (1964); Comment, 18 CATH. U.L. Rv., supra
note 45, at 549. The fact that Congress did not make it a basis for decision says
nothing, however, about the appropriateness for so considering it.
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would be done if he had but one more chance to appeal. Yet
looking at the issue objectively, a system for resolving differences
becomes less just, not more, when basically fair, impartial deci-
sions are subject to repeated reviews. Even assuming that each
additional review would catch a few more 'mistakes,' in most sit-
uations the long run benefits would be less than the long run
costs. However well intentioned, then, we believe the GAO's
participation in the disputes process would probably not be in the
long-run interest either of the Government or of the contractors. 1,4
This is the philosophy that should govern the entire disputes pro-
cedure. Congress never dreamed of boards of contract appeals in 1817
when it gave claims authority to the forerunner of the GAO. Present
authority should reflect current realities and current needs. To the
maximum extent possible the Government and contractor should be
permitted and encouraged to settle all issues at the lowest possible level
-that of the contracting officer. The more levels of appeal there are,
the less will be the incentive of either side to negotiate hard and com-
promise differences. The GAO should, of course, be permitted and
encouraged to investigate and criticize any specific settlements. What
should be avoided is the GAO's random intervention in cases, either to
penalize contractors or to charge disbursing officers for improper set-
tlements.
If, on the other hand, Congress were to change the law and grant
the Government a right of appeal, one recent change and an additional
one proposed here should reduce the problems feared by the majority
in S & E Contractors. First, it is ironic that just shortly before the
Supreme Court decided S & E Contractors, much of the rationale for
it was undercut by the long overdue administrative decision to pay six
percent interest on claims against the Government from the time they
are filed to the time resolved. 55 Thus any delay is now at least partly
at the Government's expense, not the contractor's.
Another much needed change would be to simplify the Court of
Claims rules so as to accelerate Wunderlich Act appeals. At present,
one cannot just file a notice of appeal, then brief and argue his case.
The court requires a complaint and answer, followed by a motion for
summary judgment.'5 That is fine for an ordinary civil suit in the
154. Doolittle, supra note 153, at 518.
155. ASPR 7-104.82, 37 Fed. Reg. 21,499 (1972); FRP 1-1.322, 37 Fed. Reg.
15,152 (1970). The agencies got advance approval of the Comptroller General before
agreeing to this practice. 51 CoMP. GEN. 251 (1971). This clause applies only to
future contracts, of course, and was not used in the contract in S & E Contractors.
156. The rules of the Court of Claims are found in 28 U.S.C. (1970). See gener-
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Court of Claims where the facts to be proved are in doubt, but in
Wunderlich Act cases it can take a year to get the case at issue. Even
with six percent interest, a Government appeal could be "vexatious"
delay under the present rules. With these changes, however, Govern-
ment contract litigation should be no more time-consuming than any
other.
The Southside Plumbing Case
The converse of the S & E Contractors situation was presented
in a case involving the Southside Plumbing Company. 157  It and S &
E Contractors were handed down only three days apart and were
premised on the same view of the GAO's rule in the disputes process.
Southside had done rehabilitation work on family housing units
at Hunter Air Force Base in Georgia. It had been directed by the
contracting office to insulate air conditioning ducts in a manner the
contractor believed was not required by the specifications. His claim
for extra compensation for this work was denied by the contracting
officer and, on review, the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals
sustained the administrative decision.15 Instead of appealing to the
Court of Claims, however, the contractor sought relief from; the GAO.
In an unusual but not entirely unprecedented decision,' 59 the GAO
concluded that it had jurisdiction coextensive with the Court of Claims
to review Board decisions that had been favorable to the Government.
Ruling that interpretation of specifications presents a question of law
that the Wunderlich Act makes not binding on either party, it pur-
ally Jacoby, Procedure in the United States Court of Claims, in WEST'S FDERAL
PRACriCE §§ 1930, 1942 (2d ed. M. Volz 1970); King & Little, Critique of Public
Construction Contract Remedies with Recommended Changes, 5 PUB. CONT. L.J. 6-12
(1972).
157. Comp. Gen. Dec. No. B-156192 (Dec. 8, 1966) (unpublished). The prob-
lem raised by Southside Plumbing was apparently overlooked by the Commission on
Government Procurement.
158. CCH 1964 Bd. Cont. App. Dec. 4314; CCH 1963 Bd. Cont. App. Dec.
11 3982.
159. The written opinion in one earlier case can be found at 44 Covw. GEN. 1
(1964). The GAO reports that it certified a voucher for payment in another case in
1961. Brief on the Jurisdiction of the General Accounting Office with Special Refer-
ence to B-156192 (Dec. 8, 1966) (unpublished, submitted to the Attorney General in
connection with his review of the case). See also Comp. Gen. Dec. No. B-152346
(Nov. 22, 1963, Dec. 31, 1964) (unpublished) (considering an appeal on the merits
but rejecting the contractor's claim); Comp. Gen. Dec. No. B-150515 (Nov. 13, 1963)
(unpublished), (saying issues were of "sufficient doubt . . . that we must reject your
claim and leave you to prosecute it in the courts if you so desire"); Comp. Gen. Dec.
No. B-35514 (July 18, 1945) (unpublished).
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ported to "reverse' the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals.
At this point, GAO faced its inherent problem; it has no fact-finding
machinery. Thus it ordered the Air Force to determine administra-
tively the amount due and then to pay the contractor.
The entire sum claimed was only 45,000 dollars, and one might
have expected the Air Force to pay just to keep peace with the GAO.
But it did not do so. The Air Force General Counsel wrote the Comp-
troller General that the GAO had no authority to order an agency to
pay what the agency's board of contract appeals had determined was
not legally owing.' 60 If one views a board decision essentially as fac-
tual determinations of the head of the agency, then it is not illogical
for the GAO to use it in conjunction with its own perceived statutory
responsibility to pay claims. But if that is true, there is no need for
the Comptroller General to apply Wunderlich Act standards.
The Air Force submitted the controversy to the Attorney General
for directions.' 6' Just as he was leaving office, Attorney General Ram-
sey Clark wrote that the disputes process is a matter between the execu-
tive branch and the courts. 0 2 He accepted the view that the Gov-
ernment could "appeal" an adverse board decision by nonpayment or
later set-off, and he encouraged executive agencies to submit such cases
to the Justice Department when appropriate. But the GAO had noth-
ing to add, he concluded, either in the S & E Contractors-type case or
this one. Further, in part because GAO procedures lacked due proc-
ess, he ruled that its decisions should not even be followed on the basis
of executive-legislative comity.
Shortly after the change of administrations, Comptroller General
Statts informed Attorney General Mitchell that he rejected the "opinion
of your predecessor."' 63  At that point the contractor filed suit in the
Court of Claims. Rather than get a judicial test of the issues, how-
ever, the Justice Department settled the case.
160. Letter from J. William Doolittle to Frank H. Weitzel, May 15, 1967.
161. Letter from Harold Brown, Secretary of the Air Force, to Attorney General
Ramsey Clark, Nov. 13, 1967.
162. 42 Op. ATr'y. GEN. No. 33 (1969). Attorney General Clark also held that
agencies should send him, not the Comptroller General, any decisions of boards of
contract appeals which they believed failed to meet Wunderlich Act standards so that
he could analyze them and recommend action. Needless to say, after S & E Con-
tractors, there is nothing left of that direction.
163. Comp. Gen. Dec. No. B-156192 (Feb. 7, 1969) (unpublished). '"his letter
has reference to the opinion of your predecessor dated January 16, 1969 .... [Wie
are in complete disagreement with the conclusion reached."
In confirmation of this position, the General Accounting Office agreed to decide
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What should the Comptroller General's rule be in such a situa-
tion? Is his power to pay claims in the face of a board decision as
limited as his power to deny them? The answer to the latter question
is probably no. S & E Contractors seems to have been decided largely
on the basis that contractors should not have to wait for their money.
Clearly no such problem exists when the GAO offers to pay.
Then if the GAO rules in favor of the contractor, what rights
does the contractor have if, as in Southside Plumbing, the agency re-
sists payment? Or indeed, what if the agency pays but then sets off
the sum on the next contract in order to recoup the "overpayment"?
Before S & E Contractors the Court of Claims might have followed
Associated Traders'" and Langenfelder 65 and treated the resistance as
a legitimate Government "appeal" of the GAO decision. On the other
hand, the court even then would likely have treated the GAO ruling
as "settlement" of the controversy. Indeed the "final and conclusive
upon the Executive branch" 16 language was originally adopted to com-
pel recalcitrant agencies to award Civil War bonuses, 167 so a finding of
GAO authority to pay contractors would have historical support. Cer-
tainly after S & E Contractors, such a GAO settlement would be en-
forced. The real question is not whether the GAO may act but
whether it should.
The better view would seem to be that it should not. The Gen-
eral Accounting Office simply has nothing unique to add to the proc-
ess. The contractor's remedies are too diverse and overlapping as
things stand.16 8  The aim should be to provide adequate judicial-type
fact-finding machinery before the board of contract appeals, plus an
expeditious appeal by either side to the Court of Claims. If it is al-
the "appeal" of the Southwest Engineering Co. from a decision of the Armed Services
Board of Contract Appeals. It submitted the contractor's letter to the Air Force for
comment. Comp. Gen. Dec. No. B-166157 (Feb. 17, 1969) (unpublished). The Air
Force refused to comment. Letter from William Munves, Deputy Air Force General
Counsel, to M.E. Miller, Mar. 12, 1969 (unpublished). The GAO ultimately decided
the case on the merits, but concluded the Board decision should not be reversed.
Comp. Gen. Dec. No. B-166157 (Apr. 11, 1969) (unpublished).
164. Associated Traders, Inc. v. United States, 169 F. Supp. 502 (Ct. Cl. 1959).
165. CJ. Langenfelder & Sons v. United States, 341 F.2d 600 (.Ct. Cl. 1965).
166. 31 U.S.C. § 74 (1970).
167. Baltimore & O.R.R. Co. v. United States, 34 Ct. Cl. 484 (1899); MANS-
FsiLD 58; Cibinic & Lasken 355-58.
168. Professors Nash and Cibinic have identified five or more partly concurrent
and often overlapping approaches a contractor can take for resolution of a contract
controversy. Hearings before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1760-61 (1969). See also Whelan, A Government Contractor's
Remedies: Claims and Counterclaims, 42 U. VA. L. REv. 301 (1956).
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leged that an appeal to the Court of Claims is too time-consuming,
the remedy should be to streamline the court's procedures as suggested
earlier. The General Accounting Office can perform some roles well,
but claims settlement in the disputes context is not one of them.
GAO INVOLVEMENT tN' BiD PROTEST CASES
The preceding two examples of GAO involvement in the day-to-
day work of executive agencies are, of course, important. Neither,
however, approaches the degree of GAO participation in agency deci-
sions through its handling of protests by disgruntled bidders. Once
again the protest procedure is simple."6 9 A contractor who believes
he has been wrongfully denied a Government contract need only write
a letter to that effect to the Comptroller General. The GAO then
gets the agency's version of the facts, which may be rebutted in writings
by the contractor,170 and renders a decision on the merits. In some
cases it will order the agency to change its planned award.
The past three years have seen its role in bid protests go from
the only place to get action at all, to a second-class and discredited
status, and once again to the predominant "forum" for such cases.17 1
Yet there is even less statutory or theoretical basis for the GAO's han-
dling of this protest role than there is for the others, and the pervasive-
ness of the function makes it an important place to direct attention
for reform.
169. The procedure is set out in 4 C.F.R. 17-19 (1973). See generally Shnitzer
§§ 1787-91; Dembling, Administrative Techniques for Challenging the Award of Gov-
ernment Contracts, Fmn. CoNT. REP. No. 351, Nov. 9, 1970, at D-1.
170. Until recently, the agency's statement of the facts was taken as true in bid
protest cases just as in claims cases. Shnitzer §§ 1709, 1743, 1783. The new protest
regulations discussed at text accompanying notes 234-40 infra do not expressly change
that rule, but in his 1972 pocket part, Shnitzer asserts that "there is no policy of pre-
suming the correctness of the administrative version of disputed facts in bid protests."
Id. § 1709. This asserted change in policy is presumably due to the criticism and
proposals made in ABA SECTION OF PUBLIC CONTRACT LAW, REPORT OF Tim COM-
M=rEE ON Bis & POTSTS 11 (1971).
171. On this chapter in GAO history, see Munves, Judicial Backlash: Second
Thoughts and New Judicial Standards from the People Who Brought You Scaniwell
Labs, 7 PuB. CoNr. NBWSLETrER, Jan. 1972, at 4.
A related area of GAO activity, not treated separately here, is relief from clerical
mistakes in bids. The GAO once asserted that only it could permit a bidder to with-
draw or alter his bid in such a case, but now it has "delegated" authority to the agen-
cies. Shnitzer §§ 1792-1795. For a criticial view of the GAO's delegating "authority
which it does not legally have," see Cibinic & Lasken 384-86. See also Henry Spen &
Co. v. Laird, 354 F. Supp. 586 (D.D.C. 1973) (GAO refusal to let a contractor cor-
rect his bid was arbitrary and capricious); Comp. Gen. Dec. No. B-176760 (Jan. 22,




How the GAO Became Involved in Protest Cases
Most discussion of the GAO's role in bid protests begins with
Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co.,'7 2 which for thirty years closed the courts
to unhappy bidders and made the GAO's role preeminent. But it is
useful to begin the story somewhat earlier.
In 1913 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit decided B.F. Cummins v. Burleson.'73 In that case the low bid-
der had sought to enjoin award of a Post Office contract to anyone
other than himself. The court properly saw that an injunction would
"interfere with the action of an executive department. . . blocking its
actions, and seriously interfering with its orderly and regular adminis-
tration.' 74  It went on to hold that an injunction or mandamus is
appropriate "only where a plain or ministerial duty is imposed by
law.' 175 Because the appropriation act in question required the award
to be made on the "basis of cheapness and efficiency," and not neces-
sarily on price alone, the Postmaster General's decision was held to be
a matter of "discretion. 1 7'  Thus an injunction would not issue.
Then, in 1918, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Pur-
cell Envelope Co., 7 7 in which the contractor had been awarded a con-
tract to supply prestamped envelopes and newspaper wrappers to the
Post Office Department. The department delayed signing the agree-
ment, and after the contractor had made ready to perform, a new
Postmaster General declared the contract void and advertised for new
bids. Purcell sought an injunction against the new award, but it was
denied by the trial court on the ground that Purcell had an adequate
remedy at law. The Supreme Court had before it only the question
of breach of contract, and it affirmed a Court of Claims judgment for
the contractor. The Government had argued that the contract was
never consummated because the Postmaster General had "quasi-judi-
cial" discretion whether or not to commit the Government to the award.
The Supreme Court answered in these words:
There must be a point of time at which discretion is 'ex-
hausted. The procedure for the advertising for bids for supplies
or services to the Government would else be a mockery-a pro-
172. 310 U.S. 113 (1940).
173. 40 App. D.C. 500 (D.C. Cir. 1913).
174. Id. at 509.
175. Id. at 507.
176. Id. at 506.
177. 249 U.S. 313 (1919).
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cedure, we may say, that is not permissive but required....
By it the Government is given the benefit of the competition of
the market and each bidder is given the chance for a bargain.
It is a provision, therefore, in the interest of both GoVernment
and bidder, necessarily giving rights to both and placing obliga-
tions on both. And it is not out of place to say that the Gov-
ernment should be animated by a justice as anxious to consider
the rights of the bidder as to insist upon its own. 178
Comptroller General McCarl thus took office at a time when the
law seems to have recognized both a compulsory character to the for-
mal advertising requirement and the contractor's justifiable interest
in fair procedures for contract award. At the same time, the courts
had recognized executive discretion as to at least some aspects of con-
tract selection, and had granted injunctions only rarely so as to avoid
potential disruption of Government operations.
In his first month in office, Comptroller General McCarl received
the Postmaster General's request for an advance decision on whether
a contract for insuring for registered mail had to be formally adver-
tised. He answered that it must.'7 9  The Comptroller General re-
ceived more than ten such requests for advance decision on procure-
ment matters, from various agencies, during his first four years in
office.' s0 So too in audits, if the Comptroller General believed a con-
tract had not been properly let, the auditors would disallow payment
of the amount due. The Comptroller ultimately seems to have excused
and set aside the disallowance in most cases in these early years,' 8 ' but
his reputation as an authority on the requirements of the procurement
statutes was established.
The GAO protest practice as we know it began as a relatively
unimportant adjunct to this practice of rendering advance decisions
and settling accounts. The first reported protest to the GAO direct
from an unhappy bidder seems to have been in 1925.182 The Autocar
Sales & Service Co. contended that the Panama Canal authorities had
drafted truck specifications so as to describe the product of only one
178. Id. at 318.
179. 1 COMP. GEN. 21 (1921).
180. 4 CoMp. GEN. 1035 (1925); 4 CoMP. GEN. 880 (1925); 4 COMP. GEN.
429 (1924); 4 CoMw. GEN. 191 (1924); 3 COMP. GEN. 862 (1924); 3 Cowvn. GEN.
604 (1924); 3 CoMP. GEN. 304 (1923); 2 CoMP. GEN. 739 (1963); 2 CoMP. GEN.
544 (1923); 1 CowP. GEN. 232 (1921).
181. See, e.g., 4 CowI'. GEN. 568 (1924); 3 Cown,. GEN. 920 (1924); 2 CoM.
GEN. 459 (1923).
182. 5 CoM. GEN. 712 (1925). The Commission on Government Procurement
asserts that there were two earlier unpublished decisions. 4 PRoc. COMM'N 40 n.31.
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supplier. On receipt of this "protest," the Comptroller General had
sent the letter to the Panama Canal for comment. The Comptroller
General's published opinion rejected the idea that although the agency
procedure was in violation of statute, it had been in "the best inter-
ests of the Government."1 83  Nowhere does the opinion reflect recog-
nition that the GAO was making an historic shift in procedures. One
reason may be that the protestor neither asked for nor received any
personal relief. Likewise the opinion apparently was not even thought
of as a binding advance decision. The GAO would find out some-
time, the Comptroller General seems to have reasoned, and notification
to "correct" the agency "methods of purchase" for the future might as
well come now as later.
In 1940 the Supreme Court decided Perkins v. Lukens Steel
Co.,'84 which for all its later reputation as a landmark case was strik-
ingly consistent in result-though not in dictum-with the prior law.
The Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act 85 required contractors on all
Government contracts over ten thousand dollars to pay the prevailing
minimum wage in the firm's "locality."'' 80 Secretary of Labor Perkins
had divided the country into six "localities." Lukens Steel and the
other plaintiffs were in the "locality" that included thirteen North-
eastern states, the District of Columbia, and part of West Virginia.
Plaintiffs argued that this definition of "locality" was far too broad
and sought an injunction against continuing the prevailing wage deter-
mination so made.
The district court refused the injunction but the court of appeals
granted it. The court of appeals held that the Secretary of Labor's de-
termination was so wrong as to be "beyond any possible application of
the words" and thus beyond her discretion. It recognized that disap-
pointed bidders had previously been denied injunctions against award
to another bidder but that was because, the court said, some aspects
of selection are matters of discretion. It held that bidders have a "val-
uable right" to be "free from unlawful restrictions and interference' ' 87
with the legally established conditions of contracting and thus the in-
junction was proper.
183. 5 CoMe. GN,. at 713.
184. 310 U.S. 113 (1940).
185. 41 U.S.C. § 35 (1970).
186. The facts are laid out most fully in the decision of the Court of Appeals.
See Lukens Steel Co. v. Perkins, 107 F.2d 627, 629-30 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
187. Id. at 639.
1973] 1331
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
It was this decision that the Supreme Court reversed. In doing
so, the Court could simply have said that the definition of locality was
a matter for the Secretary of Labor to determine. The Court's opinion
by Justice Black suggested as much, s8  but it did not stop there. It
placed most of its emphasis on a second question-that of standing
to sue. Moreover, the opinion was so full of rhetorical overkill that it
has frustrated establishment of a reasonable and workable balance be-
tween the interests of contractors and those of the Government.
[N]o legal rights of respondents were shown to have been in-
vaded or threatened. . . . Nor can respondents vindicate any
general interest which the public may have in the construction of
the Act by the Secretary and which must be left to the political
process ...
Section 3709 of the Revised Statutes requires for the Govern-
ment's benefit that its contracts be made after public advertising.
It was not enacted for the protection of sellers and confers no
enforceable rights upon prospective bidders ...
Like private individuals and businesses, the Government en-
joys the unrestricted power to produce its own supplies, to deter-
mine those with whom it will deal, and to fix the terms and con-
ditions upon which it will make needed purchases ...
[The Public Contract Act] was not intended to be a be-
stowal of litigable rights upon those desirous of selling to the
Government; it is a self-imposed restraint for violation of which the
Government-but not private litigants--can complain ...
Courts have never reviewed or supervised the administration
of such an executive responsibility even where executive duties
'require an interpretation of the law'. Judicial restraint of those
who administer the Government's purchasing would constitute a
break with settled judicial practice and a departure into fields
hitherto wisely and happily apportioned by the genius of our
polity to the administration of another branch of Government.' 89
This decision made the GAO the natural place for bidders to turn.
The Court had said the procurement statutes were enforceable only
"by the Government," and the Comptroller General had a self-declared
responsibility for determining "legality" of Government action. Even
so, his role in bid protests started slowly, and as late as the mid-
1960's the GAO was only deciding about two hundred protests a year.
In fiscal 1971 and 1972, however, the GAO decided over seven hun-
188. 310 U.S. at 117-20.
189. Id. at 125-28.
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dred protests from unhappy bidders.190 In the first ten months of fiscal
1973, the figure was already close to nine hundred. Such protests had
long since replaced the advance decision and the audit as the primary
vehicle for rendering procurement opinions.
The Lack of Legal Basis for the GAO's Role
The hearing of bid protests was a natural role for the GAO to
assume, but its actual authority to do so was dubious. In a widely
quoted opinion, Judge l-oltzoff has described the basis of GAO in-
volvement as follows:
As a matter of convenience, the Comptroller General may
render advance rulings on questions whether certain payments, if
made, would or would not be approved by him ...
[T]he decision of the Comptroller [in a bid protest] . . .
is 'equivalent to an announcement that if the contract were made
with the plaintiffs, he would disallow any payments that might
be made by any disbursing officer thereunder. As a practical mat-
ter, no disbursing officer would make any such payments in the
face of this ruling. . . . As a matter of fact, in light of the rul-
ing of the Comptroller General the plaintiffs would be buying a
lawsuit if the contract were awarded to them.""'
At first reading that may seem to be an affirmation of GAO au-
thority, and the GAO has so construed it. It puts bid protest authority
on the same level as the power to disallow, however, and as discussed
earlier," 2 the latter is little more than a license to harass.
A good case to illustrate the ambiguity of the GAO's actual au-
thority is Graybar Electric Co. v. United States.193 Graybar had been
awarded and had begun work on a contract for radio transmitters.
The Comptroller General then sent the War Department a letter as-
serting that the award had been illegal because Graybar had not been
the low bidder. The War Department explained that the low bidder's
technical drawings had not complied with the specifications and thus
he was not responsive to the invitation for bids. The Comptroller
General ruled, however, that the low bidder's accompanying promise
190. The figures for 1967-71 were compiled and set forth by the court in Wheela-
brator Corp. v. Chafee, 455 F.2d 1306, 1314 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The fiscal year
1972 and 1973 are reported in FED. CoNT. REP. No. 483, June 4, 1973, at A-4. See
also 4 PRoc. COMM'N 77.
191. United States ex rel. Brookfield Constr. Co. v. Stewart, 234 F. Sapp. 94, 100
(D.D.C. 1964).
192. Text accompanying notes 60-78 supra.
193. 90 Ct. C1. 232 (1940).
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to produce a conforming product overcame the defects in the draw-
ings.194 The War Department notified Graybar of this ruling and the
possibility it would not get paid for the work. Graybar suspended
production.
Almost a year later, the Attorney General ruled that the award
had indeed been valid,195 so Graybar resumed production and sought
to have the period of suspended production treated as an excusable
delay in performance. The Department of War, however, relied on
the Attorney General's opinion that no reasonable contractor could
think that the Comptroller General's opinion had any legal significance
and assessed Graybar over thirteen thousand dollars in penalties for
late delivery. The Court of Claims ordered return of the penalty.
It held that the GAO had no actual authority to award or order the
cancellation of contracts, but the possibility of disallowance and con-
sequent harassment of the agency and the contractor made Graybar's
delay not imprudent. The court wisely held that the delay was the
fault of the Government, not the contractor.
More recently, in Manloading & Management Associates v. United
States'90 the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUT)
had contracted for conversion of some of its records to magnetic tape.
The job Was to take two years, but because funds must be appro-
priated annually the contract was for one year with an "option" for
the second. The low bidder's bid had been rejected as "unreasonably
low and nonresponsive," a determination with which the Comptroller
General disagreed. His solution was to let the first year of the contract
run, but he directed HUD not to exercise the option.'9 7  HUD com-
plied and the bidder filed suit for breach of contract. The bidder al-
leged that although the form of the contract included an option, a
Comptroller General's decision was no basis for refusing to exercise it.
The Court of Claims agreed and permitted recovery as if the contract
had been terminated under the termination for convenience clause of
the contract.
Indeed, in all its review of bid protests the GAO apparently can
point to only one judicially confirmed case of a genuinely illegal pro-
194. Comp. Gen. Dec. No. A-68974 (Dec. 23, 1935, Feb. 17, 1936, May 18,
1936) (unpublished).
195. 38 Op. ATr'Y GEN. 555 (1937).
196. 461 F.2d 1299 (Ct. Cl. 1972).
197. Comp. Gen. Dec. No. B-169824 (June 26, 1970) (unpublished).
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curement it has set aside. In Schoenbrod v. United States9 8 the In-
terior Department solicited proposals for processing and selling Alaskan
sealskins for the account of the United States. Five firms submitted
proposals, and discussions were conducted with each on everything but
price. The firms were then ranked in order of quality, and price nego-
tiations were held with only the best firm, Supara, Inc. A contract
then was awarded to Supara without ever discussing price with the other
competitors.
A protest was submitted to the General Accounting Office, which
ordered termination of the contract about seven months after award.199
The contract was rescinded as ordered, and the contractor filed suit
for breach of contract in the Court of Claims. The court considered
the matter de novo and gave no special weight to the Comptroller
General's findings, but it did agree that an award made without even
asking the price of four of the competitors was illegal. Thus the con-
tract was held to have been void ab initio, and the contractor did not
even get his costs for the period before termination. °0
198. 410 F.2d 400 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
199. 43 CoMe. GEN. 353 (1963).
200. The court relied on Prestex Inc. v. United States, 320 F.2d 367 (Ct. Cl.
1963), invoking this same severe remedy where a contractor proposed to use a type of
cloth clearly inferior to that required by the Invitation for Bids. The contracting offi-
cer did not discover the discrepancy until after award, and the court held he was not
barred from avoiding the contract since he had no authority to accept a bid not con-
forming to the invitation.
One valid criticism of the GAO would seem to be that it is inconsistent in its
rulings. In a case seemingly even more illegal than Schoenbaum, the Army sought
additional sources for M-16 rifles. Four firms were asked to submit technical pro-
posals, but none were asked for prices until the two winning contractors had been
selected. Both losing contractors asserted they would have proposed prices far lower
than the winners were to be paid. The Comptroller General took the position that
"competitive range is a matter of administrative discretion" and determined that the
Army could use its own estimates of contractor cost in making its evaluations, rather
than asking the contractors for price proposals. Comp. Gen. Dec. No. B-164313
(July 5, 1968) (unpublished).
On the other hand, in another case the Air Force had solicited proposals (includ-
ing price) from four firms and had stated at the outset that no further negotiations
would be conducted with any firm not meeting minimum performance standards in an
actual benchmark test. Only one firm (IBM) passed. There was no issue of the in-
tegrity of the test, but the Comptroller General held it to be illegal not to conduct nego-
tiations with the failures as well "in view of the possibility thereby of increasing
competition, and the potential savings indicated." 47 CoNT. GEN. 29 (1967).
There were probably good practical reasons for both decisions. In the IBM case,
the "failures" improved their performance and the award to one of them, Burroughs,
saved the government about 150 million dollars over the proposed award to IBM.
Likewise, in the M-16 case the Army had been severely chastised in the press and the
weapons did, after all, have to be reliable. The objection of bid protestors is not that
the GAO is "practical;" it is that it looks at cases from the Government's point
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Schoenbrod, however, is the distinct exception. More common
is the situation illustrated by John Reiner & Co. v. United States.
201
There the invitation for bids specified that a bidder's offering a delivery
schedule over sixty days longer than the Government stated "may be
cause for rejection of bid." The low bidder, Reiner, and some others
had proposed schedules beyond the sixty day criterion. Reiner was
awarded the contract, but on a protest from a losing bidder, the GAO
ruled that the invitation for bids was imprecise as to the firmness of
the requirement and thus must be cancelled.
Reiner then sued for breach of contract, arguing that the Comp-
troller General had no authority to tell the Army what to do. The
Court of Claims agreed in part:
The . . . question . . . whether . . . the award was illegal
and void . . . is not precisely the same as that with which the
Comptroller General dealt. Because of his general concern with
the proper operation of competitive bidding in government pro-
curement, he can make recommendations and render decisions
that, as a matter of procurement policy, awards on contracts should
be cancelled or withdrawn even though they would not be held
invalid in court. He is not confined to the minimal measure of
legality but can sponsor and encourage the observance of higher
standards by the procuring agencies.
202
of view rather than providing a truly independent forum dispensing even-handed, con-
sistent justice. See generally Note, The Comptroller General of the United States:
The Broad Power to Settle and Adjust All Claims and Accounts, 70 HARv. L. Rv.
350, 360 n.94 (1956).
201. 325 F.2d 438 (Ct. Cl. 1960).
202. Id. at 440. The GAO does not agree that its standard of review is "policy"
rather than "legality."
As to the court's suggestion in the Reiner case that, in view of the Comp-
troller General's concern with the proper operation of competitive bidding in
government procurement," he can "sponsor and encourage the observance of
higher standards by the procuring agencies," through the concellation of con-
tracts which "would not be held invalid in court," our decision in this case
was not based upon any such theory, nor do we feel that an assertion of such
authority could be supported.
Where a bid acceptance is proposed but not yet consummated by a pro-
curing agency, and our Office considers such acceptance undesirable, we may
recommend or direct such action as we believe is required by the public policy
expressed in applicable statutory enactments to preserve the integrity of the
competitive bidding system. However, the sanction for any decision by this
Office holding that an accepted bid did not result in a valid contract is our
authority under the Budget and Accounting Act, 1921, 31 U.S.C. 1, et seq.,
to disallow credit in the accounts of the Government's fiscal officers for any
payments out of appropriated funds made pursuant to an illegal contract.
We do not employ that sanction if we think a resulting claim would be legally
justified and payment could be obtained by instituting judicial proceedings. ...
We therefore believe that any variations in the standards which may be ap-
plied by our Office and by the Court of Claims in determining the en-
forceability of a contract already awarded result from occasionally differing
interpretations of governing statutes and regulations, or different factual
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The court then held the contract valid, not void as the GAO had de-
termined. Nevertheless the court held the termination to have been
for the convenience of the Government, and not a breach of contract.
The GAO had no authority to direct the agency to cancel, the court
held, but as a practical matter it was politic to go along with the GAO,
so the contractor had no right to claim bad faith.
It is tempting to speculate what would have happened in Schoen-
brod if the contract had been satisfactorily completed. Is it reasonable
to suppose the contractor would have received no money? Would he
have received only quantum meruit if the Government had received
the benefits of a contract entered into in good faith? Would some
poor disbursing officer have had to pay the contractor himself? None
of these likely would have occurred. It seems that the stamp of "ille-
gality" was applied in Schoenbrod where little turned on it, but to use
this case as illustrating justification for the whole bid protest enter-
prise would be far-fetched.20 3  The GAO's "authority" arises purely
and simply from agency willingness to follow GAO directions, whether
authorized or not, and the relative inability of contractors to get judi-
cial review of the decisions.
The Pressure for Change
Why has the system lasted as long as it has? Why have agencies
tolerated the GAO? Even bidders have not vigorously sought change.
The apparent reason is because, in agreeing to hear such cases, the
conclusions, rather than from any differences in the scope of our respective
objectives.
44 CoMp. GEN. 223 (1964).
203. The result in Schoenbrod is particularly surprising given the holding the
previous year in Mid-West Constr., Ltd. v. United States, 387 F.2d 957 (CL Cl. 1968).
There the plaintiff has been low bidder on a contract for construction of a road in
Alaska. The job had been reserved or "set-aside" for a "small business," and the
next low bidder protested that the plaintiff, a Canadian firm, did not have "a place of
business in the United States" as required by the small-business regulations. 13 C.F.R.
§ 121.3-2(g) (1963). The SBA Size Appeals Board ruled the plaintiff unqualified and
the Comptroller General agreed, 44 Comp. Gmr. 253 (1964). The contract was can-
celled pursuant to this finding and the contractor sued for breach of contract. The
Court of Claims upheld the suit even assuming the plaintiff was unqualified for the
award under the regulations. The court read Prestex Inc. v. United States, 320 F.2d
367 (Ct. Cl. 1963), to render an award "illegal" only where it deviated from the invi-
tation "substantially," i.e., so as to affect price, quantity or quality. 387 F.2d at 961,
citing 320 F.2d at 372. Accord, Allen M. Campbell Co. v. United States, 467 F.2d 931
(Ct. Cl. 1972). The question of appropriate damages for the Government's breach is
considered in Mid-West Constr. Co. v. United States, 461 F.2d 794 (Ct. Cl. 1972).
The opinion in Schoenbrod did not even mention Mid-West, which lends credence to
the view that Schoenbrod is deviant from the clear trend of the cases.
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GAO has performed at least three functions. First, bidders have been
given someone to turn to. It costs time and money to bid on a con-
tract, and no one likes to lose unfairly. The bidder may not have a
"legal right" to a contract and the GAO may not always get results,
but the bidder does get the satisfaction of thinking someone has listened
and responded to his problem. And the cost of that listening ear is
often simply the cost of a letter.
Secondly, Congress has been given the feeling that an independent
agency is watching over the procurement process. Individual con-
gressmen have likewise been provided with a place to refer constituents'
problems for "help." Thirdly, executive agencies have likewise not
been losers. Of the 758 protests ruled upon in fiscal 1972, the protest
was sustained in only fifty-two cases, and in only twelve was the agency
directed to cancel the award.204 Thus agencies have had the appear-
ance of being under tight rein while in fact the GAO rarely imposes
an "impractical" limitation on their ability to stretch the rules in par-
ticular cases.
These "benefits" have not been insubstantial. Indeed, they cre-
ated what was for many years considered to be a balanced and prac-
tical system. However, there have been periodic efforts to seek judi-
cial relief in addition to or instead of GAO review. Two reasons
stand out. First, many bidders are tired of Pyrrhic victories. The GAO
has no authority to enjoin an impending "illegal" award to someone
else, and as a practical matter it is hard to get GAO to order cancella-
tion of a contract that has been awarded.20 5 This explains how in the
1972 statistics, fifty-two protestants were upheld on the law but only
twelve received any relief. Secondly, the GAO has no provision for
an adversary hearing or any of the other trappings of due process. The
protest traditionally .has been considered solely on the written record.
This effectively makes the agency's version of the facts hard to rebut.
That might be tolerable if de novo judicial review followed, but in bid
protests the "supreme court" has in effect been loaded in favor of one
of the parties.
204. 14 Thin GOVRNMENT CoNTRAcroR 438 (1972). In fiscal year 1971, out
of 715 decisions, the Comptroller General sustained the protest in seventy-four and
ordered cancellation in only four cases. Wheelabrator Corp. v. Chafee, 455 F.2d
1306, 1314 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The figures through April 30, 1973, were 887
protests filed, 24 sustained; figures were unavailable on cancellations ordered. FED.
CoN'r. REp. No. 483, June 4, 1973, at A-4.
205. Id. at 1314-15 n.11; Shnitzer § 1788. Agencies often make a practice of
suspending award, pending the GAO decision, but need not do so even under the
GAO's new rules, 4 C.F.R. § 20.4 (1973), discussed at notes 222-28 infra.
1338 [Vol. 51
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
Criticisms of this situation are often mistakenly understood to be
criticisms of the GAO. They are not. GAO procedures and presump-
tions were developed when its job was solely to review procurement
policy from the perspective of the best interests of the Government.
It was never intended to be a fair-minded "forum" from which a liti-
gant had any right to expect real relief.
In the late 1960's, pressure to provide due process was building
with respect to all kinds of quasi-administrative decisions. The right
to procedural safeguards before denial of admission to the bar,20 6 the
right to a hearing before loss of welfare,20 7 and even the right to a
hearing before replevin by a creditor 208 are all illustrations of this
awakening consciousness. In many cases a government contract will
be a major part of a businessman's projected income for a year. He,
too, does not like to lose.
The Rise and Fall of Scanwell Labs
The pressure that built for change culminated in 1970 in ScanweU
Labs v. Shaffer.20 9  In that case the second-lowest bidder had sought
to have an award to the low bidder declared void on grounds of non-
responsibility. The low bidder had previously neither installed a sys-
tem nor obtained a Federal Aviation Administration certificate of per-
formance, both of which were required by the invitation for bids. The
district court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction as Perkins
seemed to require, but the court of appeals reversed. Modem ideas of
standing no longer require the plaintiff to have a "legal right" to an
award, it said.2 10  It is enough that he be "adversely affected in fact by
agency action '211 or that he simply be acting as a "private attorney
206. Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963).
207. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
208. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
209. 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970). The result in Scanwell was foreshadowed
by the same court's decision in Superior Oil Co. v. Udall, 409 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir.
1969). There the Secretary of the Interior had received bids for certain oil leases.
The high bidder had failed to sign his bid and the Secretary proposed to throw out all
bids and start again. The second-high bidder ($13.6 million vs. $11.6 million) ob-
jected and the district court ordered award to him. The court of appeals affirmed in
an opinion by Judge Burger which cited Comptroller General opinions as authority.
The question of standing was not discussed, but standing was apparently accepted by
the court as self-evident. See generally Pierson, Standing to Seek Judicial Review of
Government Contract Awards: Its Origins, Rationale and Effect on the Procurement
Process, 12 B.C. Imh. & COM. L. REV. 1 (1970).
210. 424 F.2d at 863; accord, Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations,
Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
211. 424 F.2d at 865 (emphasis by the court).
19731 1339
1340 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51
general 212 to enforce the public interest in proper adherence to the
procurement statutes. It thus remanded the case for a hearing on the
merits.2
13
Scanwell Labs was followed by more than a dozen cases. Some
sought temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions pend-
ing GAO review.21 4 Others sought ultimate judicial disposition on the
merits. 1 5 In some, the question was raised whether the possibility of
a protest to the GAO was an administrative remedy that must be ex-
hausted. In each of the early cases the courts answered "no."210  The
GAO may be an informal, alternate remedy, they said, but it is not
a prerequisite to review.
212. Id. at 864.
213. Although the Court did not say so, the merits of the situation had been
reached by the GAO between the time of the district court and court of appeals
opinions. In 49 CoMp. GEN. 9, 12 (1969), the GAO had held that the IFB was un-
clear but that no bidder was prejudiced thereby; and since the award had been made,
it should not be set aside.
214. National Cash Register Co. v. Richardson, 324 F. Supp. 920 (D.D.C. 1971);
Aerojet-General Corp. v. Thiokol Chem. Corp., 15 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 83,786 (N.D.
Cal. 1970); Page Communications Engr's, Inc. v. Resor, 15 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 84,116
(D.D.C. 1970), rev'd, 15 CCH Cont Cas. F. 84,154 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Wheelabrator
Corp. v. Chafee, 15 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 84,009 (D.D.C. 1970), rev'd, 455 F.2d 1306
(D.C. Cir. 1971). In Keco Indus. v. Laird, 318 F. Supp. 1361 (D.D.C. 1970), the
plaintiff sought an injunction pending GAO review but the court deemed that inappro-
priate for lack of binding GAO authority and so went on to the merits. Cf. Floyd v.
Miner Security Services v. Paine, 115 CCH Cont. Cas. F. % 83,967 (D.D.C. 1970)
(injunction pending reconsideration by SBA Size Appeals Board).
215. Allen M. Campbell Co. v. Lloyd Wood Constr. Co., 446 F.2d 261 (5th Cir.
1971); Gould & Eltra Corp. v. Chafee, 16 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 80,499 (D.C. Cir.
1971); Gulf & W. Indus., Inc. v. Resor, 16 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 80,158 (D.C. Cir.
1971); M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 15 CCH Cont. Cas. F. % 83,921 (D.D.C. 1970);
Big Four Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. SBA, 15 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 83,766 (W.D.
Okla. 1970); American Standard, Inc. v. Laird, 326 F. Supp. 492 (D.D.C. 1970); Lom-
bard v. Resor, 321 F. Supp. 687 (D.D.C. 1970); A.B. Schoonmaker Co. v. Resor,
319 F. Supp. 933 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 445 F.2d 726 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See also Northeast
Constr. Co. v. Romney, 16 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 80,459 (D.D.C. 1971) (ordering the
agency to let the bidder supply missing racial hiring goals figures, the lack of which
had been said by the GAO to make the bid non-responsive), rev'd, 18 CCH Cont. Cas.
F. I 82,066 (D.C. Cir.), opinion supplemented, 18 CCH Cont. Cas. F. U 82,304 (D.C.
Cir. 1973); Blount-Barfell-Dennehy, Inc. v. United States, 15 CCH Cont. Cas. F.
1 83,917 (W.D. Okia. 1970) (granting a permanent injunction ordering the contracting
officer to accept a bond the Comptroller General had said was deficient).
216. Scanwell Labs. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 875-76 (D.C. Cir. 1970). In Simp-
son Elec. Co. v. Seamans, 317 F. Supp. 684, 686 (D.D.C. 1970), Judge Gesell de-
scribed the Comptroller General's role in bid protests as follows:
[Tjhe Comptroller General controls disbursements from the public treasury,
and will, upon request, give an advisory opinion on the legality of a particular
contract on which payments by the United States are contemplated. Al-
though his decision is as a practical matter usually decisive upon the con-
tracting officer, it does not technically bind him, and the Comptroller, of
course, cannot award a contract."
Accord, Keco Indus. v. Laird, 318 F. Supp. 1361, 1363 (D.D.C. 1970).
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Lawyers soon found, however, that it was one thing to open the
courthouse door and quite another to get relief. Standing has always
been only half the battle. It was hard to get injunctions even before
Perkins, and it proved hard to get them after Scanwell. Less than two
weeks after denying rehearing in Scanwell, the same panel of the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit decided Black-
hawk Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Driver,2 17 in which they noted that
"the mere fact that a party has standing to sue does not entitle him to
render uncertain for a prolonged period of time government contracts
which are vital to the functions performed by the sovereign. 2 18  It
thus concluded that summary judgment for the Government should be
granted readily in bid protest cases if the pleadings and accompanying
documents do not make a convincing case for relief.
In cases that followed, some courts reached the merits of their
cases but found the Government had acted properly. 219 In others the
contractor's case was insufficient even to justify a preliminary injunc-
tion or temporary restraining order.220  Even when the evidence tended
to support the complainant, relief was not always forthcoming. For
example, in Simpson Electric Co. v. Seamans,221 the court concluded
"that the refusal to accept plaintiff's bid modification as timely was ar-
bitrary and irrational." It went on to say that "it was illegal to award
the contract to anyone else." Nevertheless, the contract had already
been awarded to another firm and because "injunctive relief is discre-
tionary and a remedy that should be most sparingly used," the plaintiff
was left to his remedy, if any, in the Court of Claims.222 In two other
cases, injunctions based on apparently sound grounds were dissolved
because the Secretary of Defense had certified that awards must be
217. 433 F.2d 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1970). The panel consisted of Judges Bazelon,
Tamm and MacKinnon. Rehearing in Scanwell was denied on May 7, 1970; Black-
hawk was handed down on May 19. Cf. Ballerina Pen Co. v. Kunzig, 433 F.2d
1204, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
218. 433 F.2d at 1141.
219. City Chemical Corp. v. Shreffler, 333 F. Supp. 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Gulf &
W. Indus. v. Resor, 16 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 80,158 (D.D.C. 1971); Lombard
Corp. v. Resor, 321 F. Supp. 687 (D.D.C. 1970).
220. Floyd F. Miner Security Service, Inc. v. Paine, 15 CCH Cont Cas. F.
f 83,967 (D.D.C. 1970); American Standard, Inc. v. Laird, 326 F. Supp. 492 (D.D.C.
1970).
221. 317 F. Supp. 684, 686 (D.D.C. 1970) (Gesell, J.).
222. Id. at 688. This same approach was taken in Wilke v. Department of the
Army, 357 F. Supp. 988 (D. Md. 1973). Judge Gesell was less critical of the Gov-
ernment but equally wary of the use of injunctions in National Cash Register Co. v.
Richardson, 324 F. Supp. 920, 921 (D.D.C. 1971), where the standard for injunctive
relief was said to be 'flagrant disregard for the regularity of contracting procedures."
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made to keep up the flow of military material to Viet Nam.228
Indeed, relief was granted in only a few cases, 224 and when most
of those were reversed on appeal, the euphoria with which contractors
had greeted Scanwell was quickly deflated and the role of the Comp-
troller General was rediscovered by the courts. For example, in A.G.
Schoonmaker Co. v. Resor225 an unsuccessful bidder had protested to
the GAO that the low bidder was not responsive. The Comptroller
General ruled that the solicitation was ambiguous and ordered a new
solicitation. The Army complied and the low bidder went to court
seeking an injunction ordering award to it. The injunction was granted
by the district court but reversed by the court of appeals. The district
court had looked at the merits of the case itself, the court of appeals
said, instead of determining whether there was any basis for the
Comptroller General's ordering a resolicitation. The court of appeals
found the GAO opinion was not "arbitrary or capricious," and thus the
injunction was reversed without "reach[ing] the problem of the au-
thority of the Comptroller to issue decisions in bid protests. 220
Then in Wheelabrator Corp. v. Chafee227 and M. Steinthal & Co.
v. Seamans 228 new panels of the Court of Appeals for the District of
223. Pace Co. v. Resor, 453 F.2d 890 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 974
(1972); Page Communications Eng'rs, Inc. v. Resor, 15 CCH Cont. Cas. F. g 84,154
(D.C. Cir. 1970).
Because of the potentially serious consequences to the Government of enjoining a
critical program, some contractors were required to post a bond when the injunction
was issued. In Page Communications Eng'rs, Inc. v. Froehlke, 475 F.2d 994 (D.C.
Cir. 1973), the court ruled that the district court could propely efuse to assess dam-
ages against Page who it found had filed suit in good faith. Northeast Constr. Co. v.
Romney, 18 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 82,066 (D.C. Cir. 1973), opinion supplemented, 18
CCH Cont. Cas. F. 1 82,304 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See also Johnson, Scanwell Plaintiff's
Potential Liability for Damages Caused by an Erroneous Injunction, 8 Pun. CONT.
NEWSLETER, No. 4, July 1973, at 8.
224. A.G. Schoonmaker Co. v. Resor, 319 F. Supp. 933 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 445
F.2d 726 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Blount-Barfell-Dennehy, Inc. v. United States, 15 CCH
Cont. Cas. F. I 83,917 (W.D. Okla. 1970); Wheelabrator Corp. v. Chafee, 15 CCH
Cont. Cas. F. 84,009 (D.D.C. 1970), rev'd, 455 F.2d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1971); M.
Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 15 CCH Cont. Cas. F. % 83,920 (D.D.C. 1970), rev'd, 495
F.2d 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Page Communications Eng'rs, Inc. v. Resor, 15 CCH
Cont. Cas. F. 1 84,116 (D.D.C. 1970), rev'd, 15 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 84,154 (D.C. Cir.
1970); Big Four Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. SBA, 15 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 83,766
(W.D. Okla. 1970).
225. 445 F.2d 726 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
226. Id. at 728 n.3. The panel in Schoonmaker consisted of Judges Bazelon and
Tamm, joined by District Judge Smith from Montana. Judge Tamm dissented. It
may be inferred that he saw this as a departure from his course in Scanivell.
227. 455 F.2d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
228. 455 F.2d 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Judge Leventhal wrote the opinion in
both cases. In 1966, Judge Leventhal wrote an excellent article advocating increasing
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Columbia administered the coup de grace. Wheelabrator Corporation
had developed a portable blast cleaner for cleaning the hulls of ships.
The Navy sought to procure the device by a two-step formally adver-
tised competition while Wheelabrator argued that regulations required
the Navy to negotiate only with it. The district court enjoined award
to the other bidder pending a GAO decision on Wheelabrator's pro-
test.229 The court of appeals reversed, finding no "prima facie case
of illegality." It pointed to the congressional preference for formal ad-
vertising and said the decision whether or not to negotiate was "com-
mitted to agency discretion" and thus unreviewable, in effect reiterating
an approach adopted by that court in 1913.230
Steinthal was shnilarly a question of discretion. There the de-
livery schedule in the invitation for bids had been interpreted three dif-
ferent ways by the three bidders. The Air Force cancelled the invita-
tion and prepared to readvertise, but two bidders objected, each claim-
ing it was entitled to the award. Both protests were denied by
the GAO but the district court granted Steinthal's request for a man-
datory injunction making the award to it.231 The court of appeals -as
it had in Schoonmaker-properly found the decision to cancel and re-
advertise to have been consistent with agency regulations.
Both cases were straightforward and would be footnotes in the
story but for the extensive dicta in both about the deference the courts
should pay to GAO review. For example, in Wheelabrator the court
said:
The G.A.O. has established a corps of officials concerined
with compliance by procurement officials with provisions of ap-
plicable statutes and regulations. Its rulings provide review by an
agency that is independent of the executive departments engaged
in the procurement ...
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, a court may en-
tertain an action for permanent relief and defer its consideration
of the merits until an agency "with special competence" in the field
resort to administrative law concepts in government contract cases, although not total
applicability of the APA. Leventhal, Public Contracts and Administrative Law, 52
A.B.A.1. 35 (1966).
229. 319 F. Supp. 87 (D.D.C. 1970).
230. 455 F.2d at 1311-12. The 1913 case was B.F. Cummins v. Burleson, 40
App. D.C. 500 (D.C. Cir. 1913). Cf. -i-Ridge Lumber Co. v. United States, 443
F.2d 452 (9th Cir. 1971); Curan v. Laird, 420 F.2d 122 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Safer-
stein, Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of "Committed to Agency Discretion",
82 HARV. L. Rnv. 367 (1968).
231. M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 15 CCH CONT. CAS. F. 1 83,920 (D.D.C,
1970), rev'd, 455 F.2d 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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has ruled on the issues, if fecessary maintaining the status quo
pendente lite with injunctive relief avoiding irreparable injury
pending such agency consideration.
232
It went on to say in Steinthal:
We are, finally, conceried that the District Court did not
even consider the opinions of the Comptroller General denying the
protests of Pioneer and Steinthal and upholding the government's
cancellation of the bids under the amended IFB. We are not
called upon to make a formal determination concerning the con-
troversy over the legal authority of the Comptroller General to issue
decisions in bid protests, and the effect of such determinations on
agency procurement policies. Certainly we must acknowledge that
the office headed by the Comptroller General provides unique ex-
perience in the area of government procurement and a tradition
of care and objectivity, including freedom from prior involvement
in the matter at hand, that would have provided, "the court with
additional guidance in resolving the issues before it.' '23 3
The GAO was back in judicial good graces. Judical rhetoric had
created authority in the GAO that Congress had never chosen to pro-
vide. At this point the GAO issued "Interim Bid Protest Procedures
and Standards 234 to systemize the handling of its reaffirmed responsi-
bility. Time limits for submitting information were imposed on the
agencies233 and self-imposed by the GAO on its own decision proc-
ess.236 A conference procedure was established to try to end the prac-
tice of separate, informal, ex parte conversations with the protector, the
agencies, and, some suspected, members of Congress. 37 Agencies
were directed to withhold award pending GAO rulings unless a high
232. 455 F.2d at 1314-16.
233. 455 F.d at 1298. A number of cases since Steinthal and Wheelabrator
have denied injunctions. Northeast Constr. Co. v. Romney, 18 CCH Cont. Cas. F.
I 82,066 (D.C. Cir.), opinion supplemented, 18 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 82,304 (D.C.
Cir. 1973), rev'g 16 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 80,459 (D.D.C. 1971); Ocean Elec. Corp.
v. Laird, 473 F.2d 154 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Wilke v. Department of the Army, 357
F. Supp. 988 (D. Md. 1972). In Serv-Air, Inc. v. Seamans, 473 F.2d 158 (D.C. Cir.
1972), the court upheld the denial of the injunction but went on to explain that an
injunction was proper if there was "no rational basis for the agency's decision."
Explaining the statement in Steinthal that a court might even deny an injunction in
such a case, Judge Leventhal (who had also authored Steinthal and Wheelabrator)
wrote that that exception from the right to an injunction was limited to "extreme situa-
tions, as where relief would delay or interfere with supply of items urgently needed in
military operations." Id. at 160. This admonition was apparently not followed by the
court in Wilke, but an injunction was entered against an already awarded contract in
Rudolph F. Matzer & Associates v. Warner, 348 F. Supp. 991 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
234. 36 Fed. Reg. 24,791 (1971).
235. Id. § 20.5.
236. Id. § 20.10.
237. Id. § 20.9.
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level official made a written finding that such a delay could not be tol-
erated.23
8
These were, of course, constructive changes, but restrictions were
simultaneously imposed on the contractors' right of protest. Protestors
were required to be "interested, 2 39 for example, and tight time limits
on filing of protests were imposed.2 40  Such limits are consistent with
a quasi-judicial role but not with the GAO's previous function as critic
of genuine wrongs.
Even the GAO conceded that it had no real authority to make
its rules binding on the agencies .241 That, however, did not stop the
district court in General Electric Co. v. Seamans.24 2 The court not only
entered an injunction against award pending GAO review; it decreed
in advance that if the GAO's decision was in favor of the protestor,
the agency must follow it. That was a major development, since it
was the first time a GAO decision had ever truly been enforceable
against an agency. The court of appeals correctly reversed that part
of the district court order, preferring not to "abdicate its responsibili-
ties" to the GAO.243  The GAO finally rendered the matter moot by
ruling that the agency had been right all along. 44 At the same time,
however, the GAO took pains to assert that its findings of fact, not
the district court's, were controlling under Wheelabrator and Steinthal.
Indeed it held that the court's opinion was not even entitled to comity.
Finally, two district courts in other circuits have now held that
238. Id. § 20.4.
239. Id. § 20.1.
240. If the basis of the protest is known before bid opening, the protest must be
filed then. Otherwise the protestor has five days from the time the "basis for pro-
test is known or should have been known." Id. § 20.2(a). The GAO has enforced
this provision by ignoring late protests. Comp. Gen. Dec. No. B-175779 (July 13,
1972) (unpublished); Comp. Gen. Dec. No. B-175610 (Apr. 25, 1972) (unpublished).
However it waived its time limits in Serv-Air, discussed supra note 233, once the
matter was before the Court of Appeals. 52 Com.i. GEN. 161, 163 (Sept. 25, 1972).
It was complemented by the court: "This procedural flexibility is responsive to the
interests that courts and officials proceed with full regard for and accommodation to
the other's province. It is a rightful corollary to the rule of primary jurisdiction de-
veloped in Wheelabrator." 473 F.2d at 160.
241. Preface to Interim Bid Protest Procedures and Standards, 36 Fed. Reg.
24791 (1971). It has been reported, however, that the Office of Management and
Budget is drafting regulations which would be binding on the agencies. FED. CONT.
REP. No. 470, Mar. 5, 1973, at A-20.
242. 340 F. Supp. 636 (D.D.C. 1972).
243. General Electric Co. v. Seamans, 14 Tnm GovERNMENT CONTRACTOR 258
(D.C. Cir. 1972).
244. Comp. Gen. Dec. No. B-175004 (Oct. 12, 1972) (unpublished).
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Scanwell Labs was wrong ab initio.2 45  They have denied injunctions
for lack of standing to sue, citing Perkins, so the stage may be set for
an eventual Supreme Court test of the GAO's authority.
How Should Bid Protests Be Handled?
The dilemma in this area has been recognized since before Per-
kins v. Lukens Steel. The more due process is permitted, the more
the orderly procurement of material is impaired. Put another way, due
process is costly, both to the contractor and to the Government. The
question thus should be how one can get the most fairness for the least
cost to the parties and the least disruption of the procurement proc-
ess. 2 4
6
The GAO remedy places a high value on not disrupting the proc-
ess. As mentioned earlier, if work has begun or if there is an urgent
need for the item, the odds of getting the GAO to act fall sharply.
The courts seem to place a far lower premium in procurement effi-
ciency, which in large part is why the agencies so fear a judicial remedy.
An illustration of this difference in approach is provided by Home
Brothers v. Laird.47  There the Navy, without notice or hearing, had
"suspended" a ship repair contractor for allegedly bribing Navy per-
sonnel on earlier contracts. The contractor, who was thus denied fu-
ture contracts, sought an injunction and protested to the GAO. The
GAO opinion denying the protest stressed the government's interest in
245. Gary Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 342 F. Supp. 473 (W.D. Tex. 1972);
Rubber Fabrication v. Laird, 14 TIM GOVERNMENT CoNRnAcroR 276 (N.D.W. Va.),
injunction dissolved as moot, 17 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 1 80867 (4th Cir. 1971); cf.
Fortec Constructors v. Kleppe, 18 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 81,723 (D.D.C. 1972), af d,
18 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 1 81,756 (D.C. Cir. 1972). On the other hand, a district
court in the fifth circuit has found standing under Scanwell and issued an injunction
applying the Steinthal test. Rudolph F. Matzer & Associates v. Warner, 348 F. Supp.
991 (M.D. Fla. 1972). A district court in the third circuit had rejected the Scanwell
position on standing as inconsistent with Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
Merriam v. Kunzig, 347 F. Supp. 713, 720-24 (E.D. Pa. 1972). That case, however,
has been recently reversed and Scanwell embraced by the Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals. Merriam v. Kunzig, 476 F.2d 1233, 124043 (3d Cir. 1973). The court pointed
to the GAO protest regulations as a sign from the "agent of Congress in policing
Government expenditures" that bidders were within the zone of interest that Con-
gress intended to create with the procurement statutes. 476 F.2d at 1242-43.
246. This problem of how much "agency discretion" is to be recognized-the
striking of a balance between the need for review and the practicalities of administra-
tion-is far broader than bid protests. The issues are well summarized and analyzed
best in Saferstein, supra note 230. A particularly insightful discussion of the dilemma
in the bid protest area is provided in FFD. CoNT. REP. No. 281, July 7, 1969, at X-1.
See also Pierson, supra note 209, at 24-31.
247. 463 F.2d 1286 (D.C. Cir. 1972), rev'g 342 F. Supp. 703 (D.D.C. 1972).
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business integrity. It recognized that a hearing is required before a
debarment, which lasts three years. The GAO held, however, that the
"temporary" remedy of suspension-even for a year or more-requires
a substantially lower level of due process.248 Both the district court
and court of appeals disagreed. They emphasized the harm done the
contractor by even "temporary" denial of contracts. The court of ap-
peals thought a one-month suspension without a hearing might be al-
lowable, but in most cases no more.249  The suspension was thus re-
versed and sent back to the agency. Home Brothers does not neces-
sarily show that the GAO is less concerned with "fairness" than are the
courts. Every case, however, presents some elements of agency con-
venience conflicting with what a contractor sees as his rights. The
GAO simply seems to give convenience or "practical considerations"
somewhat more weight.
Special Proposals
The greatest concern of the agencies seem to be that needed ma-
terial will not be available while courts and lawyers discuss who should
supply it. One possible compromise would be to award money dam-
ages to any bidder who was improperly denied a contract award. Such
!recovery was permitted in 1956 in Heyer Products Co. v. United
States250 and in two later cases in 1970 and 1971.2 "51 All three cases
held that when the treatment of plaintiff's bid is "arbitrary and capri-
cious" or when the bid is not "honestly and fairly" considered, the
plaintiff should be allowed to recover the costs incurred in preparing
the bid.
The most recent case, Continental Business Enterprises v. United
States, 252 expressly spoke of this remedy as being a way around the
248. No. 51 CoMP. GEN. (1972).
249. 463 F.2d at 1271. The opinion suggests that if holding an evidentiary hear-
ing could be shown to be prejudicial to a later criminal action against a contractor, for
example, the Government might not be required to tip its hand. Id.
250. 140 F. Supp. 409 (Ct. Cl. 1956).
251. Continental Business Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 452 F.2d 1016 (Ct.
Cl. 1971); Keco Indus., Inc. v. United States, 428 F.2d 1233 (Ct. Cl. 1970). Both
were cases in which a bidder went to court after the GAO had turned him down on
the merits, Continental in 48 Comy. GEN. 314 (1968) and Keco in Comp. Gen. Dec.
No. B-162538 (Aug. 15, 1968, Jan. 13, 1969) (unpublished); cf. Allen M. Campbell
Co. v. United States, 467 F.2d 931 (Ct. Cl. 1972) (contract cancelled by order of
federal district court treated as not illegal but as terminated for convenience of the
Government, thus allowing payment of costs); 52 CoMP. GEN. 215 (1972).
252. 452 F.2d 1016 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
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problems that followed Scanwell Labs.2 8  But at least three problems
arise with this approach. The first problem to overcome is how one
justifies awarding damages, absent a statute, for failing to give a bidder
what he had no "legal right" to anyway. Is improper denial of a con-
tract a tort and thus not cognizable by the Court of Claims?2 ' 4  Does
one have an express or implied contract right to a contract?25 The
second problem is determining how much in damages should be al-
lowable. Keco Industries v. United States, the 1970 decision, said that
damages should be measured by bid preparation expenses but not by
lost profits.2 50  Few bidders would consider that sufficient,2 7 yet if
one goes farther it is hard to stop. Is lost profit enough? How about
253. 452 F.2d at 102:
"Our decision in Keco was premised at least in part on the feeling that aggrieved
bidders have the right to require the Government to enforce the statutes and regula-
tions fairly and honestly, either by seeking equitable relief in the Federal district courts
or by suing for money damages here.
In requesting that we reconsider our holding in Keco, defendant asserts that per-
mitting suits such as the present one could create serious problems in maintaining a
smooth and effective procurement system. We have not been told what these problems
will be, but we doubt that our holding today will jeopardize the procurement process.
Certainly, a suit for damages in this court after the completion of the contract will
not disrupt the procurement process as much as an injunction issued before the contract
is awarded. M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans,...
The Heyer rule was extended in Keco to give aggrieved bidders a damages remedy
in lieu of the equitable remedies available in the Federal district courts after Scanwell
Lab v. Shaffer, .... In such a suit for damages after completion of the procurement,
the merits of each claim can be considered without the time pressures attendant to ex-
pedited actions for injunctive relief. Apparently the necessity for such an alternative
remedy is even greater than it was when we decided Keco because of the difficulties
experienced by the district courts in handling Scanwell-type cases. See M. Steinthal
& Co. v. Seamans, supra."
254. The court's jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1970), is quite explicit:
"The Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim...
for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort." The remedy for
torts is, of course, the Federal Tort Claims Act which vests jurisdiction exclusively in
the district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1970).
255. The only court to consider the question directly decided without explaining
that the suit was on a contract under the Tucker Act. Armstrong & Armstrong, Inc.
v. United States, 356 F. Supp. 514 (D. Wash. 1973).
256. 428 F.2d 1233, 1240 (Ct. Cl. 1970). The rationale for this measure of
damages is as follows. The usual measure for an improper termination is that provided
in the termination for convenience clause of the contract, basically cost of work done
plus profit on that work. John Reiner & Co. v. United States, 325 F.2d 438 (Ct. Cl.
1963); Albano Cleaners, Inc. v. United States, 455 F.2d 556 (Ct. C1. 1972) . Where
no work has yet been done, there are no costs (except bid preparation) and thus no
profits.
257. For example, in Gould, Inc. v. Chafee, 450 F.2d 667, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1971),
Judge Leventhal addressed himself generally to this point: "[lit is questionable
whether appellants' legal remedies as aggrieved bidders and contractors are adequate
enough to justify dismissal of their suit for want of equity. See Keco Industries v.
United States. .. ."
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the value of "experience" the contract would have given? Thirdly,
what does one do about the situations in which a bid was honestly,
but not properly, evaluated? Must bidders take the risk of all but the
most egregious conduct? Surely that is in neither the Government's,
nor the contractor's interests.258
Another alternative, proposed by a subcommittee of the American
Bar Association Section of Public Contract Law, is that jurisdiction over
bid protests be transferred to agency boards of contract appeals. 250
That would have the advantage of providing a true adversary forum
and an opportunity to make a full record. However, there is little
connection between the expertise developed hearing disputes cases and
the questions involved in bid protests. Likewise, until all boards of
contract appeals truly are independent of the heads of their agencies,
the possibility of an inherent conflict of interest may be present even
more than in a disputes case.
A better view would seem to be that bid protests should be per-
mitted and should be handled by a wholly new division of the GAO.
They would no longer be the stepchild of some other GAO function.
Such an office expressly should be empowered by statute to hear bid
protests and to develop the procedures to do so properly with due proc-
ess to all parties.26 0 While agency convenience is important, it seems
258. The district court in Armstrong & Armstrong, Inc. v. United States, 356 F.
Supp. 514 (D. Wash. 1973), granted the bidder damages in what appears to have not
been a case of Government bad faith. The issues surrounding damages were not di-
rectly addressed, however, and the precedential value of the case seems doubtful.
259. ABA SECnON Op PUBLIC CONTRaCr Aw, supra note 170, at 22-24.
260. The Commission on Government Procurement also proposed leaving bid
protest authority in the GAO, although they did not require a separate division. 4
PRoc. COMM'N 40-41. Along with the creation of the new division, it would seem
that procurement statutes and regulations should be changed to require announcement
of the winning competitor before the actual award, even in negotiated procurements.
A protest filed within five days should stay the award unless the agency convincingly
demonstrates-not simply alleges-extreme urgency. A conference should be held
promptly that would include a representative of the GAO, the agency, the protestor,
and the firm proposed for award. Other firms in the bidding would be informed and
could also send a representative. The conference could even be held at the field office
letting the contract if that were more convenient for most of the participants. Written
evidence, or even oral testimony, could be received at that time. Decisions should be
prompt and binding with a formal opinion filed later when the time pressure is off.
Judicial review could be provided in the form of a suit for recovery of bid preparation
expenses by any bidder who can show he would have received the contract but for the
illegal action of the procurement authority and the lack of relief from the GAO.
Judicial review is important not only for the protection of the bidder, but also for
the review of substantive "common law" made by the GAO in the course of its review.
On the GAO's procurement law-making function see Shnitzer, Changing Concepts in
Government Procurement-The Role and Influence of the Comptroller General on
Contracting Officer's Operations, 23 FED. BJ. 90 (1963); Cibinic & Lasken 372-86,
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that both bidders and the general public should have a right to know
that agencies will follow the law and regulations in making contract
awards. Some kind of real forum and real remedy is thus essential.
It may seem that this latter proposal is inconsistent with the rest
of this article, which argues for limiting the GAO role in "binding"
review of executive action. Nonetheless, the GAO has a unique tra-
dition and an accumulated expertise in this area that should not be
lost. The experience of many of the GAO protest experts is far greater
than that of most judges, and by removing these GAO decision-makers
from the policy-making side of the GAO, their decisions could be even
more candid and impartial than today.2 61
Another benefit would accrue from this plan. One value of GAO
consideration of protests is the degree to which it lets the GAO keep
abreast of and report to Congress problems in administration of the
procurement process.2 62 That is a value that should be preserved.
The proposal made here would have bid protests and reports to Con-
gress handled by distinctly separate divisions, but it would centralize
the protest function and make monitoring by the reporting division
relatively easy.
Tam STAFF ARM OF CONGRESS: PROBLEMS MET BY TE
GAO IN ACQUIRING INFORMATION
This article has suggested that the single most important role of
the GAO is that of a professional investigative staff for the Congress.
It has criticized the diversion of GAO time and resources into at-
tempts to direct or countermand executive behavior and review con-
tract disputes. But the ability to investigate is integral to an effective
Congress. As long as the executive departments have information that
Congress does not have, it will be difficult for Congress to assume a
more active role in decisionmaking. If the GAO can acquire sufficient
261. The Commission on Government Procurement addressed (but left unresolved)
the allegation that a separation of powers problem is presented by GAO review of
contract awards. 4 PRoc. Co m'N 40-41. The issue is the same here as was dis-
cussed supra at text accompanying notes 79-87. Giving the GAO explicit authority to
review bid protests should raise no more genuine constitutional problems than creation
of an independent agency to do the same thing.
262. A good recent example is Comp. Gen. Dec. No. B-175292 (June 19, 1972)
(unpublished) in which a protest led to a suggested revision of the "brand name or
equal clause," ASPR 1-1206.3(b) and FPR 1-1307.6(a)(2). The GAO now reports
to Congress all decisions requiring corrective action by an agency. The agencies are
required to respond to the GAO report within sixty days. 31 U.S.C. § 1176 (1970);
see 52 CoM. GEN. 215, 219 (1972).
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information sufficiently early, it can help the Congress be in an equally
good position to make and assess policy judgments.
Two Fundamental Issues
The Budget and Accounting Act gives the Comptroller General
the authority to require the executive agencies to give him "such infor-
mation . . . as he may from time to time require.""" Early in the
history of that Act, the Attorney General conceded that the Comp-
troller General may determine how much and what type of information
he requires. 60 Subsequent administrations, however, have not acted
as though that is in fact the law.
The first line of resistance came on the theory that the Comp-
troller General's authority to require information was no broader than
his power to settle accounts. For example, in connection with an
audit of certain real estate transactions, the auditors asked to see ab-
stracts of title and other documents relating to the property interests
purchased. The Attorney General has passed on the validity of the ti-
tles and asserted that the Comptroller General had no authority to sec-
ond-guess him.26 5
The Attorney General's position on the GAO's settlement au-
thority is consistent with the view taken in this article. It does not
follow, however, that the right of the GAO to acquire information is
likewise limited. Criticism of executive action is the GAO's mandate
even if countermanding such action is not. When the GAO's audits
were wholly transactional, the Attorney General's position may have
had arguable merit. Under the system of comprehensive audits, it is
intolerable.
Secondly, some agencies take the position that the GAO is entitled
to see significantly less information than a member of Congress would
be entitled to see. The tripartite structure of our government, the argu-
ment runs, raises certain inherent obligations in the Executive to be
open with Congress itself. The General Accounting Office, on the
other hand, is said to be a mere subsidiary agency whose rights are
263. 31 U.S.C. § 54 (1970).
264. 34 Op. ATr'y GEN. 446 (1925).
265. 37 Op. ATr'y GEN. 95 (1933). A close modem analogy is the dispute
between the Emergency Loan Guarantee Board and the Comptroller General discussed
at text accompanying notes 286-87 infra. The GAO there wants to confirm that
security deemed acceptable to the Board to support the l.oan to ockldeed Aircraft
Company is in fact sUfficient.
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strictly limited by the enabling statute. 266
The scope of the GAO's specific investigative authority is not
altogether clear. On the one hand, the GAO is given specific man-
dates to report on matters of sweeping concern. For example, section
312(a) of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 provides, "The
Comptroller General shall investigate, at the seat of the government
or elsewhere, all matters relating to the receipt, disbursement, and ap-
plication of public funds . . 267 Section 206 of the Legislative Reor-
ganization Act of 1946 further directs him to "make an expenditure
analysis of each agency in the executive branch . . . which . . . will
enable Congress to determine whether public funds have been eco-
nomically and efficiently administered and expended. ... 2 In
1970 the responsibility of the GAO was even further expanded by Con-
gress' direction to "review and analyze the results of Government pro-
grams and activities carried on under existing law, including the mak-
ing of cost benefit studies."26 9
Although the Comptroller General is given these broad duties,
however, only one section imposes a duty on the executive agencies
to cooperate with the GAO. Section 313 of the 1931 Act requires
the agencies to supply
such information regarding the powers, duties, activities, organi-
zation, financial transactions, and methods of business of their
respective offices as he [the Comptroller General] may from time
to time require of them; and [GAO employees] ...shall, for the
purpose of securing such information, have access to and the right
to examine any books, documents, papers, or records of any such
department. 2
70
Section 313 is arguably less broad than it first appears. First, the
access to books and records could be said to be onl3 to discover infor-
mation in the categories enumerated. Of those categories, "powers,"
"duties," and "organization" are public information and raise no par-
ticular issues of disclosure. "Financial transactions" and "methods of
business" are likewise the classic stuff of auditors. Only the power
to investigate agency "activities" is left as the basis for GAO compre-
hensive reviews. It can be argued that Congress would not have
266. A specific distinction, for example, is drawn by Department of Defense Di-
rective 7650.1, at 3-4 (July 9, 1958).
267. 31 U.S.C. § 53(a) (1970).
268. 31 U.S.C. § 60 (1970).
269. 31 U.S.C. § 1154 (1970).
270. 31 U.S.C. § 54 (1970).
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buried such a potentially sweeping grant of investigative authority
among a series of relatively ordinary and obvious powers.
In response to such arguments, the General Accounting Office
has suggested that, quite apart from section 313, each new directive
to report implies a new correlative investigating authority.2 71 Fur-
thermore, in the floor debates on the Budget and Accounting Act of
1921 Congressman Good expressly explained that the reference to
"application" of funds in section 312272 was intended to permit in-
vestigation of agency efficiency as distinguished from financial integ-
rity.273 In addition, if the issue of GAO authority is directly posed, a
congressional committee can request the information and turn it over
to the GAO.
-2 7 4
The ambiguity of GAO authority, however, leaves room for agency
evasion where none should be possible.275 Whatever one thinks of the
Comptroller General's proper role in disputes, bid protests, or the set-
tlement of accounts, his ability to ferret out information is essential.
To avoid the ambiguity and to reiterate that the GAO is ttly a staff
arm of Congress, any new statute dealing with GAO responsibilities
and power should expressly give the GAO the authority to compel pro-
duction of any and all information that any individual congressman
or committee of Congress could compel.
Some Hard, Concrete Issues
Describing GAO authority as co-equal with that of Congress gives
a general measure of proper GAO authority, but it does not decide
the concrete cases. The GAO has met and may be expected to con-
tinue to meet resistance to its having "ready access to uncensored files"
of an agency.
27 6
271. Hearings on Defense Production Act Amendments-1972 Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 51-59 (1972).
272. 31 U.S.C. § 53 (1970).
273. 58 CoNG. REc. 7292-93 (1919) (colloquy with Congressman Luce).
274. Congress' authority to compel information is codified in 2 U.S.C. §§ 190b
(a), 192 (1970). The specific dimensions of Congress' inherent investigative power is
beyond the scope of this article. See McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927);
2 ROBmRTsoN, T"IALs OF AARON BuRR 533-36 (1809); cf. United States v. Reynolds,
345 U.S. 1 (1953); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
275. Some of the most vigorous resistance to GAO review has come, perhaps sur-
prisingly, from the Internal Revenue Service. The issues apparently do not center on
disclosure of individual tax returns; that would indeed raise issues of confidentiality.
Instead the IRS seems to take the position that the GAO lacks explicit authority to
monitor its methods of operation; see 1972 COMP. GEN. ANN. REP. 11, 16, 115.
276. The phrase is from an unpublished letter from Deputy Secretary of Defense
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The most obvious-and most extreme-basis for resistance is that
of executive privilege. Many words have been spent in analysis of that
concept. None have identified a specific constitutional basis for it, but
there are unquestionably many cases in which Presidents have asserted
the "privilege" and gotten away with it. One Attorney General has
not unconvincingly argued that conversations between the President
and his advisors should be as privileged from congressional investiga-
tions as conferences between Justices of the United States Supreme
Court.17 7  Most writers argue, however, that the issues are completely
different and that the executive has no privilege at all. s
The Watergate investigation has brought the issue to public at-
tention once again, but in the long run executive privilege is unlikely
to be a major barrier to GAO investigation. Presidents Kennedy, John-
son, and Nixon have decreed that the privilege may be invoked only
by them personally.279  As presidential staffs have grown in recent
Paul Nitze to Comptroller General Staats, dated November 16, 1967, part of an ex-
change they had over the degree of appropriate GAO access to Inspector General re-
ports.
277. Hearings on the Power of the President to Withhold Information From the
Congress Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 44 (1958) (testimony of Attorney General
Rogers). It should be remembered that at the time this was an appealing position to
many since the most probing Congressional investigator of recent years had been
Senator Joseph McCarthy. See also Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on Gov't Operations on United States Gov't Information Policies and Prac-
tices-The Pentagon Papers, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 358-90, 780-97 (1971) (testimony of
Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist).
278. See HOUSE COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, THE RIGHT OF CONGRESS TO
OBTAIN INFORMATION FROM THE EXECUTIVE AND FROM OTHER AGENCIES OF THE FEDERAL
GOV'T, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956); 118 CONG. REC. E579698 (daily ed. May 25, 1972)
(statement of Raoul Berger); Berger, Executive Privilege v. Congressional Inquiry,
12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1043 (1965). For middle ground positions, see Soucie v. David,
448 F.2d 1067, 1071-72 & nn.8-12 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Bazelon, C.J.); id. at 1080-85
(Wilkey, J., concurring); Bishop, The Executive's Right of Privacy: An Unresolved
Constitutional Question, 66 YALE L.J. 477 (1957); Developments in the Law-The
National Security Interest and Civil Liberties, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1130, 1217-19 (1972).
279. President Eisenhower construed the doctrine broadly to prohibit all testimony
as to "conversations or communications, or any documents or reproductions concerning
... advice [from one "employee of the Executive Branch" to another on "official
matters"]." 1954 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: DWIGHT
D. EISENHOWER 483-84.
President Kennedy changed the policy in a letter to the Foreign Operations and
Government Information Subcommittee of the House Government Operations Commit-
tee, dated March 7, 1962, saying: "Executive privilege can be invoked only by the
President and will not be used without specific Presidential approval." President
Johnson reaffirmed this policy by a letter to the same committee, April 2, 1965.
President Nixon concurred in a memorandum to the executive agencies on March 24,
1969, sent to the House committee on April 7, 1969. HOUSE COMM. ON GOV'T OP-
ERATIONS, ACCESS BY TnE CONGRESS TO INFORMATION FROM REGULATORY BOARDS AND
CoMIIsSIoNS, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 39-41 (1970).
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years, the number of subjects and incidents arguably privileged has
also grown. It still remains true, however, that assertion of executive
privilege is comparatively rare.2 "
The GAO has traditionally been most often involved with execu-
tive agencies other than the White House staff.281  The more sensitive
the issues become that the GAO investigates, the greater the likelihood
that executive privilege may be invoked. If invoked, it will take more
congressional protest than heretofore mustered to obtain the secreted
information. The real problems for the GAO, however, are likely to
continue to come up in more mundane guises that some may describe
as raising issues of "separation of powers" but which are really very
practical problems of making government work.
Duplicate Material: Inspector General Reports
First, if basic information is available in two forms, can the GAO
have both or only the one the agency wishes? The best example of
this issue is the continuing battle over GAO access to reports of the
Inspectors General of the military services. 82 Audit reports of the
departments contain most of the information the GAO needs for tra-
ditional financial review. Inspector General reports, on the other hand,
are usually more candid and contain more specific recommendations
as to both personalities and policies.
President Nixon reaffirmed this policy on March 12, 1973 in a published policy
statement. 31 CONG. QuAR. WEEKLY REP. 608-09 (1973) (text of statement).
The statement was stimulated by the efforts of two Congressional committees to have
White House Counsel John W. Dean HI testify about his involvement, if any, in at-
tempts to "bug" the Watergate headquarters of the Democratic National Committee
during the 1972 Presidential campaign. See 31 CoNG. QuAR. WEEKLY REP. 599
(1973). The doctrine has since been further invoked in the Watergate investigation,
particularly over the issue of disclosure of tape recordings of Presidential conversa-
tions. See, e.g., 31 CoNG. QuAR. WEEKLY RP. 1935, 2048 (1973) (text of Presidential
letters invoking privilege).
280. One may question on a number of grounds the propriety of using Executive
Privilege in the Watergate case. By President Nixon's count, he relied on Executive
Privilege only three times in his first term, however, and while there is dispute about
the exact number, it would be a mistake to allow headlines of the moment to put the
"problem" of Executive Privilege in a distorted perspective. See CoNG. QuAR. WEEKLY
REP. 295 (1973).
281. But see "White House Bar on G.A.O. Inquiry Charged by Aspin", New York
Times, Nov. 20, 1972, at 18, col. 4 (midwest edition). The story reports the White
House has refused to let GAO auditors determine whether the total number of White
House employees exceeded ceilings set by Congress. At this writing the matter appar-
ently is still unresolved.
282. See Comp. Gen. Dec. No. B-107366, B-134192 (June 5, 1967) (unpub-
lished); Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations,
Availability of Information from Federal Departments and Agencies, 85th Cong., 1st
Sess. pt. 16, at 3627-707 (1958).
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For obvious reasons, the GAO wants the latter reports-or pref-
erably both-particularly when it takes a comprehensive look at an
agency's practices. To the armed services, however, Inspector Gen-
eral reports constitute candid advice to a commander for him to use
to improve his command. If they are potentially open to public in-
spection, the reasoning goes, criticism will be muted and problems min-
imized. 2
83
One can imagine situations in which Inspector General reports
would not be essential for the GAO to do a complete report and as to
which the armed services are probably right in saying that they con-
tain little new information. The practical problem in forcing the GAO
to show specific need for a document, however, is that the agencies
will rarely find the need sufficient and then the GAO must use some
other remedy if any is available. The services have offered summaries
of the reports as a substitute,284 but summaries can be genuinely mis-
leading and may even be worse than nothing at all.
It does seem that if the requirement of disclosure to the GAO
truly meant the likelihood of candor to no one, the "victory" would not
be worth the cost. So far, however, no one has come up with any
concrete evidence to show the likelihood of a loss of candor, and one
suspects that it is an argument trotted out when no legitimate conten-
tions are left. The GAO should have access to all relevant documents
on a question, whether or not some appear to the executive agency to
be duplicative.
Underlying Working Papers: PPB Documents
Another area in which resistance has been met is the supplying
of information underlying programming, planning, and budgeting doc-
uments. In preparing a budget, the Defense Department and now
many other executive agencies use elaborate cost-benefit analyses to
select among programs and determine the effectivensss of spending
alternatives. The decisionmaking process can thus be recreated in
some detail, and it would obviously be in Congress' interest to have
such analyses to know the bases of the budget data it is receiving.
283. Letter from Paul Nitze, supra note 276; Hearings, supra note 282, at 3660-63,
3670-72, 3676-77. A good analogy here is (1) FBI reports which the executive has
long refused to supply, e.g., 40 Op. ATr'Y GEN. 45 (1941) (opinion of Attorney Gen-
eral Jackson), and (2) personnel records which are concealed to protect the privacy of
government employees as much as to encourage candor in reporting.
284. Hearings, supra note 282 at 3575-76.
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Now, however, the Executive determines which such reports Congress
will receive. Again, the theory is that foolish proposals should be
freely made and rejected. Officials would be less willing to be candid,
it is argued, if they knew their true feelings and assessments might later
be made public.
Such an attitude on the part of executive agencies is understand-
able and practical, but it seems that within limits Congress should
protect its interest in obtaining essential information. Here there are
no practical alternative sources of this information. Further, much of
this data is absolutely essential if GAO is to help Congress determine
the effectiveness of programs and the priorities of an Administration.
There is a hard-to-define level of preliminary working drafts of docu-
ments before which the GAO should not inquire. Plans do change,
foolish suggestions are made and dismissed, and early studies can be
more misleading than helpful. Agencies and officials should be free to
make candid preliminary analyses without being called to account for
them later. However, late-stage documents presenting alternative
courses of action and support for each should be open for review.
They do not "belong" to the executive agencies. They were paid for
by the public and should be available to the agency reviewing the pro-





The GAO has m&t the most resistance when it has sought to ac-
quire information prior to the time decisions are made. From the con-
gressional perspective, the information is absolutely essential at this
stage if Congress is to avoid being presented with a fait accompli.
From the Executive's point of view, however, this is a direct threat
to its authority to make decisions.
For example, in 1971 Congress established the Emergency Loan
Guarantee Board in the Treasury Department,"' which had as its first
285. See generally Mink v. EPA, 464 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1972), rev'd, 93 S. Ct.
827 (1973) (Congressmen seek secret reports on underground nuclear tests); Soucie v.
David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (citizens granted access to study of SST).
In fairness, it should be said that Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard
went a long way toward making such documents available in his unpublished mem-
orandum for the Secretaries of the Military Departments dated August 27, 1969. De-
velopment Concept Papers, Program Change Decisions, Technical Development Plans,
Selected Acquisition Reports, Cost Information Reports, and, after the budget is sub-
mitted, Program Budget Decisions, were all made available for GAO review on a regu-
lar basis.
286. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1841-52 (Supp. 1971).
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function the supervision and administration of the 250 million dollar
loan given to Lockheed Aircraft Company in connection with the C-SA
cost overrun. The GAO has sought to see the data submitted by
Lockheed to justify the sums it has received and to document the
strength of the security supporting the Government loan.287 The Board
has flatly denied the GAO's request for such information. It will file
its public reports, appropriately documented, at the times required by
law, it says. It has refused, however, to let the GAO look over its
shoulder in the interim.
Another instance of conflict can occur when the Government is
negotiating with a contractor and the GAO wants to know the terms
of the offers made by each side so as to be able to comment on the
wisdom of the proposed settlement. The Executive regularly declines
to supply the information prior to settlement on the ground that the
information might leak out and might compromise the Government's
negotiating position.
Yet a third example of the resistance to supplying advance infor-
mation is the policy of not submitting budget data to the GAO before
the President formally submits the budget to Congress. If the GAO
were given tentative information somewhat earlier, it could prepare
commentary and criticism of the President's proposals. Even conced-
ing-and perhaps fearing-that it might be helpful to Congress, how-
ever, Presidents have not allowed such access. If "leaks" are to be
made, Presidents have wanted to make them for their own purposes.
The denial of advance information to the GAO or to Congress
presents a difficult question. It can be argued persuasively that it is
proper for Congress or the GAO to criticize a policy that has been
adopted-or to say the wrong alternative was selected-but that it is
improper to subject the Executive to unsolicited advice during the time
287. The GAO says it wants to determine how the Board has placed values on
pledged security, why the Board waived the prohibition on Lockheed's making pay-
ments on other loans, how the Board decided Lockheed's management was not to
blame for the failure to get other credit, and whether the Board has received required
financial statements, certifications, and plans from Lockheed. Hearings before the
Subcomm. on Production & Stabilization of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing &
Urban Affairs, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 51-59 (1972). The General Counsel of the
Treasury, Samuel R. Pierce, Jr. on the other hand, has stated that "all credits and re-
lated agreements" have been made available to the GAO and that only "internal rec-
ords of the board relating to its decision-making processes" have been withheld.
N.Y. Times, May 21, 1972, § 4, at 14, col. 3. The GAO reports that its "impasse"




decisions are being made. Indeed, it seems inevitable that if given ad-
vance information, the GAO would find itself advocating particular
policies rather than only reporting them.
Total control over timing release of information, however, would
seem to give the President more power than is tolerable today. The
budget is now so large and the issues so complex that few appropria-
tions can even be considered between January, when the budget is
submitted, and June 30, the end of the fiscal year. Many appropria-
tions are hardly enacted before the budget is presented the following
year.288 If Congress is to understand fully the issues underlying the
budget and if it is to have time to work its will, the GAO should have
access to budget data in advance of the budget message. If some of
the information leaks to the public-and it may-that seems a neces-
sary price to pay.2 9
Foreign Affairs
What may seem a unique set of problems arises in the area of
foreign affairs. Vietnam has increased the intensity of the debate but
the issues are broader than that. Should the GAO, for example, have
access to documents from foreign governments which might not ap-
prove of release? Should it have access to candid Defense Department
military assessments of the combat effectiveness of our allies' forces?
May it examine memoranda relating to the nation's position in pend-
ing or completed negotiations? All these issues have arisen and have
proved hard to resolve. 90
288. The Department of Defense appropriation for fiscal year 1972 was not passed
until December 15, 1971. Act of Dec. 18, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-204, 85 Stat. 716.
That same year the basic appropriation for HEW, the Department of Labor and related
agencies was passed on August 6, 1971. Act of Aug. 10, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-80,
85 Stat. 285. This appropriation was supplemented by the Act of Dec. 15, 1971,
Pub. L. No. 11955, 85 Stat. 627.
Last year was an election year so Congress completed work somewhat sooner.
The Defense appropriation was passed Oct. 13, 1972. Pub. L. No. 92-570, 86 Stat.
1184. However, the HEW appropriation passed on Oct. 14 was pocket vetoed by Pres-
ident Nixon. Thus the Department of Health, Education and Welfare was funded by
continuing resolution for all of fiscal year 1973. See 1972 CONG. QUARTERLY AL-
MANAC 865; 31 CONG. QUARTERLY WEEKLY REP. 413 (Feb. 24, 1973).
289. S. 1214, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), introduced by Senator Muskie and
Senator Ervin, would require that each agency's budget request be sent to Congress,
with supporting documents, at the time it goes to the Office of Management and
Budget or the President. This would help give Congress the information it needs
without adding an additional burdensome reporting requirement on the agencies.
290. Memorandum accompanying Comp. Gen. Dec. No. B-163582 (Sept. 10,
1971) (unpublished). In addition, for example, the GAO complained of being denied
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It seems, however, that the fact that foreign affairs is involved
should not change the principles already discussed. Congress has an
interest in many international questions on which it is asked to make
appropriations and perhaps support the commitment of troops. It
should be entitled to the facts necessary to make those important judg-
ments. Security classifications are no barrier to GAO review since
GAO personnel have security clearances and already review countless
highly classified projects. Negotiation memoranda as to foreign af-
fairs should be no more and no less available to the GAO and Congress
than memoranda on negotiations with domestic contractors, i.e. they
should be available after the fact but not before. In only one area
does absolute confidentiality seem in order. Foreign governments must,
it seems, have the confidence that their own communiques and views
will not be released against their will.291 The marginal gain in con-
gressional insights provided by those messages, while perhaps impor-
tant in a few cases, seems outweighed by this essential consideration.
A Proposed Remedy for Nondisclosure
But suppose the executive does not turn information over even in
situations in which Congress is entitled to it? Today the GAO is ba-
sically limited to cajoling and complaining in its effort to get an agency
to change its mind. It could, of course, ask a committee of Congress
to subpoena the information and then have the recalcitrant official
prosecuted for contempt of Congress.29 But criminal actions are a
crude and extreme way to test the legality of sincerely held executive
opposition to disclosure.
Senator Fulbright has proposed in Senate Bill 858 that all funds
be automatically cut off for any executive agency that fails to turn
over all information that the GAO requests. Only the President's per-
sonal invocation of executive privilege would save the agency from this
sanction.293  There are significant benefits to this approach. It would
access to Thai and Korean bases in Vietnam where they wished to study use of
American furnished equipment Id. at 15-17. Similarly, the State Department denied
the GAO access to U.S. records relating to occupation costs in Berlin. Id. at 17-18.
291. Cf. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728 (1971) (Stew-
art, J., concurring): "Other nations can hardly deal with this Nation in an atmosphere
of mutual trust unless they can be assured that their confidences will be kept."
292. The issue could also get to court if Congress ordered its Sergeant-at-Arms to
arrest the official, and he in turn applied for a writ of habeas corpus. Bishop, supra
note 278, at 484-85.
293. S. 858, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). The precedent for this fund cut-off is
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be basically self-executing. The GAO would ask, and if the agency
refused, in forty days the funds would dry up. It would be a powerful
club and might make agency resistance a thing of the past. It seems,
however, that the proposal constitutes legislative overkill. Presum-
ably, even Senator Fulbright would agree that if a court held the non-
disclosure proper, the cut-off of funds should not occur, yet the pro-
posed law would leave a period of uncertainty pending determination
by a court. Contractors performing during that period would pre-
sumably go unpaid or cease performance completely. 9 4 Furthermore,
even if the cut-off were held proper, the beneficiaries of the program
would be the ones to suffer for the resistance of the agency. It seems
that people who need housing, for example, should not do without be-
cause HUD withholds information from Congress.
A better approach would seem to empower the GAO to seek a
court order compelling production of particular types of agency rec-
ords. In this way the propriety of the agency action could be deter-
mined prior to imposition of any sanction. As suggested in the first
part of this article,2 90 the Comptroller General's own attorneys should
represent him in any such enforcement action since the Justice De-
partment will likely side with the executive agency. There is always
the remote possibility that an agency would defy a court order in such
a case and a recalcitrant official be put in jail, but it seems unlikely
this would often happen. The real battle is usually between the will of
the agency and the will of the Comptroller General. Am impartial
judicial ruling in a case presented fairly for both sides will almost
surely be respected.29 "
Acquiring Information Directly from Contractors
Of course much of the information sought by the GAO has to
do with programs under Government contract. A tempting way around
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, § 634(c), 22 U.S.C. § 2394(c) (1970). How-
ever S. 858 goes farther and would give Congress authority to determine the validity of
the President's invocation of the privilege.
294. Cf. Graybar Elec. Co. v. United States, 90 Ct. Cl. 232 (1940), discussed at
text accompanying notes 193-95 supra.
295. Text accompanying notes 88-89 supra.
296. A bill along these lines has recently been proposed by the GAO and intro-
duced by Senator Ervin. S. 2049, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). Title IV of that bill
would allow the Comptroller General to get a court order compelling production. If
the agency refused, the appropriation for that agency would be cut off unless Congress
by resolution of either House voted not to have the cut-off occur. See text accom-
panying notes 311-13 infra.
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the problems in acquiring information directly from executive agen-
cies is that of going to the contractors instead. Not surprisingly, con-
tractors resist any attempt to give the GAO unlimited access to their
books and records. They have no constitutional protection against
disclosure, but they have a lot to lose.
First, some cost data is extremely sensitive and in the hands of
their competitors would affect the firms' commercial positions. Next,
the Government might use the data gathered to measure efficiency and
thereafter use it against the contractor in renegotiation or in a suit al-
leging defective cost and pricing data.207 Thirdly, there may be costs
involved in generating data or making it available. In a fixed price
contract, the government never offers to pay these costs, and they may
be only partly recoverable on later contracts.
298
The compromise of these conflicting pressures has been 10 U.S.C.
§ 2313(b), which provides that each negotiated contract with a mili-
tary department, the Coast Guard, or NASA
shall provide that the Comptroller General and his representative
are entitled, until the expiration of three years after final pay-
ment, to examine any books, documents, papers, or records of the
contractor, or any of his subcontractors, that directly pertain to,
and involve transactions relating to, the contract or subcontract. 200
The GAO has audited contractors pursuant to this section with-
out major incident, save for one case, Hewlett-Packard Co. v. United
297. The Renegotiation Act, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 1211-33 (1970), provides for re-
covery of excessive profits. The Truth in Negotiations Law, 10 U.S.C. § 2306(f)
(1970), requires the contractor to supply cost data to justify his proposed price. Inac-
curate data can be the basis for a later price reduction.
298. If anything, they would be recoverable as general overhead costs of the
contractor and would be borne by the Government on negotiated contracts in the pro-
portion such contracts bear to the contractor's total business during the year.
As to these and other problems from the contractor's perspective, see MAPI
STUDY 82-111, 150-64.
299. 10 U.S.C. § 2313(b) (1970). The comparable provision for non-defense con-
tracts is 41 U.S.C. § 254(c) (1970).In a disturbing bid protest case, the GAO came very close to asserting the audit
authority extended to advertised procurements as well. IBM was low bidder on a
formally advertised procurement of typewriters. It however refused to comply with
what it said was an illegal requirement that its books be open to inspection by the pur-
chasing agency and the GAO. When the agency ruled IBM nonresponsive, it pro-
tested to the GAO. Nothing in the legislative history of § 254(c) prohibited inserting
the requirement in more contracts than the statute required, the GAO said. In the
particular case, the contract included some repair and services work to be done on a
cost and hourly basis, so the case may not say every attempt to put the requirement in
an advertised contract is proper. As argued further herein, however, firms have a
legitimate concern for business privacy that should be infringed only where genuinely
necessary. Comp. Gen. Dec. No. B-169589 (Nov. 25, 1970) (unpublished).
1362 [Vol. 51
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
States. 00 In that case the contractor had been awarded four negoti-
ated fixed-price contracts for electronic testing equipment carried in
Hewlett-Packard's regularly published commercial catalogue. GAO in-
vestigators were shown all papers relating directly to these contracts,
but the contractor balked at supplying other information "necessary
[for the GAO] to review the reasonableness of the contract prices."3 '
Hewlett-Packard argued that the basis of its pricing was none of
the Government's business. Because the contracts were for "commer-
cial articles," neither the Renegotiation Act nor any other statute would
have allowed the Government a price reduction if the price were "ex-
cessive. ' 30 2  The GAO's right of access is limited to situations it can
do something about, the contractor argued. The GAO and ultimately
the court of appeals, however, disagreed. The court said:
[T]he word "contract," as used in this statute is intended to
[embrace] not only the specific terms and conditions of the agree-
ment, but also the general subject matter ...
Production costs directly pertain to that subject matter, be-
cause if out of line with the contract pride, the contract may have
been an inappropriate means of meeting this particular procure-
ment need of the Government. While this appraisal could not af-
fect these particular contracts, it could lead to the use of other
methods of meeting future procurement needs. 30 3
A moment's reflection suggests that Hewlett-Packard grants extra-
ordinary authority to the GAO. No longer is it limited to assessing
performance of government contracting officials relative to the facts
they had access to. Now it can also criticize them based on informa-
tion they could not have known. Of course, this is not unreasonable
if one sees the purpose of the statute as being to help educate Congress
about procurement generally. If this were the purpose, however, Con-
gress should have permitted audit of formally advertised contracts as
well. Hewlett-Packard's testing of the GAO's authority in court does
not seem to have been inherently unreasonable.
The GAO was frustrated by the contractor's resistance, however.
The audit began in 1962, and the case was not resolved until 1968.
300. 385 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 988 (1968).
301. 385 F.2d at 1015.
302. The Renegotiation Act has an exception for standard commercial articles.
50 U.S.C. App. § 1212(e) (1970). The Truth in Negotiations Act excepts "catalog
or market prices of commercial items sold in substantial quantities to the general
public." 10 U.S.C. § 2306(f) (1970).
303. 385 F.2d at 1016.
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As a result, the Comptroller General has sought the authority to sub-
poena information rather than being forced to proceed by injunction
as in Hewlett-Packard. The importance of this issue is such that some
have suggested that contractor resistance to this subpoena authority
is what is holding up passage of Senator Ribicoff's omnibus bill for
updating GAO's authority in a variety of areas. 04
It is unfortunate to hold up needed change over such an issue.
The addition of subpoena authority would seem unlikely to make the
GAO's acquisition of information significantly easier. If one served
with an administrative agency's subpoena refuses to turn over the re-
quired information, the agency must seek judicial enforcement. In
any such proceeding the contractor can argue that the subpoena re-
quests information that the agency is not entitled to have.805
The GAO presumably wants the benefit of the rule that the court
shall compel production of subpoenaed information that is not "plainly
incompetent or irrelevant to any lawful purpose" of the agency. 00
The court in Hewlett-Packard, however, took virtually an identical
approach. There seems no necessary reason to believe Hewlett-Packard
would have been resolved significantly faster or that more information
would have been available under a subpoena process than under the
present system. The GAO must come to recognize that contractors
will have the right to make substantive objections to GAO examination
of their books and records under any procedure and that that may
take some time.
Instead of insisting on addition of this minor procedural refine-
ment, the GAO should concentrate on legislative clarification of the
documents it is entitled to see. The GAO's authority, as defined by
Hewlett-Packard, is probably already excessive. The GAO was origi-
nally created to audit and review the executive agencies, not private
contractors. The same argument that would justify a GAO audit in
Hewlett-Packard would justify an audit of contractors doing no gov-
304. The bill is S. 468, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), the Budget & Accounting
Improvement Act, which the GAO has helped draft. The comments as to what is
holding up passage were made by persons following progress of the Bill who have spe-
cifically asked not to be quoted by name. A virtually identical subpoena provision is
contained in S. 2049, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 201-02 (1973).
305. E.g., Shasta Minerals & Chem. Co. v. SEC, 328 F.2d 285 (10th Cir. 1964);
SEC v. Wall St. Transcript Co., 294 F. Supp. 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); FCC v. Cohn,
154 F. Supp. 899 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
306. Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501, 509 (1943); United States
v. Feaster, 376 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1967); FTC v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co.,
304 F. Supp. 1254 (D.D.C. 1969).
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ernment business at all. The information might in some way be use-
ful, if only for purposes of comparison with government contractors.
To the extent that the GAO audits matters the contracting agency itself
has no right to audit or determine, the GAO is infringing upon an area
of legitimate business privacy for comparatively little incremental gain
in important information.
CONCLUSION
The attempt by Congress to reassert a major role in policy plan-
ning may be one of the most important political developmens of the
next decade. The Vietnam War initiated a feeling of urgency about the
issue. Having the Presidency and the Congress controlled by different
parties will likely sustain the concern of Congress about its role.
The General Accounting Office can be one of Congress' most ef-
fective instruments for making its influence felt. No other existing
institution is equipped to conduct the long-term, in-depth surveillance
and analyses necessary to let Congress know the issues and alternatives
before it.30 7  This article has suggested, first, that the GAO should
be given additional authority to help it accomplish this fundamental
task, and, second, that it should withdraw from activities-perhaps
important in the 1920's-that bear little relation to the problems of
Congress today.
Three bills before the 93rd Congress are specifically designed to
enhance the GAO effectiveness. [They] encompass several of the sug-
gestions made herein. Senator Ribicoff has proposed in his Budget
and Accounting Improvement Act of 197308s that the GAO's role and
staff be increased so as to make major studies requested by committees
or members of Congress, including "reviews of legislative proposals
and alernatives to such proposals. ' 30 9  Congressman Reid's Congres-
307. The GAO has made and continues to make internal changes necessary to
be able to analyze complex programs more intensively. It has gone through several
organizational changes in the past two years. On July 1, 1971, an Office of Policy and
Program Planning was created to give direction to GAO activities. 1971 CoMB. GEN.
ANN. REP. 709. Effective April 1972, three new Assistant Comptroller Generals were
appointed and a reorganization was made "on a Government function and program
basis." THE G.A.O. P~v., Spring 1972, at 64. See also Staats, G.A.O. Auditing in
the Seventies, Thn G.A.O. REv., Spring 1972, at 1.
308. S. 460, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). Many of Senator Ribicoff's proposals
are outgrowths of the Hearings Pursuant to S. Con. Res. 2 Before the Joint Committee
on the Organization of the Congress, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). In the 92d Con-
gress, the bill was S. 1022.
309. S. 460, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (1973), amending 31 U.S.C. § 53 (1970)
to add a new subsection (f) (1). In addition, proposed subsection (h) would require
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sional Oversight Act of 1973310 would go much farther and create an
Office of Budget and Expenditure Oversight within the GAO which
would "analyze the Budget," review the "accuracy of revenue projec-
tions therein" and determine "the extent to which proposed expendi-
tures conform to the legislative proposals of Congress." In addition,
the Reid bill would require the President to get the approval of the
Comptroller General before impounding any appropriation, and would
expressly reaffirm the Comptroller General's authority to determine
the legality of particular expenditures. Senator Ervin has recently
introduced what is apparently the "official" GAO request for new
authority.3 1 It resembles most the Ribicoff bill, but goes far beyond
that bill toward guaranteeing GAO access to information.
As argued herein, it seems essential that Congress give the Comp-
troller General the authority and resources to investigate, criticize, and
evaluate alternatives to any and all Government programs, whether
at the request of a committee or member of Congress or on its own
initiative. Bills go far in that direction. Both the Ervin and Reid
bills would give the GAO basically the same right to compel produc-
tion of information from an executive department that a member of
Congress would have. 2
Congressman Reid also would give the GAO authority to appear
in court to seek an order compelling production of all records it is
entitled to see. Senator Ribicoff, in turn, would give the GAO au-
thority to file suit in federal district court to enjoin any announced or
initiated program of activity which the Comptroller General believes
the GAO to submit regular status reports on major programs, particularly highlighting
cost overruns. Title ]I of the proposed bill would change the name of the General
Accounting Office to the Office of the Comptroller General of the United States. Titles
I and IV propose technical changes in the audit of Government corporations and
other entities. Title V would authorize employment of consultants. Title VI would
give the GAO subpoena power. Title VII would give the GAO authority to enforce
its findings in court. But see Staats, Objectives of the General Accounting Office,
THE GAO REv., Winter 1973, at 2: "It is certainly not the GAO's objective to be-
come the 'think tank' for the Congress on the best solutions to pressing national prob-
lems. Nor is it our job to assess overall national program priorities or budget funding
requirements."
310. H.R. 2403, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
311. S. 2049, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). On the "official" status of the bill,
see FED. CONy. REP. No. 486, June 25, 1973, at A-12.
312. Neither acknowledges, as suggested earlier in this article, that two exceptions
should probably be recognized: (1) executive privilege asserted by the President him-
self, and (2) confidential communications from foreign governments; cf. S. 858, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (Fulbright bill on disclosure of information and executive
privilege). Yet another bill on advance disclosure of budget requests, S. 1214, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), is discussed at note 289 supra.
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to be in violation of federal law. The Ervin bill recognizes, as argued
in this article, that a new law should include both powers. 113 Further,
the GAO should be represented in court by its own attorneys, some-
thing the Ribicoff and Ervin but not the Reid bill recognize.
On the other hand, the Comptroller General should be specifically
prohibited from unilaterally disallowing payments that he believes to
be ",illegal." The Ribicoff and Ervin [bills] seem far preferable to the
Reid bill in this regard. As discussed early in this article, the power
of disallowance is extraordinarily subject to abuse. The GAO reme-
dies surely should be limited to (1) obtaining an injunction against
further spending and (2) referral to the Justice Department of pay-
ments made knowingly or negligently in violation of an unambiguous
statute or court decision.
Finally, none of the bills consider two other issues raised in this
article. 14 As discussed above, the General Accounting Office should
be prohibited from review of board of contract appeals decisions,
whether in favor of the contractor or of the Government. Further, a
new division should be established in the GAO to handle bid protest
cases and develop the procedures necessary to provide bidders with the
due process that has heretofore been lacking.
The proposals made in this article are not the first proposals for
change in the GAO. Just two years after signing the Budget and Ac-
counting Act of 1921, President Harding proposed a return of the
GAO's functions to the Treasury.315 President Hoover also proposed
to return some of its powers to the Treasury316 and President Roosevelt
almost succeeded. 31 7  Later Hoover Commissions renewed the pro-
posals, but all such attempts have failed.
318
313. Senator Ervin's bill is more precise about this procedure. He would have
the Comptroller General file suit in federal district court. The decision there could
be appealed directly to the United States Supreme Court. If an agency failed to com-
ply with a final order to produce, its appropriation would be cut off thirty days after
the Comptroller General decided to invoke that remedy if in the interim neither House
of Congress had passed a resolution not favoring that sanction. S. 2049, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess., § 402 (1973).
314. Two other bills do deal with these issues and incorporate the recommenda-
tions of the Commission on Government Procurement, H.R. 9061, H.R. 9062, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
315. MANSFmLD 279-80; MAPI STuDy 25.
316. MANsFiELD 280-81; MAPI STUDY 26.
317. MANSFmrLD 281-85; MAPI STUDY 26-28. "Mhe .. . legislative record
reads something like an early motion picture serial-including a narrow escape from
sudden death." Id. at 27.
318. MAPI STuDY 28-29. Some of the recommendations of the First Hoover Com-
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The proposals made herein are as extensive as any made before.
Is there any chance, then, of their success? It seems that there is.
All proposals up to now have been proposed and advocated so as to
make Congress a net loser at the expense of the executive. The sug-
gestions here do just the reverse. Any "loss" of GAO authority is
proposed only to focus its attention on the real business of Congress,
the constructive review of Executive programs.
The changes proposed here and in these bills will not of them-
selves restore Congress to parity of power with the executive branch,
but they seem an essential beginning. The real danger seems more
and more to be that Congress will be too sluggish or timid to seize
the initiative. Senator Packwood has been quoted as saying, "Con-
gress really doesn't want power; it's a lot easier around here if there isn't
much responsibility." 319  If that is true, the nation, not just the Con-
gress, will be the loser. Congress is not always right and the President
always wrong, but the health of our system depends on a vigorous
check and balance between the two. Watergate, unfortunate as it has
been for the nation, gives Congress an opportunity almost unique in
history to reassert itself-if it has the will to do so. The General Ac-
counting Office can be an important ally in that process.
mission resulted in the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950, but Congress
did nothing to return any authority to the Executive. See discussion supra at note 32.
319. Hunt, Senate and House Move to Reassert Authority But May Lose Initiative,
Wall St. J., Aug. 3, 1973, at 1, col. 1; cf. 1972-73 Report of the [ABA] Separation of
Powers Committee, 25 ADMIN. L. REV. 351 (1973) (arguing that Congress has abdi-
cated much of its authority by overly broad delegations of power in statutes).
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